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SUZANNAH LINTON*
COMPLETING THE CIRCLE: ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR THE CRIMES OF THE 1971 BANGLADESH
WAR OF LIBERATION
I INTRODUCTION
There aremany policy issues that need to be consideredwhen a country
and its people start to deal with horrors that are 39 years old. The trial
process is a critical part of that, but it is not the only issue to dealwith. It
is essential for Bangladesh to develop a comprehensive, coherent and
principled strategy for dealing with its past. It has not done that yet.
The country is at a critical juncture, and it falls on the government to
seize the opportunity to make the most of a process of accountability.
Any trial process, especially of such a charged matter as the crimes of
the liberation war, must meet international standards in order to have
any legitimacy, honour the victims and provide some kind of redress to
survivors. But that is not enough. After 38 years, the damage to the
fabric of society is immense, and a properly conducted trial process
opens a window of opportunity to repair some of the harm. The gov-
ernment must respond appropriately.
My purpose in this paper is not to address the important wider
issues of how Bangladesh should deal with the legacies of its past.
I wish to focus on the key legal issues arising out of the Awami
League government’s avowed determination to investigate, prosecute
and punish alleged criminals under the International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended. And, due to constraints of space,
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my aim can only be to draw as many of the noteworthy issues to
attention as possible, with some observations in the hope that this can
contribute to assisting and improving the process that appears to be
moving forward in Bangladesh. Other papers in this Special Edition
fill in critical areas that need closer attention. This is, as will be seen
from this study, a process that is in need of great assistance from the
international community.
II BACKGROUND
Given how little is known internationally about this situation today, I
must begin this paper with some context. The tragedy of Bangladesh
in 1971 was closely chronicled in the international and domestic
media at the time, and there have been many academic studies par-
ticularly in the three affected countries. The densely populated ter-
ritory on the Ganges delta became a medium through which the Cold
War superpowers flexed their muscles. International lawyers also
followed the situation closely, for it concerned not just important
issues of accountability for international crimes, but also secession
and self-determination, humanitarian intervention, self-defence in
international law, assistance to and exercise of control over armed
groups engaged in a struggle for secession in a neighbouring country,
recognition of States and internationalisation of a non-international
armed conflict. In fact, the creation of the State of Bangladesh out of
a secessionist breakaway from a repressive State is the most pertinent
example to be cited in favour of the Kosovar Declaration of Inde-
pendence. When the war was over, there was even a case brought to
the International Court of Justice by Pakistan in relation to the
Pakistani prisoners-of-war being held by the Indian Army, which is
discussed later in this section.
Today’s Bangladesh was once part of Pakistan, which was carved
out of British India at partition in 1947.1 It was known as East
1 Many laws that applied in Pakistan in 1971, including the criminal and criminal
procedure codes, have continued to apply in the state of Bangladesh. In 1971, there
were a number of applicable treaties and conventions, specifically the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4 1969) [hereinafter CERD]; the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (including the Convention (I) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
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Pakistan. East Pakistan came to be an unhappy member of the
Pakistani family. Its grievances included perceived domination by
the West, racial and linguistic discrimination and exploitation.2 The
leaders of East Pakistan began asking for greater autonomy within
Pakistan. This was rejected. The tensions were exacerbated when, in
1970, the West failed to respond appropriately to the most devas-
tating cyclone ever to hit the East. In the elections of 1970, the
Awami League won a landslide victory (167 of the 169 allotted to
East Pakistan) and captured the majority of seats in the Pakistani
National Assembly. The Awami League was expecting to head the
new government. But, President Yahya Khan then cancelled the
Parliamentary session that he had earlier delayed in calling. Over in
East Pakistan, the Awami League took to the streets of Dhaka in a
5 day general strike (hartal). They ‘‘virtually took over the adminis-
tration in East Pakistan’’.3 Sheikh Mujibur’s historic speech on 7
March 1971 is regarded by Bangladeshis with the same respect as
President Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg address.4 There were some
skirmishes between the security forces and the Awami League sup-
porters before 25 March 1971, and serious attacks against the Bihari
community in Chittagong,5 but in general the Awami League actions
Footnote 1 continued
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
81; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21 1950).
In 1971, Pakistan was a party to the Genocide Convention (ratified on Oct. 12, 1957);
CERD (ratified on Sep. 21, 1966) and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (all
ratified on Jun. 12, 1951). India was a party to the Genocide Convention (ratified on
Aug. 27, 1959); CERD (ratified on Dec. 3, 1968) and also the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 (all ratified on Nov. 9, 1950).
2 See WILLEM VAN SCHENDEL, A HISTORY OF BANGLADESH, Ch. 11–12 (2009).
3
MAHMUDUL ISLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF BANGLADESH 12 (2nd ed., 2002).
4 Email from M. Shah Alam, Professor of the University of Chittagong (Sept.
5, 2009) (on file with the author). My thanks to Professor Alam for this insight.
5 The persons referred to as ‘‘Biharis’’ do not necessarily come from the Indian
state of Bihar. They were Indian Moslems who migrated to Bangladesh during the
Partition of India.
See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN PAKISTAN: A LEGAL STUDY
BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 9 (1972) [herein-
after ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT] (‘‘Owing to the language difference, assimilation
proved difficult in areas where there were large concentrations of Biharis and hos-
tility and resentment developed between the Biharis and Bangladeshis’’). They were
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were not violent and there does not seem to have been a Common
Article 3 situation, unlike after that date.6
There seems little doubt that the human and material cost of the
armed conflict that was shortly to follow were enormous. It is difficult
to obtain non-partisan and scientifically reliable figures for this
conflict. An oft cited international account, derived from Bangladeshi
sources, is that a possible three million people lost their lives, ten
million fled across the border to India and 200,000–400,000 women
were raped, leading to approximately 25,000 pregnancies.7 The sexual
violence deployed in the Bangladesh war appears to have been used
as a weapon of war, and has been likened to the World War II
Japanese rapes in Nanjing. According to Brownmiller:
200,000, 300,000 or possibly 400,000 women (three sets of statistics have been variously
quoted) were raped. Eighty percent of the raped women were Moslems, reflecting the
population of Bangladesh, but Hindu and Christian women were not exempt…. Hit-
and-run rapeof largenumbers ofBengaliwomenwasbrutally simple in termsof logistics
as the Pakistani regulars swept through andoccupied the tiny, populous land…. Girls of
eight and grandmothers of seventy-five had been sexually assaulted…Pakistani soldiers
had not only violated Bengali women on the spot; they abducted tens of hundreds and
held them by force in their military barracks for nightly use.8
Accounts of the armed conflict are contested and what is described
below is merely an attempt to reconstruct relevant aspects of the
armed conflict through distillation of the assertions made in a number
Footnote 5 continued
pro-Pakistan in the struggle for independence. Certain of their members are now
widely regarded as targets for prosecution. They live in a limbo-land for they wish to
be Pakistani nationals, but Pakistan refuses to grant them nationality, and until
recently, they had to live in a country that will not grant them nationality. In 2007, a
judgement of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh granted them voting rights and
hence citizenship. Those few, who are still not willing to declare their allegiance to
Bangladesh and still hoping to be repatriated to Pakistan, are excluded.
6 This is based on the account as related in the ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra
note 5, at 15–19. As the International Commission of Jurists notes, during the hartal,
some acts of violence occurred, but the Awami League were generally able to
maintain order.
7
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OURWILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 81 (1975) 81. See
also Ahmed Ziauddin, The Case of Bangladesh: Bringing to Trial the Perpetrators of
the 1971 Genocide, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: CAUSES, CASES, CONSEQUENCES 99
(Albert J. Jongman ed., 1996). These accounts are verified by more recent Ban-
gladeshi scholarship, but are contested by the Pakistanis, including the Hamoodur
Rahman Supplementary Report, infra note 9.
8
BROWNMILLER, supra note 7, at 81, 83.
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of ostensibly reliable narratives of the conflict.9 I do not claim they
are factually proven, but the accounts appear to have been respon-
sibly compiled. I rely in particular on the 1972 International Com-
mission of Jurists report, which remains to this day the leading legal
analysis of the armed conflict.
2.1 Operation Searchlight
Operation Searchlight was led by General Tikka Khan, and involved
a full armed assault – using tanks, armoured personnel carriers and
troops – on the civilians of Dhaka. On 25 March 1971, after the
stealthy departure from Dhaka of Military Chief General Yahya and
the leading West Pakistani politician Zulkifar Ali Bhutto in the
middle of negotiations with the Awami League, the Pakistani Army
which was then in cantonment, emerged from barracks and launched
an attack on Dhaka. They had, over the preceding weeks, been
reinforced by fresh troops, and weaponry shipped in. This was a
carefully planned operation, whose ‘‘objectives were to neutralize the
political power of the Awami League and to re-establish public or-
der’’.10 Terrorisation seems to have been used as a weapon and an
objective. Homes were burned down. Symbols of Bengali nationalism
were destroyed. The University of Dhaka and its student supporters
of the Awami League were attacked using arms, mortars, tanks,
cannons and machine guns. A video showing alleged executions from
this time is widely circulating on the internet.11 The Police and the
East Pakistan Rifles were also attacked.
9 The following account of the armed conflict is derived from numerous sources:
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5; VAN SCHENDEL, supra note 2, at Ch. 16;
BROWNMILLER, supra note 7; ANTHONY MASCARENHAS, BANGLADESH: A LEGACY OF
BLOOD (1986); RICHARD SISSON & LEO E. ROSE, WAR AND SECESSION: PAKISTAN, INDIA AND
THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH (1990); Nitin Pai, The 1971 East Pakistan Genocide –
A Realist Perspective, THE ACORN: THE INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST, Mar. 25,
2008, available at http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/east
pakistangenocide1971-nitinpai-25march2008-1.pdf); SUPPLEMENTARY HAMOODUR
REHMAN COMMISSION REPORT (UNOFFICIAL VERSION) (2007), available at http://
boltapakistan.files.wordpress.com/2007/08/hamood_ur_rehman_commission.pdf. The




SISSON & ROSE, supra note 9, at 157.
11 This can be seen at Youtube, BangladeshGenocide: DhakaUniversityMassacre,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMg9Ly9nK0g (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
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Then, came the attacks on the Hindu community. Eyewitnesses
interviewed by the International Commission of Jurists spoke of the
justification given by members of the Pakistani Army: ‘‘Hindus are
enemies of the State’’.12 It was apparently primarily West Pakistani
paramilitaries and some Bengali Moslems who engaged in attacks on
the Hindu community.13 Armed attacks extended into the country-
side, and aerial bombardment was used. There are many accounts of
the burning and looting of villages. People would be disappeared by
way of a process euphemistically called ‘‘being sent to Bangladesh’’.
There was resistance. Amidst the many pages of distressing accounts
of the attacks on Bengalis, the International Commission of Jurists
devotes several pages of its report to Bengali attacks on the pro-
Pakistani Biharis that took place during this stage of the armed
conflict.14
The little resistance that there was could not match the firepower
of the Pakistani Army. Refugees and resistance fighters began
flooding into India in massive numbers.
On 26 March 1971, Sheikh Mujibur declared independence from
Dhaka ‘‘in due fulfillment of the legitimate right of self-determination
of the people of Bangladesh’’ and urged Bangladeshis to ‘‘defend the
honour and integrity of Bangladesh’’.15 On 10 April 1971, the exiled
members of the East Pakistan National and Provincial Assemblies
(Awami League-dominated since the election of 1970) confirmed that
declaration and formed the government of Bangladesh in exile,
although their leader was by then detained in Pakistan.16
2.2 The Return of the Mukti Bahini
The Awami League regrouped in India and the Mukti Bahini (free-
dom fighters) began to be assisted in a material sense by India, with
advice, training and weapons. India began exercising direct control
over the government in exile and the various liberation forces. The
first effort to create an organised armed force out of the disparate
Bengali groups seems to have occurred on 14 April 1971 when the
12
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
13
SISSON & ROSE, supra note 9, at 177 (The authors also allege that pro-Awami
League and anti-West Pakistani Bengali Moslems did little to protect them).
14
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 32–36.
15 Bangladesh Proclamation of Independence (Apr. 17, 1971), 11 I.L.M. 119
(1972).
16
ISLAM, supra note 3, at 13.
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Bangladesh government in exile appointed a former army officer, Col.
M.A.G. Osmani, as commander in chief of the Bangladesh armed
forces.17 From this time on, training camps were created, with the
assistance of the Indian Border Security Force. ‘‘The Indian army
had assumed primary responsibility for the arming and training of
the Mukti Bahini forces from the Border Security Force on 30 April
1971…Even occasional participation by Indian military personnel in
raids across the border was now permitted.’’18 A command structure
was established by the end of May 1971, incorporating a substantial
number of the different groups into company units and brigades, and
dividing up responsibility for undertaking guerrilla operations in
assigned sectors of the territory.19 India sent some of the Mukti
Bahini around the country for training, including as underwater
saboteurs.20
After the end of the monsoon period, the Mukti Bahini returned
to the fray from India, having been trained and equipped. During
their absence, there had been retaliatory attacks on the remaining
Bengali civilian community by the Biharis and the Army. There was
massive and indiscriminate destruction of villages. This was not
spontaneous mob violence, but planned violence. The journalist
Anthony Mascarenhas reported, in the UK’s Sunday Times, of first
hand remarks made to him by military officials about the conduct of
the operation, that led the International Commission of Jurists to
conclude that ‘‘the atrocities committed against the population of
East Pakistan were part of a deliberate policy by a disciplined
force’’.21
The returning Mukti Bahini were able to engage in increasingly
successful guerrilla activity against the Pakistani Army. Their frog-
men even managed to sink a number of Pakistani vessels in port.
From about May–June, the Mukti Bahini also received artillery
support from Indian forces firing from within Indian territory.22
‘‘Indian artillery stationed on the border was used on occasion to
support Mukti Bahini activities in the immediate transborder areas,
usually in response to Pakistani shelling and incursions, if the Indian
17
SISSON & ROSE, supra note 9, at 183–184.
18 Id., at 182.
19 Id., at 184.
20 Id., at 184.
21
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 37.
22
SISSON & ROSE, supra note 9, at 185.
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reports are taken seriously.’’23 The civilian population supported the
Mukti Bahini, and in retaliation, the Army conducted search and
destroy reprisal operations, attacked villagers, burned villages and
crops, and destroyed livestock. As the International Commission of
Jurists put it, ‘‘Every act of sabotage was followed by reprisals by the
armed forces who continued to burn and kill’ whole villages’’.24
Van Schendel asserts that by November 1971, the liberation forces
controlled more than 10 liberated areas along the Indian border.25
The Indians and Pakistanis began having border skirmishes. Van
Schendel also asserts that in November, an Indian general was put in
charge of the joint command of freedom fighters and Indian troops.26
By November, the Indian Army was already operating within Ban-
gladesh in support of the Mukti Bahini. On 21 November 1971, the
Indian government admitted to incursions into the contested territory
with tanks, during which they captured and brought some Pakistani
tanks back to India.27
It was in this period that the Pakistani Army began to create
civilian groups such as the Peace Committee, and later paramilitary
or auxiliary groups such as the Razakars,28 Al-Shams and Al-Badr.
Some were Biharis, but they also included Bengalis. ‘‘Their task was
to maintain control of the inner areas while the Pakistan army was
deployed on the frontier to try and prevent the infiltration of the
Mukti Bahini from India and to counter the threat of invasion from
23 Id., at 211.
24
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 42.
25
VAN SCHENDEL, supra note 2, at 167.
26 Id., at 170.
27
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 43.
28 The current Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, in an speech as Opposition Leader
on 16 April 1992, cited a Pakistan Gazette notification referring to the Razakars
Ordinance, No. X of 1971 (1971) (E. Pak.). The gazette notification, from the
Ministry of Defence, and under the Pakistan Army Act, makes it clear that the
Razakars were under the control of the Pakistan Army. It includes a statement that
‘‘the officer of the Pakistan army under whose command any member of the
Razakars is placed shall exercise the same powers in relation to that member as he is
authorized to exercise under the said Act in relation to a member of the Pakistan
Army placed under his command’’. See Opposition Leader Sheikh Hasina’s parlia-
mentary speech given on 16 April 1992 on the subject of Golam Azam and the public
tribunal, in DOCUMENTS ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED BY PAKISTAN ARMY
ANDTHEIR AGENTS IN BANGLADESHDURING 1971 137 (1999–2002) [hereinafter Opposition
Leader Sheikh Hasina’s parliamentary speech given on 16 April 1992].
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India which they feared’’.29 All the groups operated under Pakistani
command.
2.3 The Indo-Pakistan War
From mid-October to 20 November 1971, there was a quantitative
and qualitative shift in Indian support to the Mukti Bahini: not just
did artillery support increase, but ‘‘Indian military forces, including
tanks and air power, on a few occasions, were used to back up the
Mukti Bahini’’, although the units were always withdrawn back over
the border once the objective was achieved.30 This continued to
escalate. ‘‘After the night of 21 November, however, the tactics
changed in one significant way – Indian forces did not withdraw’’.31
Several army divisions, already in the territory, ‘‘moved into key
strategic areas around the principal Pakistani defence positions on or
near the Indian border with the objective of either capturing or
neutralizing them.’’32
It was 2 weeks later, on 3 December 1971, that Pakistan bombed
Indian airfields in Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Awantipur,
Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra, triggering the formal start of
the third Indo-Pakistan war. India then invaded West and East
Pakistan, and formally recognised the State of Bangladesh on 6
December 1971. On 12 December 1971, Indian troops parachuted
into Dhaka and 3 days later, General Niazi surrendered to the Indian
commander of the joint Indian–Mukti Bahini force, Lt. General
Jagjit Singh Aurora.
In the last few days before the surrender, one of the most serious
mass killings of the entire war took place in Dhaka, when intellectuals
and professionals were rounded up and summarily executed. It is
alleged that this was committed, with the aid of lists of names, by a
variety of persons from the Pakistani army, the Razakar and Al-Badr
militias, and Jamaat-e-Islam party. The Liberation War Museum has
documented many ‘‘killings fields’’ across the country.33
29
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 41.
30
SISSON & ROSE, supra note 9, at 212.
31 Id., at 213.
32 Id., at 213.
33 SeeLiberationWarMuseum,LiberationWar, http://www.liberationwarmuseum.
org/liberationwar.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
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2.4 Post-Surrender Retaliatory Violence
In the chaos and emotion of the post-surrender period, there are many
reports that Mukti Bahini exacted vengeance against Razakars, collabo-
rators andWest Pakistanis, whilemobs attacked the Bihari community.34
2.5 When the war was over
Obviously, more facts have emerged since the International Com-
mission of Jurists published their report in 1972. Their findings are not
the final word, but their legal assessment in Parts IV–VII of the report
was careful and knowledgeable and deserves to be closely consulted by
those wishing to learn more and to proceed further down the road of
accountability.35 The report assessed that the Awami League’s Uni-
lateral Declaration of Independence was not valid under international
law, even under the principle of self-determination;36 in other words,
Bangladesh did not come into existence at that stage and remained
part of Pakistan. This – a correct assessment in the author’s view – sits
uneasily with its other finding, that its resistance to Pakistan’s armed
assault was legitimate,37 and begs the question: what else were they
supposed to do, when negotiation had failed and they had to resist the
armed assaults of their own State, of which they had been elected to
Parliament by a majority, with force. The report also found that India
(which did not actually raise this) was entitled to intervene in the
Bangladeshi conflict by way of the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention,38 and after being attacked by Pakistan on 3 December 1971,
was entitled to use force in self-defence.39 On the other hand, India’s
assistance to the Bangladeshi resistance prior to Pakistan’s attack was
found to have been in violation of international rules of neutrality and
non interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan.40 The International
Commission of Jurists was ultimately to find that both sides
34 See e.g., ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 44–45; Pai, supra note 9,
at 5. Some call the revenge attacks on the Bihari a ‘‘counter-genocide’’.
35
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 49–97.
36 Id., at 74–75. This assessment has been rigorously challenged by M. Rafiqul
Islam in his Monash University Ph.D. Thesis, later published as a book: M. RAFIQUL
ISLAM, THE BANGLADESH LIBERATION MOVEMENT: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
(1987). My thanks to Professor M. Shah Alam for drawing this to my attention.
37 Id., at 75.
38 Id., at 96.
39 Id., at 88–89.
40 Id., at 90.
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committed violations of international law, although its focus and
tenor clearly show that there was no equivalence: the vast bulk of
incidents studied involved the Pakistani army and its supporters and
paramilitaries/auxiliaries. It found that there was a strong prima facie
case that international crimes, namely war crimes and crimes against
humanity and breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions 1949 had taken place. The International Commission of
Jurists also concluded that acts of genocide against the Hindu group
had been perpetrated. They did not identify anyone for investigation
and prosecution. I shall leave my consideration of their findings on
international criminal law until my later assessment of the Interna-
tional Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended.
After the Pakistani debacle in the east, President Bhutto, who took
over from General Yahya Khan, established a judicial commission of
inquiry under the chairmanship of the then Chief Justice, Hamoodur
Rahman. The Commission examined nearly 213 witnesses and hun-
dreds of classified army signals between East and West Pakistan. Its
work comprised a main report submitted in July 1972, and a sup-
plementary report, further to interviews with freshly released pris-
oners of war and civilian internees in India (a further 72 witnesses
were interviewed), that was submitted on 23 October 1974.41 Neither
was made public for many years; some accounts claimed that Prime
Minister Bhutto ordered all copies destroyed. Since 2000, the Sup-
plementary Report has been publicly available, and for sale, having
been declassified. The commission placed the blame squarely on the
Pakistani Army, and what it saw as moral shortcomings in some of its
leaders that came to impact on the situation that arose in East
Pakistan. The commission accepted the Pakistani estimates of a death
toll of 26,000 persons killed, and rejected the Bangladeshi allegation
of 200,000 rapes as being highly exaggerated and ‘‘altogether fan-
tastic and fanciful’’. According to the commission, ‘‘[s]o much
damage could not have been caused by the entire strength of the
Pakistan Army then stationed in East Pakistan even if it had nothing
else to do’’.42 The commission named several of Pakistan’s top mil-
itary leaders as having final and overall responsibility for their per-
sonal and command roles which ‘‘brought disgrace and defeat to
Pakistan by their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and
willful neglect in the performance of their duties, and physical
and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the
41
SUPPLEMENTARYHAMOODURREHMANCOMMISSIONREPORT, supra note 9, at 2, – 6.
42 Id., at 18, – 32.
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capability and resources to resist the enemy’’.43 This, the commission
said, required proper and firm disciplinary action before a court
martial, and not merely retirement from service. There could be no
‘‘future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during
the 1971 war’’.44 This was not just about punishing personal failings
but was necessary to ‘‘emphasize the concept of professional
accountability which appears to have been forgotten by senior army
officers since their involvement in politics, civil administration and
Martial Law duties.’’45 This did not exonerate the lower levels, who
continued to bear direct responsibility. In respect of the atrocities
committed during the conflict, the Commission recommended, inter
alia:
a high-powered Court or Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate into per-
sistent allegations of atrocities said to have been committed by the Pakistan Army in
East Pakistan during its operations from March to December, 1971, and to hold
trials of those who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad name to the Pakistan
Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by their acts of wanton
cruelty and immorality against our own people.46
The Prisoner-of-War situation was significant. India held some
92,000 Pakistani Prisoners-of-War and others.47 An Indian govern-
ment spokesman described the shape of the accountability process
that was planned: ‘‘two categories of tribunals would be set up
shortly to try the war criminals-one exclusively for the trials of those
top army officials who were responsible for planning the genocide and
the other for the lower ranks who executed the order of the high
officials’’.48 The high profile leaders were out of the jurisdiction in
Pakistan, but there were 195 suspects being held by India among the
92,000, and Bangladesh held some 600,000 persons, of which it
wanted to expel 260,000 to Pakistan and take criminal proceedings
43 Id., at 43, – 3.
44 Id.
45 Id., at 22, – 6.
46 Id., at 20, – 39.
47 Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India) (Req. for the Indication of
Interim Measures of Protection) (Order of Jul. 13, 1973), – 1, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/60/10697.pdf (last visited Aug. 14 2009).
48 Dhaka Will Try Yahya and Others for War Crimes, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Feb. 23
1973.
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against the rest. On the other side of the sub-continent, Pakistan held
some 400,000 Bengalis that it wanted to send back to Bangladesh.49
On 11 May 1973, Pakistan brought proceedings against India for
the release of its nationals, still being held after the cessation of
hostilities on 17 December 1971, in the International Court of Jus-
tice.50 Pakistan complained about the plans to try 195 of the over
92,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees being held by
India for alleged genocide. The central issue was whether or not
Pakistan had an exclusive claim to exercise jurisdiction in respect of
such persons by virtue of Article VI of the Genocide Convention,
which both States were party to.51 Levie has argued that the real
reason for the prolonged detention was to force Pakistani recognition
of the State of Bangladesh.52 The matter was removed from the list by
an Order of 15 December 1973, at the request of Pakistan, in light of
negotiations between itself and the Government of India which later
resulted in an agreement signed at New Delhi on 28 August 1973.53
The agreement was, inter alia, for the release of all but the 195 sus-
pects. In relation to these, India would continue to detain them, and
Bangladesh agreed not to prosecute them until resolution of the
dispute over what to do with them.
The politics of political recognition and population exchange
would ultimately seal the fate of the accountability project in Ban-
gladesh. In April 1974, in return for Pakistan having recognised the
existence of Bangladesh, the 195 alleged Pakistani genocidaires were
released. The Bangladesh–India–Pakistan Agreement on the Repa-
triation of War and Civilian Internees (the Simla Agreement) saw the
Foreign Minister of Bangladesh state that the Government of Ban-
gladesh has decided not to proceed with the trials against Pakistanis
as an act of clemency.54 It was agreed that the 195 prisoners of war
would be repatriated to Pakistan along with the other prisoners of
war already in process of repatriation under the earlier Delhi
49
VAN SCHENDEL, supra note 2, at 172; Pai, supra note 9, at 9.
50 Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India) (Application Instituting
Proceedings) (Application of May 11, 1973), at 3, available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/60/9461.pdf (last visited Aug. 14 2009).
51 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, Art. IV.
52 Howard S. Levie, Legal Aspects of the Continued Detention of the Pakistani
Prisoners of War by India, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 512, 514 (1973).
53 For analysis, see Id.
54 See Bangladesh–India–Pakistan Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of
War and Civilian Internees, Bangl.–India–Pak., Apr. 9, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 501 (1974).
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Agreement.55 There was no obligation by Pakistan to take action
against the 195 suspects, or to provide reparation to Bangladesh and
its nationals. It was expressly about ‘‘reconciliation’’ and ‘‘forget the
past’’, words used in the agreement. This was politics and the issues of
international criminal responsibility had become intermeshed with
post-war regional disputes and global politics.56
III THE BANGLADESH COLLABORATORS
(SPECIAL TRIBUNALS) ORDER 1972
The Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 (the
1972 Collaborators Act’) came into force through Presidential Order
No. 8 of 1972.57 Parliament was not in session, so this was done by a
presidential order, later approved by the Parliament that came into
being after 1973 General Elections.58 It was designed to bring to
account those who had collaborated with, or otherwise aided and
abetted, the Pakistan Armed Forces, and who waged war or aided
and abetted in waging war against Bangladesh.
This law provided for the creation of special tribunals of Sessions
judges sitting alone, with exclusive jurisdiction. Senior judges would
try the more serious cases. All cases were to be brought by a Public
Prosecutor. The tribunals were to use the then-applicable domestic
law, that is, identified sections of the Penal Code 1860 and Code of
Criminal Procedure 1898. Collaboration was defined at length in
Section 2. The cases would be investigated by the Officer in Charge of
a police station. Notable provisions included the non-reviewable
power granted to the government to extend the period of detention
‘‘if, in the opinion of the government, further time is required for
completion of the inquiry’’59 and denial of any bail.60 The tribunal
could pardon’ a person involved in the crime ‘‘on condition of his
making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within
55 Id., –– 13–15.
56 Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Pro-
cess: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 31–36 (1978).
57 President’s Order No. 8 of 1972 (1972) (Bangl.); Collaborators (Special Tri-
bunals) Order (1972) (Bangl.).
58 Email from M. Shah Alam, Professor of the University of Chittagong (Sept. 5,
2009) (on file with the author). My thanks to Professor Alam for this insight.
59 Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order, supra note 57, Section 3(5).
60 Id., Section 14.
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his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person
concerned’’.61 Property belonging to an accused’s minor brothers,
sisters or dependants or any benamdar could be seised by the Gov-
ernment.62 Appeal to the High Court was possible.63 There were no
special rules of evidence, so the regular Evidence Act 1872 applied.
The death penalty was available.
There are conflicting accounts about the trials that were held
under the 1972 Collaborators Act. One account is that the trials took
place over 6 months and then ground to a halt.64 Another account is
that proceedings were taken against 11,000 Bangladeshi suspects in
custody, and by 1975, 73 tribunals had been constituted.65 Another
account, by the same author, in the same paper, is that 37,413 people
were arrested under the Act and tried, with 2,848 cases completed.66
Another source says that some 30,471 persons were charged, of
whom 2,848 were tried, 752 convicted (one to death) and 2096
acquitted.67 It seems that, at that time, the trials were regarded as
problematic because of systemic flaws in the justice system, and also
the difficulty of substantiating charges against the alleged collabo-
rators.68
On 30 November 1973, the government declared a general
amnesty. Under this, the majority of persons held or convicted (some
35,000) were released.69 One account for this is that ‘‘[a]s the number
of accused was very high and many of them committed petty crimes,
Sheikh Mujib declared an amnesty but not a blanket one…Those
who were punished for or accused of rape, murder, attempt to
61 This has been included in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amen-
ded, infra, note 79 and will be discussed later in this paper.
62 Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order, supra note 57, Section 17.
63 Id., Section 16(1).
64 Sara Hossain, A Long and Winding Road: Justice and Accountability for War
Crimes in 1971, a paper presented at the International Conference on Genocide,
Truth and Justice, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Mar. 1–2, 2008, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
52 (2008).
65 Humayun Reza, War Crimes & Genocide in 1971: The Reality of the Trial, a
paper presented at the International Conference on Genocide, Truth and Justice,
Dhaka, Bangladesh, Mar. 1–2, 2008, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 55 (2008).
66 Reza, supra note 65, at 56.
67 Hossain, supra note 64, at 53.
68 Id., at 52.
69 REDRESS, Torture in Bangladesh 1971–2004, at 27, http://www.redress.org/
publications/Bangladesh.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
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murder or arson will not come under general amnesty’’.70 Others point
to the exchange of Bangladeshis held in Pakistan with those who were
to be returned from Bangladesh to Pakistan, and the much-needed
diplomatic recognition by Pakistan.71 Another account is that they
were released in connection with the 3rd anniversary of the birth of
Bangladesh, to ‘‘join in the task of nation building’’ and that among
those released were former cabinet ministers under the last Pakistani
governor, members of the Central Peace Committee, members of the
Peace and Welfare Council and members of suspected parties such as
Jamaat e Islami, Muslim League, PDP and Nizam e Islam.72
While the amnesty did not apply to those charged with murder,
rape or arson, apparently a large number of persons falling into this
category, including prominent collaborators, were also released.73
The 1972 Collaborator’s Act was repealed in 1975 by President
Ziaur Rahman.74
IV THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
(TRIBUNALS) ACT 197375
The 1973 Act was adopted to provide for the detention, prosecution
and punishment of ‘‘any person irrespective of his nationality who,
being a member of any armed defence or auxiliary forces commits or
has committed in the territory of Bangladesh, whether before or after
the commencement of this act’’ any of the listed acts.
I shall be discussing the Act, as amended, in detail in the following
section. But as a brief prelude to that, some introduction is necessary.
The Act provided for establishment of ‘‘a tribunal’’ with jurisdiction
over crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
‘‘violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts
laid out in the Geneva Conventions of 1949’’ and ‘‘any other crimes
under international law’’. There was no scope for exercise of juris-
diction over crimes in domestic law, i.e. the regular criminal code.
70 Reza, supra note 65, at 57.
71
VAN SCHENDEL, supra note 2, at 172; Opposition Leader Sheikh Hasina’s par-
liamentary speech given on 16 April 1992, supra note 28, at 139.
72 Hossain, supra note 64, at 52–53.
73 REDRESS, supra note 69, at 27.
74 Id.
75 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, Act No XIX of 1973 (1973) (Bangl.)
[hereinafter International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973].
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The cases were to be tried by panels of two to four persons who were
or were qualified as judges of the Supreme Court, High Court or
General Court Martial, and were to be based in Dhaka but able to
hold sittings at other locations as deemed fit.76 There was no provi-
sion for trial in absentia. Unlike the 1972 Collaborators Act, this Act
did not follow regular rules of procedure and evidence and the court
was empowered to adopt its own provisions.
Evidence was gathered and prosecutors appointed. 11,000 of the
detainees originally held under the 1972 Collaborators Order, sus-
pected of crimes to which the amnesty did not apply, were to have
been tried under this law.77 All work on this issue came to an end
with the assassination of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
and his family members on 15 August 1975 by forces aligned against
the liberation movement. Four of the leading politicians held in
detention in the Central Jail were murdered on 3 November 1975.
The new regime repealed the 1972 Collaborators Order, stopped
prosecutions and released all. Professor M. Shah Alam suggests that
they may have simply omitted to repeal the 1973 Act, since no trials
were yet held under that law, nor any commissions formed.78
V ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
(TRIBUNALS) ACT 1973 AS AMENDED79
In Dhaka, one is repeatedly told that this 37 year old law was, at its
time of adoption, the world’s only such legislation and that it was
progressive and cutting-edge. Because legal luminaries Professor
Hans-Heinrich Jescheck and Professor Otto Triffterer, with other
76 In the 2009 amendment, this has been changed to remove military judges. ‘‘Any
person who is a Judge or is qualified to be a Judge, of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh, may be appointed as a Chairman or member of a Tribunal’’. It is not
clear if there will be transparent mechanisms for the appointment and removal of
judges or the assignment of cases. These are often ways by which States exert undue
influence over proceedings.
77 Notes of the Presentation of AVM (Red.) A.K. Khandker, Chairman of Sector
Commanders Forum, a presentation at the International Conference on Genocide,
Truth and Justice, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Mar. 1–2, 2008, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 6
(2008).
78 Email from M. Shah Alam, Professor of the University of Chittagong (Sept. 5,
2009) (on file with the author).
79 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 as amended by the International
Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act 2009 (2009) (Bangl.) [hereinafter International
Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended].
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international lawyers from the International Commission of Jurists,
contributed towards a process that was ultimately shepherded by
Bangladesh’s own outstanding Dr. Kamal Hossain, one is told that
this law is unassailable.80 They say it has withstood the test of time
and does not need substantial amendment. Those involved in the
efforts to secure accountability speak with an emotional attachment
to this law, seeing it as some kind of golden international standard
and link to a glorious past that needs to be preserved.
That Bangladesh chose to adopt such a law in 1973 is indeed
remarkable and admirable. It is true that, like the earlier Israeli Nazis
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950,81 this would have
been a progressive law for its time. Improvements are what the inter-
national justice movement strives for as part of the overall quest: the
tribunals set up under Control Council Law No. 1082 were already an
improvement on Nuremberg. The International Crimes (Tribunals)
Act 1973 contained some of the fair trial and due process rights re-
quired by the not-yet-in-force International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights83 and it was certainly framed by a deep understanding
of the criminal justice process and international criminal law. Certain
provisions, in this common law legislation, also seem to bear the mark
of the continental lawyer anxious to streamline the lengthy adversarial
process and get around its notoriously cumbersome rules of evidence.
The law is also 37 years out of date, and contains some provisions
that were actually controversial at that time, such as war crimes in
non-international armed conflict. As would be the case today, few, if
80 The making of the law is recounted in WALI-UR RAHMAN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
FRAMING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (TRIBUNALS) ACT 1973 (undated). The
Ambassador relates the efforts of the Bangladesh Institute of Law and International
Affairs, and his trips around Europe in consultation with various international
lawyers.
81 Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950, 57 Sefer Ha-Hu-
kim 154 (Isr.), as quoted in Attorney General of the Government of Israel
v. Eichmann 36 I.L.R. 5, 7–8, 30 est. seq. (Isr. DC 1961) [hereinafter Eichmann
District Court Judgement]. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District
Court in Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann 36 I.L.R. 277
(Isr. S. Ct. 1962) [hereinafter Eichmann Supreme Court Judgement].
82 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945 (1946) 3 Official Gazette
Control Council for Germany 50–55 [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10].
83 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, Bangladesh acceded on Sept. 6,
2000) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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any, international lawyers would have seriously claimed that
aggression (crimes against peace) could be committed in a war of
secession. It seems unwise to have excluded recourse to the positive
domestic penal laws that applied at the time of the crimes, and which
had in fact been exclusively used in the 1972 Collaborators Act. In
Cambodia, the United Nations insisted on the inclusion of the-then
applicable domestic penal provisions in order to forestall any prob-
lems with retroactivity; the underlying domestic law has also been
preserved in the relevant East Timor and Sierra Leone laws. These
domestic law provisions are in fact being used in litigation, alongside
the international ones. The failure to use it in Bangladesh’s 1973
legislation leaves a vacuum in the instances where there are significant
problems with using particular crimes as defined. Then, the interna-
tional human rights law of today imposes far greater demands on a
process of accountability than it did in 1973. Our understanding of
international criminal law has been immeasurably refined in the last 2
decades, and legal work done on historic crimes of the 1970s in situ-
ations such as in Cambodia, East Timor and Latin America takes us
well beyond the speculation about the state of customary interna-
tional law in 1971 that was to some extent made into law in the form
of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973. While there are
concerns that can – and must be – validly raised about this law on the
basis of the principles of specificity and nullum crimen sine lege, we
need also to remember that they protect persons who reasonably
believed that their conduct was lawful from retroactive criminalisa-
tion of their conduct, and will not protect those who knew that they
were committing a crime from being convicted of that crime under a
subsequent formulation.84 There may sometimes have to be recourse
to domestic law for the purpose of establishing that the accused could
have known that the offence in question or the offence committed in
the way charged in the indictment was prohibited and punishable.85
Such considerations could have enriched and improved the Ban-
gladeshi law in the amendments of 2009, in a way that is consistent
with the overarching principle of legality.
84 Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgement, – 6 (Mar. 22,
2006) [hereinafter Stakic´ Appeal Judgement].
85 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Drag-
oljub Odjanic´’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, – 40
(May 21, 2003).
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When it was clear that the government was going to proceed with
a domestic tribunal under the 1973 Act,86 the Bangladesh Law
Commission and Human Rights Watch made recommendations for
amendment to this law to allow it to meet basic international stan-
dards.87 Unfortunately, the government chose only to tinker with the
law, making a few changes that were necessary, but leaving aside the
more substantial issues of legitimate and pressing concern. One is
drawn to recall Indonesia and the process of its adoption of the
unsatisfactory domestic legislation for the Human Rights Court that
would eventually try the East Timor, Tanjung Priok and Abepura
crimes against humanity cases in a purely domestic setting. There too,
the State ignored the advice of experts. The unacceptably low quality
of proceedings and outcome, recognised internationally as a sham’,
provided further injustice to the victims who had demanded
accountability and justice.88 It may well be, as some have pointed out,
that this charade was actually the officially desired state of affairs.
In the following section, I will address issues that remain of con-
cern and which really do need to be addressed if this process is to
become one that is worthy of the vision that accompanied the law’s
86 It is not clear that the government of Bangladesh was ever provided with
detailed expert advice on the different forms of accountability mechanism that could
be used. But, from discussions, it appears that the government considers an ad hoc
court as being out of the question because of the objections of Pakistan and its allies
in the Organisation of Islamic Conference. In particular, it seems that Saudi Arabia,
with its large number of Bangladeshi migrant workers contributing to the economy
of Bangladesh, exerts an undue influence on the decisions that are taken in this
matter. I have personally observed a deep resistance to the idea of introducing some
international judges, prosecutors and investigators into the system in an effort to
diffuse the politicisation, strengthen capacity and assist with the enormous tasks.
Unlike other countries that have specifically asked for international participation,
such as Sierra Leone, Lebanon and Cambodia, in Bangladesh even suggestions to
consider a role for direct international participation are treated as affronts to
national dignity and sovereignty. When one objectively considers the entirety of the
situation, including the reports about the state of the criminal justice system, the
budgetary requirements and the complex legal issues examined in this paper, an
internationalised process really does seem to be the best option.
87 See Human Rights Watch, Letter to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Re: Inter-
national Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 8 July 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/
07/08/letter-prime-minister-sheikh-hasina-re-international-crimes-tribunals-act (last
visited Aug. 30 2009). It is not known why Human Rights Watch called for the ICC
definitions to be used, rather than the law that was actually applicable in 1971.
88 See Suzannah Linton, Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia, X SING. Y. B. INT’L L.
199–203 (2006) (for a detailed assessment of the process).
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adoption, and the many years of effort to find accountability and
justice for the terrible sufferings and sacrifices of 1971.
5.1 Relationship with Domestic Law
The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended is not a
standalone act, as it refers to several other laws, such as the Army Act
1952 and the Air Force Act 1953. However, the underlying criminal
procedure and evidentiary rules are ousted through Section 23, which
provides that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898,89
and the Evidence Act, 187290 shall not apply in any proceedings
under this Act. It goes on, in Section 26, to provide that the provi-
sions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything incon-
sistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in
force. This normally does not refer to the Constitution, for all laws in
Bangladesh are to be subject to the Constitution,91 but as will be
discussed later, this law comes in for special treatment in the amended
Constitution. There will obviously have to be detailed rules of pro-
cedure and evidence that are developed, setting out also the interplay
with other domestic laws in Bangladesh and requiring the support of
the underlying system, including over matters such as detention,
subpoenas, witness summons, seizure of evidence, exhumations,
forensics, international warrants of arrest, etc.
Also to be resolved will be the relationship of prosecutions
brought under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As
Amended, and the amnesties and pardons to persons accused of lesser
crimes under the general amnesty granted by President Mujibur.
Persons were released – whether convicted or pending trial pursuant
to the 1972 Collaborators Act – and all proceedings, investigations
and enquiries against others under this legislation were dropped.
Those not benefitting from this clemency were those convicted for or
charged with or alleged to have committed the more serious crimes
under the Penal Code, such as murder, culpable homicide not
89 Code of Criminal Procedure 1989, Act V of 1898 (Bangl.).
90 Evidence Act, Act I of 1872 (Bangl.).
91 See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, Section 26:
(1) All existing law inconsistent with the provisions of this Part shall, to the
extent of such inconsistency, become void on the commencement of this
Constitution. (2) The State shall not make any law inconsistent with any
provisions of this Part, and any law so made shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency, be void.
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amounting to murder, rape, mischief by way of fire or explosive,
mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy houses
and mischief by way of fire of explosive substance to any vessel. All
from this latter category did in fact benefit from de facto amnesty and
were released after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur in 1975.
The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity92 provides
that no statutory limitation shall apply to war crimes93 and crimes
against humanity (including genocide and ‘‘eviction by armed attack
or occupation and inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apart-
heid’’)94 irrespective of the date of their commission. But, Pakistan
was not a party, and to this day, neither is Bangladesh. It is unclear
whether this is sufficiently reflected in State practice and opinio juris
to be treated as customary international law.95
The issue of retroactivity is obviously relevant. It is now well
established in international law that the mere fact of prosecuting
international crimes by way of a law adopted after the commission of
the crimes is not necessarily a violation of the fundamental prohibi-
tion against retroactive prosecutions. This was enshrined in Article
11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;96 the Nurem-
92 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26 1968, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII) U.N. Doc. A/
7218 (Nov, 25, 1968) (entered into force Nov. 11 1970).
93 The provision only applies to war crimes as they are defined in the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal (Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution
and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945
[hereinafter The London Agreement]), 82 U.N.T.S 279 (Aug. 8, 1945) [hereinafter
Charter of the IMT Nuremburg or IMT Nuremburg] and as confirmed by G.A. Res.
3(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3(I) (Feb. 13, 1946) and UNGA Res 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/
RES/95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946).
94 The provision only applies to crimes against humanity whether committed in
time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the IMT
Nuremberg, supra note 93, eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts
resulting from the policy of apartheid, and the crime of genocide as defined in the
Genocide Convention, supra note 1, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of
the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.
95 But in 2001, Kok argued that this had crystallised into a rule of customary
international law. See RUTH A KOK, STATUTORY LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL LAW 308 (2007).
96 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3rd Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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berg Principles,97 and is reflected with some variation in the major
regional and universal human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, to
which Bangladesh acceded on 6 September 2000. Article 15 of the
ICCPR reads as follows:
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international
law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than
the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If,
subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the
imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
So, prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and other
international crimes is not a problem using a law passed after the acts
were committed, provided that the law is drafted in a way that reflects
the state of international law at that time, which must have consid-
ered the acts as criminal. Prosecution and punishment in accordance
with Article 15 of the ICCPR requires that it is not just that the acts
or omissions were prohibited in international law, but that the acts or
omissions prohibited by international law resulted in individual
criminal responsibility under international law at that point in time.
We see the rule articulated in the following terms in Article 22(1) of
the ICC Statute:98 ‘‘a person shall not be held criminally responsible
unless the conduct in question was, at the time of the commission, a
crime within the jurisdiction of the court’’. The ICTY’s Stakic´ case
reminds us that this rule exists to protect persons who reasonably
believed that their conduct was lawful from retroactive criminalisa-
tion of their conduct, and will not protect those who knew that they
were committing a crime from being convicted of that crime under a
subsequent formulation.99
There are a number of problems of retroactivity with the Inter-
national Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, notably the
97 U.N. International Law Commission [ILC], Principles of International Law
Recognised in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the
Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/1316 Part III, reprinted in [1950] II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 364
[hereinafter ILC Nuremburg Principles].
98 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art 22(1), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force Jul. 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
99 Stakic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 84, – 6.
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possibility of prosecuting crimes committed in non-international
armed conflict as war crimes in 1971, and problems of legality, such
as prosecuting ‘‘any crimes under international law’’ and ‘‘any
humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid out in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949’’ (even today such prosecutions would
be a problem) and convicting persons on the basis of never-before-
seen notions of criminality said by some to reflect the Yamashita
principle. There are other problems, such as the definition of genocide
that expands on the Genocide Convention, and the ever controversial
notion of crimes against peace. It is pertinent to note here that in
recommending the Draft Statute of the ICTY, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations underscored the importance that had been
given to ensuring that the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunals
must apply customary international law at the time.100 While it is
very clear that a skilled and serious attempt was made in defining the
crimes in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973, it seems that
the formulations used did not, in several instances, actually reflect the
state of customary international law at the time of the commission of
the offences.
Professor Jescheck acknowledged the ‘‘relaxed attitudes put for-
ward by the IMT’’,101 but according to one of the local drafters of the
law, the Nuremberg process, the Principles that emerged and cus-
tomary international law were enough to guarantee the legitimacy of
the legislation in 1973.102 The Bangladesh Constitution throws a
spanner in the works: it provides, inter alia, in Section 35, that
‘‘[n]o person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of
100 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808, – 34, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1159 [hereinafter Report of the UNSG under UNSC Res 808]:
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum
crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary
law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific
conventions does not arise. This would appear to be particularly important in
the context of an international tribunal prosecuting persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law.
101 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The General Principles of International Criminal Law
Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute, 2 J. INT’L J. CRIM. JUSTICE 38, 42
(2004).
102 M. Amir-Ul Islam, Bringing the Perpetrators of Genocide to Justice, a paper
presented at the International Conference on Genocide, Truth and Justice, Dhaka,
Bangladesh, Mar. 1–2, 2008, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 3 (2008).
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a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an
offence’’. The earlier 1972 Collaborators Act, pursuant to Article 47
of the Constitution, was listed on a schedule of legislation which
could not be challenged as unconstitutional.103 The drafters of the
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended acted to
forestall any challenges to that act, and the Legislature obliged. In the
words of one of those involved, in order
to bury any doubt or debate, we brought in the First Amendment to our Consti-
tution…This was to remove any doubt whatsoever or eradicate any foreseeable
controversy in the future as to its applicability in identifying as well as investigating
and trying such offence whenever and wherever it is committed.104
In Dhaka today, the position is taken that there can be no problem
with retroactivity arising from the use of the 1973 Act because the
Constitution provides that nothing done under the act can ever be
unconstitutional. They refer to the amendment to the Constitution,
adopted in tandem with the 1973 Act, resulting in Section 47(3).105
This provides that:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision
thereof providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a
member of any armed or defence or auxiliary forces or who is a prisoner of war, for
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under interna-
tional law shall be deemed void or unlawful, or ever to have become void or
unlawful, on the ground that such law or provision of any such law is inconsistent
with, or repugnant to, any of the provisions of this Constitution.
Bangladeshis are justly proud of their constitution, the rights it en-
shrines and the struggle for liberation from which it emerged. Each
country has its own principles of public law, and each constitution its
own internal logic and structure. But Parliament is usually supreme in
a Westminster style democracy. The German precedent shows how
unchecked Parliamentary supremacy can lead to ruin of a nation;
that even popularly endorsed power must not be abused. Bangladeshi
constitutional law expert Mahmudul Islam admits that Bangladesh
too has had its Constitution ‘‘turned into a document permitting
103 See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, First Schedule.
104
ISLAM, supra note 102, at 3.
105 The provision was inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1973,
Act XV of 1973 (Bangl.), Section 2 (taking effect on 15 July 1973).
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autocratic rule’’.106 If one adheres to the doctrine of positivism stricto
sensu, it may, in the extreme, lead to the conclusion that once law is
properly passed, it is valid and there can be no more questions about
the law’s validity, no challenge to the legitimacy of the law. The
record shows how the IMT Nuremberg dismissed the defence of
official acts required by law by way of technicality.107 It is not just
about formal validity of law, as H.L.A. Hart wrote in an oft quoted
passage in The Concept of Law,
What surely is most needed in order to make men clear sighted in confronting the
official abuse of power, is that they should preserve the sense that the certification of
something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience, and that,
however great the aura of majesty or authority which the official system may have, its
demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny. This sense, that there is
something outside the official system, by reference to which in the last resort the
individual must solve his problems of obedience, is surely more likely to be kept alive
among those who are accustomed to think that rules of law may be iniquitous, than
among who think that nothing iniquitous can anywhere have the status of law.108
The classic Hart-Fuller debate on the relationship between morality,
justice and the law is of course here relevant109 as is Germany’s struggle
with morally controversial normative provisions, whether under the
Nazis or in EastGermany (the BorderGuards cases). Resolution of the
challenge of Bangladesh’s problematic constitutional amendment
106
ISLAM, supra note 3, at 13.
107 United States of America v. Josef Altstoetter, VI Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 1, 49 (U.S.A. Military Tribunal, 1949):
It is true, as defendants contend, that German courts under the Third Reich
were required to follow German law (i.e. the expressed will of Hitler) even
when it was contrary to international law. But no such limitation can be
applied to this Tribunal. Here we have the paramount substantive law, plus a
Tribunal authorized and required to apply it notwithstanding the inconsistent
provisions of German local law. The very essence of the prosecution case is
that the laws, the Hitler decrees and the draconic, corrupt and perverted Nazi
judicial system themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes
against humanity and that participation in the enactment and enforcement of
them amounts to a complicity in crime.
108
HERBERT L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 206 (1st ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
109 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71(4)
HARV. L. REV. 539 (1958) and Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71(4) HARV. L. REV 630 (1958).
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could certainly be aided with consideration of Gustav Radbruch’s
seminal 1946 work on ‘‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und u¨bergesetzliches
Recht.’’110 In this, he famously considered the application ofNazi laws,
and argued that in resolving the conflict of legal certainty and justice,
preference should be given to the duly enacted law and secured by state
power as it is, even when it is unjust and fails to benefit the people. The
exception would be if the conflict with justice reaches so intolerable a
level that the statute becomes effectively ‘false law’; in such a case, it
must yield to justice. Radbruch rejected the positivist argument that
one can legislate anything, even the manifest immorality of the Na-
tional Socialist ilk, into binding law; for him, statutory rules that reach
a level of extreme injustice cease to be law. He argued that ‘‘Where
there is not even anattempt at justice,where equality, the core of justice,
is deliberately betrayed in the issuanceof positive law, then the statute is
not merely ‘flawed law’, it lacks completely the very nature of law’’.111
How then should Section 47(3) of the Bangladeshi Constitution
be viewed? There are two problems that seem to arise. Firstly, prin-
ciples of fairness, equality and responsible use of power are called
into question when a legislature adopts laws and make changes to the
constitution that are wholly in favour of the government, represent-
ing one side to a conflict, and which are to the detriment of persons
belonging to the other side in that conflict in the sense of blocking off
their ability to rely on the highest law in the land in the protection of
fundamental rights. This raises the fundamental question of fairness,
and whether the constitutionality of the amendment can be chal-
lenged. Richard Albert suggests this sort of approach is tantamount
to asking whether the Bible is unbiblical112 – or, in our context, a
question that goes to Bangladesh’s constitutional order. In addition
to the possibilities already mentioned, e.g. the Radbruch formulation,
one approach that could be tried is the basic structure doctrine; or
substantive model’, that attempts to limit the powers of a Parliament
in amending in a constitution. Albert has noted that the Supreme
Courts in three countries have adopted this approach: India,
Germany and South Africa.113 India’s Supreme Court has held that
its Parliament, in exercise of the power of amendment granted by the
110 See Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law,
translated by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson into English and re-
published in 26(1) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 111 (2006).
111 Id. p.7.
112 Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments 22 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5, 5 (2009).
113 Id.
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constitution, cannot alter its basic structure or features.114 One is
drawn to recall here, Indira Gandhi’s 42nd amendment to the Indian
Constitution: ‘‘No amendment…shall be called into question in any
court on any ground’’ which was invalidated by the Supreme Court
on grounds of negation of the right of equality and in contravention
to the basic principles of the constitution.115 Bangladesh’s equivalent
case was Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh, or the 8th
Amendment case’, with the Appellate Division finding that Parlia-
ment could not, under its powers of amendment, change the consti-
tution in a way that altered its basic structure or features.116 The
basic structures and features that cannot be altered include: inde-
pendence of the judiciary and fundamental rights, as well as rule of
law.117
Nobody charged under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act
1973 As Amended will be able to challenge the provisions of the Act
as violating fundamental rights protected by the Constitution (in
particular, Section 31 (Right to protection of law), Section 35 (Pro-
tection in respect of trial and punishment) and Section 44 (Enforce-
ment of fundamental rights). Nobody will be able to challenge, on
constitutional grounds, the independence of the judiciary. Access to
this critical remedy is barred. From the perspective of international
114 Keshavandanda v, Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.
115 Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789. For a review of the
Indian cases on unconstitutional amendments’, See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, An
unconstitutional constitution? A comparative perspective 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 460 (2006).
Jacobsohn also cites from a 1951 German Supreme Court case, the Southwest case,
where the court expressly invoked German’s past to affirm that never again would
formal legal means be used to legalise a totalitarian regime:
That a constitutional provision itself may be null and void, is not conceptually
impossible just because it is part of the Constitution. There are constitutional
provisions that are so fundamental and to such an extent an expression of a
law that precedes even the constitution that they also bind the framer of the
constitution, and other constitutional provisions that do not rank so high may
be null and void, because they contravene these principles (at 447, footnote
58).For a discussion in the context of American constitutional law, see Vincent
Samar, Can a Constitutional Amendment be Unconstitutional? 33 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 667 (2008).
116 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh B.D.L. (Spl) 1, 41 DRF (AD) 165
(Bangl., S. Ct. Appellate Div. 1989). See also ISLAM, supra note 3, at 393–408 (dis-
cussing the case).
117 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, supra note 113, –– 377, 443
(Shahabuddin Ahmed J. and M.H. Rahman J.).
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human rights law, there was no emergency in 1973, and there cer-
tainly is no emergency today warranting such deviation from the
equal protection of the law or fair trial with due process. This
infringement of fundamental rights is not necessary and is dispro-
portionate. In addition, the aim of the changes itself seems also
problematic. The ousting of the protections of the usual criminal
procedure was intended to overcome prosecutorial difficulties in
building cases, and Section 47(3) of the Constitution was, it is no
secret, intended to forestall challenges to the International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act 1973.118 Thus, the whole scheme seems intended to
give an almost free hand to the government, and then block off any
constitutionally based challenges to the law or any provisions in it.
And, the Constitutional provisions that are most relevant are inde-
pendence of the judiciary and fundamental rights, as well as rule of
law. In Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh, Judge Rahman
also pointed out that
…if any amendment causes any serious impairment of the powers and the functions
of the Supreme Court the makers of the Constitution devised as the kingpin for
securing the rule of law to all citizens, then the validity of such an amendment will be
examined on the touchstone of the Preamble.119
Is there then not a major problem with Section 47(3) of the Consti-
tution, in light of the 8th Amendment Case?
Secondly, if we look at Section 47(3) of the Constitution in iso-
lation, one does get the impression that this cutting off of constitu-
tional remedies may have been targeting of the other side’, and was
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution as a whole. However, it
cannot be seen in isolation Seen in context of the entire provision, it is
in substance a mere addition to a raft of legislation that was excepted
in the schedule referred to, ranging from the Bangladesh Bank Order
1972 to the Bangladesh Jute Corporation Order 1972 and the 1972
118 See also Islam, supra note 102, at 3.
119 Id., 391. See also CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH,
preamble:
that it should be a fundamental aim of the State to realize through the dem-
ocratic process a socialist society, free from exploitation – a society in which
the rule law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice,
political, economic and social, will be secured for all citizens (emphasis added).
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Collaborators Order. Even if it is correct in terms of formal consti-
tutional law, given the degree of legitimate constitutional challenges
that could be made under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act
1973 As Amended, blocking off that avenue is a matter that, if trials
proceed, is likely to be a matter for the concern of the Human Rights
Committee in reviewing Bangladesh’s compliance with the ICCPR. It
could also be questioned by the Committee in reviewing compliance
with CERD.120 These issues are examined in the next section.
A final note is that the constitutional amendment only applies to
‘‘any person, who is a member of any armed or defence or auxiliary
forces or who is a prisoner of war’’ accused of genocide, crimes
against humanity or war crimes and other international crimes. It
does not quite track the language of the International Crimes (Tri-
bunals) Act 1973 As Amended. A civilian who was not one of the
above would not be covered by the said provision – this raises
questions in relation to the Central Peace Committee and the Peace
and Welfare Council, which were civilian organisations.
5.2 Relationship with International Law and Comparative Approaches
Bangladesh’s legal system follows English common law. Treaties and
other international conventions require incorporation into domestic
law by an act of Parliament in order to be applied.121 Bangladesh and
others v. Sombon Asavhan established that where there is municipal
law on an international subject the national court’s function is to
‘‘enforce the municipal law within the plain meaning of the stat-
120 Bangladesh acceded to the CERD, supra note 1, on Jun. 11, 1979.
121 For a classical statement of the position in English law, See J.H. Rayner
(Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry Ltd [1990] 2 A.C. 418, 500
(H.L.) [hereinafter The International Tin Council case] (Lord Oliver):
A treaty is not part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated
into the law by legislation. So far as individuals are concerned, it is res inter
alios act from which they cannot derive rights and by which they cannot be
deprived of rights or subject to obligations.
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ute’’.122 Customary international law is directly applicable without
such formal incorporation, it being already part of the common law
and the law of the land (although this is subject to not conflicting
with an act of Parliament).123 The Bangladesh Constitution contains
an incomplete reference, in Article 145(A) to international treaties; it
simply covers procedure for submitting treaties before Parliament.124
There is nothing on the status of treaties or customary international
law. Mr. Justice Chowdhury has presented the approach taken by the
Bangladeshi courts in the following terms:
True it is that the Universal Human Rights norms, whether given in the Universal
Declaration, or in the Covenants, are not directly enforceable in national courts. But
if their provisions are incorporated into the domestic law, they are enforceable in
national courts. The local laws, both constitutional and statutory, are not always in
consonance with the norms contained in international human rights instruments.
The national court should not, I feel, straightway ignore the international obliga-
tions, which a country undertakes. If the domestic laws are not clear enough or there
is nothing therein the national courts should draw upon the principles incorporated
in the international instruments. But in the cases where the domestic laws are clear
and inconsistent with the international obligations of the state concerned, courts will
be obliged to respect the national law, but shall draw the attention of the law makers
to such inconsistencies.125
In the matter of the prosecution of international crimes, the Inter-
national Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended will probably have to
be treated as the primary source of law for any tribunal that is created
to take jurisdiction. But, by referencing the enumerated international
crimes, the body of laws on which these crimes have been developed
in customary and treaty law is probably also to be treated as a source
of law.126 In the matter of the incorporation of treaties by the law,
122 See Bangladesh and others v. Sombon Asavhan (1980) 32 D.L.R. 198, 201
(Bangl., S. Ct. Appellate Div.); Bangladesh v. Unimarine SA Panama (1997) 29
D.L.R. 252 (Bangl., S. Ct.). See also M. SHAH ALAM, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS 102 (2007) (discussing these cases).
123 For the traditional common law position, see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67 (15th ed., 1809) (‘‘the law of nations, in its
fullest extent, was part of the law of the land’’). See also Trendtex Trading Corpo-
ration v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356 (C.A.).
124
ALAM, supra note 122, at 118.
125 See Hussain Muhammad Ershad v. Bangladesh and others (2001) 21 B.L.D.
(AD) 69 (Bangl.). See also ALAM, supra note 122, at 108 (discussing the case).
126
ALAM, supra note 122, at 110. Alam has also written that
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this seems to be incorporation by reference only, since incorporation
was not formally done by way of inclusion in an annexed schedule
(the only international conventions specifically referred are the
Geneva Conventions of 1949).127 Of course, some unincorporated
treaties, such as the Genocide Convention and the Regulations
annexed to Hague Convention IV,128 will be declaratory of custom-
ary international law. According to Professor M. Shah Alam,
Bangladeshi judges are not enthusiasts either of referring to or
applying unincorporated treaties.129 Others have commented that the
Bangladeshi courts have only been prepared to observe that an
unincorporated treaty ‘‘could be recognized upon ratification’’,
without elaborating on how it could be so done.130 There is also an
argument that reference to English jurisprudence may amount to
some implicit approval of the English judicial trend of using unin-
corporated conventions for a plurality of purposes, however, given
the rather conservative attitude of the Bangladeshi courts, it remains
uncertain whether this argument is actually true.131 One thing is
however certain: the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
International laws therefore, will only be applied to the extent that
they comply.
The maxim jura novit curia aside, is it going to be possible for the
Bangladeshi court to seek expert opinions, or amicus curiae briefs, on
some of the complex matters of international criminal law that it is
going to have to grapple with? Will the Bangladeshi tribunal interpret
treaties in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Footnote 126 continued
Even subscribing to the principle of primacy of domestic law vis-a`-vis inter-
national law, it is possible to resort to vast potentials of international law by
reading these norms into domestic law, or illuminating domestic law by
international law or where domestic law are not clear by interpreting them in
the light of international law, or where there is no relevant domestic law, by
applying international law.
127 The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, See supra note 1.
128 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
with annexed Regulations, Oct. 19, 1907 [1910] U.K.T.S. 9 [1907] Cmnd. 5030
[hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
129
ALAM, supra note 122, at 100, 102.
130 See Ridwanul Hoque and Mostafa Mahmu Naser, The Judicial Invocation of
International Human Rights Law in Bangladesh: questing a Better Approach 40
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 151, 180 (2006); ALAM, supra note 122, at 114.
131
ALAM, supra note 122, at 114.
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Treaties, Articles 31–33 of which are regarded as customary in
nature?132 Here, guidance can also be derived from national
practice133 and other jurisdictions.134 Strict reading of the rules
without understanding the humanitarian purposes and philosophy
behind them can lead to unjust denial of legal protections to the
vulnerable victims of conflict. Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht wisely
counselled in the decision on the Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Provi-
sional Measures) that
[w]hile the demands of legal principle cannot be ignored, it has to be recalled that the
rigid maintenance of principle is not an end in itself but the constructive application
of law to the needs of the ultimate beneficiaries of the legal system, individuals, no
less than the political structures in which they are organised.135
132 Notwithstanding that to date, Bangladesh is not a party to the Convention. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. Held to be customary in cases
including: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Serb.) (Judgement of Feb. 26, 2007), – 160, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) [herein-
after Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 Judgement]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Reports 136, – 94 (Jul. 9) [hereinafter Wall
Advisory Opinion]; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.A.), 2004
I.C.J. Reports 128, – 99 (Mar. 31); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.A.), 2001 I.C.J. Reports
466 (Jun. 27); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipdan (Indon. v. Malay.),
2002 I.C.J. Reports 625, – 37 (Dec. 17); Appellate Body Report, United States –
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 16–17, WT/DS2/AB/R (May
20, 1996) (For Article 31); Appellate Body Report, European Community – Customs
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, 104, WT/DS62/AB/R; WT/DS67/AB/
R; WT/DS68/AB/R (Jun. 5, 1998) (For Article 32).
133 See ISLAM, supra note 3, at 32–47 (for an overview of Bangladeshi practices of
statutory interpretation).
134 See e.g. Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines [1981] A.C. 251, 281–282 (H.L.) (Lord
Diplock):
The language of an international convention has not been chosen by an
English Parliamentary draftsman. It is neither couched in the conventional
English legislative idiom nor designed to be construed exclusively by English
judges. It is addressed to a much wider and more varied judicial audience than
is an Act of Parliament…. It should be interpreted as Lord Wilberforce put
it… ‘‘unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English precedent,
but on broad principles of general acceptance.’’
135 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. v. Serb.), 1993 I.C.J. Reports 408 (Provisional Measures Order
of Apr. 8, 1993) (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht).
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Trial Chambers at the ICTY have taken a teleological approach in
dealing with the tricky issues of law in this field, some of which, it has
to be said, are not sufficiently flexible to meet the reality of many of
the situations faced. It is particularly so in the case of a prolonged
occupation. An ICTY Trial Chamber in the Cˇelebic´i case136 called for
a broad and principled approach to the application of the basic
norms of the international law of armed conflict. It stressed that all of
those individuals who took no active part in hostilities and yet found
themselves engulfed in the horror and violence of war should not be
denied the protection of humanitarian law (Geneva Convention IV in
the particular case).137 This approach has also found favour with the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic´.138
Common law judges are known for being somewhat reluctant to
rule on matters of international law, seeing this body of law as
being more about policy or foreign affairs.139 According to Pro-
fessor M. Alam Shah, judges in Bangladesh tend to ‘‘shy away from
any serious consideration of international law’’, including interna-
tional instruments.140 How is the legal process to deal with the
matter of the critical jurisprudence on international crimes since
1945? Reference to the enormous body of jurisprudence in this area,
and careful handling of it to ensure respect for the principle of
legality, is essential. But, can Bangladeshi courts refer to, and apply,
the decisions of other domestic courts, international tribunals and
sometimes international human rights courts and treaty monitoring
bodies? The methodology will be challenging. Assuming the courts
will be able to rely on and even directly apply international juris-
prudence, will they follow an international law methodology or
Bangladesh’s common law tradition in these matters? For example,
in international law, there is no doctrine of stare decisis; in common
136 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic´, Zdravko Mucic´, Hazim Delic´ and Esad Landzo,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, – 275 (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Delalic´ et al.
Trial Judgement or the Cˇelebic´i case].
137 Id.
138 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement, – 168 (Jul. 15,
1999) [hereinafter Tadic´ Appeal Judgement].
139
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOWWE USE
IT 206–207 (1994). (The author argued that this reticence stems from a distinct legal
culture, characterised by a lack of background in international law for among judges,
and that this manifests itself in various ways, ranging from contempt for interna-
tional law, to strenuous efforts not to decide points of international law but to locate
the ratio decidendi on more familiar ground (emphasis added).)
140
ALAM, supra note 120, at 100, 102.
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law Bangladesh, this is a fundamental tenet of the legal approach.
In view of these being foreign cases, logic suggests that a Ban-
gladeshi tribunal, if it is allowed to consider such cases, will prob-
ably not be bound, but merely be guided in accordance with the
persuasiveness of the particular decision. In taking on the monu-
mental exercise of trying international crimes domestically, Ban-
gladesh may find guidance in the approaches taken by Canadian,
British and Australian courts in trying war crimes cases.141 These
common law jurisdictions have, in the cases before them, had to
have recourse to international law, particularly customary interna-
tional law, which is notoriously difficult to ascertain.
As already indicated, there are likely to be problems with inter-
national treaty monitoring bodies. The reason these external bodies
would have the power to examine the situation is that by becoming a
party to the ICCPR142 and CERD143 Bangladesh has consented not
just to abide by the treaties, but to external scrutiny. Pacta sunt
servanda. The ICCPR is particularly relevant, given the ousting of the
regular criminal procedure in the International Crimes (Tribunals)
Act 1973 As Amended, and the amendment to the Constitution that
expressly prohibits any challenges to the constitutionality of the
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973.144 This is borne out by
reference to the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence and in
particular, its General Comment 32 on the right to equality before
141 See the contribution of Gideon Boas to this Special Edition. Canada’s present
War Crimes Program was established in 1998, replacing an earlier programme of
unsuccessful prosecutions, specifically the trial of Imre Finta, who was acquitted (see
R v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.). The UK adopted its War Crimes Act in 1991,
and has so far only tried one historic crime – the accused was convicted. (See R v.
Anthony Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. 220 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to the House of
Lords rejected by both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords).) Australia has had
a War Crimes Act since 1945, but amended it in 1988 (see Polyukhovic v. Com-
monwealth (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501 (Austl.)). See Gillian Triggs, Australia’s War
Crimes Trials: All Pity Choked, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL APPROACHES 123–150 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry Simpson eds.,
1997); Sharon A. Williams, Laudable Principles Lacking Application: The Prosecution
of War Criminals in Canada, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, above, at 151–170. See also
Ian Bryan & Peter Rowe, The role of evidence in war crimes trials: the common law
and the Yugoslav tribunal 2 Y.B, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 307 (2006).
142 Bangladesh acceded on Sept., 6, 2000.
143 Bangladesh acceded on Jun. 11, 1979.
144 On a technical matter, the Constitution has not been amended to reflect the
fact that the 1973 law has now been amended.
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courts and tribunals and to a fair trial.145 The setup in Bangladesh
provides unequal application and protection of the law, and dis-
criminatory access to challenge alleged violations of fundamental
human rights as enshrined in the highest law of the land. The Human
Rights Committee may well find Bangladesh to be in breach of other
international obligations under the ICCPR. In addition to Article 14,
Article 9(4) of the ICCPR would be particularly relevant: ‘‘Anyone
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled
to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful.’’ As I examine later in the
section on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, there are no substantive
rules governing arrest and detention under the International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended. In any event, a complaint from a
detained person, if based on the Constitutional’s fundamental rights
guarantees, is not permissible under Section 47(3) of the Constitu-
tion. This clearly creates a clash with Bangladesh’s international
obligations.
The ICCPR’s Articles 9 on rights of liberty and 14 on equality
before the law and due process are, as has been noted, critical. These
have been authoritatively interpreted by the Human Right Com-
mittee, and these interpretations should not be dismissed on for-
malistic, technical grounds. Another concern is to do with rights such
as the presumption of innocence, which the Human Rights Com-
mittee considers so critical as to be non-derogable.146 This right is
impacted on by failure in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As
Amended adequately to protect the subsidiary rights to silence and
non-self-incrimination, given how the legislation tilts towards the
extraction of confessions. One of the issues that may also arise is the
regularity of the tribunal, for this is a special’ tribunal in every way,
down to the exclusion of the regular rules of procedure and evidence.
The ICCPR requires that tribunals be established by law, which this
one certainly is. The Human Rights Committee has not held special’
tribunals to be unlawful, but has warned that ‘‘quite often the reason
145 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 – Article 14: Right to
equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32
(Aug. 23, 2007).
146 Note however, that the Human Rights Committee makes it clear that this is
not the only right that is non-derogable. See Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 29 – States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at
186; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General
Comment 29].
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for the establishment of such courts is to enable exceptional proce-
dures to be applied which do not comply with normal standards of
justice.’’147 This concern will almost certainly mean that the Human
Rights Committee will need to be monitoring the proceedings espe-
cially closely, as part of its overseeing of the implementation of the
ICCPR in Bangladesh. Then, the Committee against Racial Dis-
crimination may well become engaged if the process is seen to be a
possible targeting of the Bihari racial/ethnic group.
As a matter of Bangladeshi law, the Constitution would be su-
preme. But, in international law, a State cannot raise its domestic law
as an excuse for non-compliance with its international obligations.148
My purpose in highlighting such irregularities here is to underscore
that they will have to be addressed sooner rather than later, before
the process starts, otherwise they may affect the overall fairness of the
process.
147 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13: Equality before the courts
and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law
(Art. 14), – 4, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14 (Apr. 13, 1998).
148 VCLT, supra note 132, art 27 (‘‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’’). Although Bangladesh
is not a party to the VCLT, there seems to be considerable authority to suggest that
this rule has been regarded as a general principle of international law: See e.g. The
Alabama Claims (U.S. v. G.B.), 1 Int’l Arb. 495, 656 (‘‘…the government of Her
Britannic Majestic cannot justify itself for a failure in due diligence on the plea of
insufficiency of the legal means of action which it possessed’’); Exchange of Greek
and Turkish Population, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 10, at 20
(‘‘[Article 18 of the Treaty of Lausanne 1923] merely lays stress on a principle which
is self-evident, according to which a State which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary
to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken’’); Applicability of the Obli-
gation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agree-
ment, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. Reports 12, 34–35 (Apr. 26, 1988):
It would be sufficient to recall the fundamental principle of international law
that international law prevails over domestic law. This principle was endorsed
by judicial decision as long ago as the arbitral award of 14 September 1872 in
the Alabama case between Great Britain and the United States, and has fre-
quently been recalled since, for example in the case concerning the Greco-
Bulgarian ‘‘Communities’’ in which the Permanent Court of International
Justice laid it down that ‘‘it is a generally accepted principle of international
law that in the relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a
treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty’’
(P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 17, p. 32).
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5.3 Personal Jurisdiction
The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 was adopted 1 year
after the 1972 Collaborators Act. It was designed to deal with the
more high value’ suspects, such as the Pakistanis Prisoners-of-War
being held by the Indians and those who were accused of more
substantial crimes and could not benefit from the 1973 amnesty. All
have long since been released from custody. The act has a very wide
personal jurisdiction that could draw in significant numbers of ac-
cused. On the basis of the materials that I studied, it seems that
crimes in the Bangladeshi war of independence were committed by:
1. Members of the Pakistani Armed Forces
2. Pakistani political leaders
3. Pakistani militias – whether from West Pakistan or East Pakistan
4. Bengali freedom fighters and other Bengali militias
5. Bengali civilians – both pro or anti Pakistan
6. Non-Bengali civilians.
Under Section 3(1) as recently amended, a Tribunal shall have the
power to try and punish any individual or group of persons, or any
member of any armed, defence forces or auxiliary forces (i.e. forces
placed under the control of the Armed Forces for operational,
administrative, static and other purposes) who ‘‘commits or has
committed’’, in the territory of Bangladesh, whether before or after
the commencement of this Act, any of the crimes listed. The
amendment here was to insert the ‘‘group of persons’’, but it does not
seem like criminalisation of the group as such is what is intended.
Joint criminality seems already possible under the law through con-
spiracy – see later discussion – so this addition does not seem to
change much.
On 30 July 2009, at the Second International Conference on
Genocide, Truth and Justice in Dhaka, the Hon. Minister for Law,
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs categorically stated that there
would be no Pakistanis tried under this law. It would only be applied
to Bangladeshi nationals.149 Pakistan is known to be very concerned
about the entire process of revisiting 1971, and the possibility of its
nationals being put on trial in Dhaka. The majority of members of
the Organisation of Islamic States are also said to be unhappy and
149 Hon. Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Shafique Ahmed,
Address at the Second International Conference on Genocide, Truth and Justice (Jul.
30, 2009) (Notes on file with author).
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support Pakistan in this matter. With all due respect, the text of the
law says that it applies ‘‘irrespective’’ of nationality, and the Minis-
ter’s understandable concern with placating Pakistan obviously
cannot override it. But taking jurisdiction over Pakistanis is a very
tricky issue that goes to the heart of this accountability exercise. To
focus simply on those whom one can get one’s hands on, who were in
the scale of things in 1971 merely foot soldiers and followers (the term
small fish’ is often used to describe this type of low-ranking perpe-
trator), while the planners, commanders and those with control over
them remain out of reach creates a dangerously warped process from
the start. This problem of inability to touch the ones with greatest
responsibility was one of the factors which doomed the East Timor
process of accountability at the Special Panels for Serious Crimes.150
But, what is Bangladesh to do about the Pakistanis? Strategically,
proceeding against locals will bring to light much evidence about the
role of the Pakistani Army and political leaders, and it will probably
create a wider momentum for some kind of action or remedy from
Pakistan. Pakistan, given the condition that it is in, is hardly in a
position to start to deal with the crimes of 1971, even if criminal
sanction was what its own Justice Hamoodur Rahman recom-
mended. In any event, the sorry precedent of Indonesia’s East Timor
trials, put on as a result of international pressure and threats of an ad
hoc international tribunal, show how a skilfully a State can twist a
judicial process to whitewash its role and that of its soldiers and
officials, create a false truth’ about what happened, and affirm
alleged criminals as national heroes in the public eye.151 Be that as it
may, some kind of accommodation must be reached with Pakistan to
ensure that the critical documents and first hand interviews relied on
by the Justice Hamoodur Rahman inquiry should be made available
to the Bangladeshis.
There are also countries, such as the United Kingdom, where
persons said to have been instrumental in atrocities in 1971 are now
150 For analyses of this, see e.g.: Suzannah Linton, East Timor and Accountability
for Serious Crimes, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed., M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 2008), 257–283; Suzannah Linton, Indonesia and Accountability for Serious
Crimes in East Timor, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, above, at 399–406; SU-
ZANNAH LINTON, PUTTING THINGS INTO PERSPECTIVE: THE REALITIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY
IN EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA AND CAMBODIA (Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian
Studies, Vol 3, 2005).
151 See e.g. Linton, supra note 88. Also, Suzannah Linton, Unravelling the First
Three Trials at Indonesia’s Ad Hoc Court for Human Rights Violations in East Timor,
17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 303 (2004).
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residing. A British Channel 4 television documentary in 1995
examined the allegations against three persons residing in the United
Kingdom and found credible evidence of criminal conduct.152 It is
usually suggested that the United Kingdom could itself be prose-
cuting such persons on the basis of its Geneva Conventions Act of
1957 which provides for the prosecution of Grave Breaches (but not
violations of Common Article 3). Obviously the acts would have to
be committed in the international armed conflict stage of the liber-
ation war for this to be applicable. Other options available to States
with such persons within their jurisdiction include extradition to
Bangladesh pursuant to a request or arrest warrant (dependant on
extradition agreements), and stripping a person of residence rights or
nationality on the basis of fraudulent statement on application (as
done in Canada) and repatriating the person back to the country of
origin, Bangladesh.
One other possibility is trials in absentia. Bangladesh’s Prevention
of Oppression of Women and Children Act 2000 permits this, under
Section 20.153 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended
says nothing about trial in the presence of the accused. In fact,
Bangladesh has made a reservation to the ICCPR on this matter of in
absentia trial.154 Such trials are highly frowned upon in common law
jurisdictions, but in international human rights law, they are not
unlawful if there are sufficient safeguards. The Human Rights
Committee has held that in absentia trials are possible where if the
State has given effective notice of the hearing and the accused chooses
not to appear.155 There is already precedent for a full-blown trial in
152 See Ansar Ahmed Ullah, Building an international network: Campaign to seek
justice & the efforts in the UK, a paper presented at the Second International Con-
ference on Genocide, Truth and Justice, Jul. 30–31, 2009, at 5.
153 Children’s Act, Act No VIII of 2000 (Bangl.).
154 See Bangladesh’s Reservation to the ICCPR, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last vis-
ited Aug. 30, 2009). The full text is extracted below:
The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh reserve apply
paragraph 3(d) of Article 14 in view of the fact, that, while the existing laws of
Bangladesh provide that, in the ordinary course a person, shall be entitled to be
tried in his presence, it also provides for a trial to be held in his absence if he is
a fugitive offender, or is a person, who being required to appear before a court,
fails to present himself or to explain the reasons for non-appearance to the
satisfaction of the court.
155 See e.g. Daniel Monguya Mbenge v. Democratic Republic of Congo (No. 16/
1977), – 14.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/16/1977 (Mar. 25, 1983).
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absentia (as opposed to a quasi-trial as with Rule 61 proceedings
under the ICTY Statute156), for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon can
hold such proceedings.157 But there are safeguards: this is only pos-
sible when an accused fails to appear as summoned, or does not even
appoint a defence lawyer to appear in his stead. In situations where
the indictment cannot be served or notified to the accused, it must be
properly publicised. Trial in absentia is never going to be a wise
option in a situation where there are doubts about the integrity of the
criminal justice system.
5.4 Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Section 3(2)
5.4.1 Crimes Against Humanity: Section 3(2)(a)
The law provides for jurisdiction over crimes against humanity,
defined as the following:
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, abduction,
confinement, torture, rape or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population or persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
This is an adaptation of the Charter of the IMT Nuremberg (added
are the specific acts of imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture
and rape, and ethnicity is added to the persecution provision, some of
which come from Control Council Law No. 10; removed are the
words ‘‘before or during the war’’).158 As Professor Jescheck has
acknowledged, the IMT made new law (in other words, it was ex post
facto law in violation of the fundamental principle of nullum crimen,
nulla poene sine lege), although he asserts that most of it was in line
with domestic law.159 The prohibition of crimes against humanity as
set out in the Charter was unanimously approved by General
Assembly Resolution 95(I), which later led to the International Law
156 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827; U.N. SCOR., 48th Sess., 3217th mtg.; U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25,
1993); 32 I.L.M. 1203 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
157 See Paola Gaeta, To be (Present) Or Not to be (Present): Trials in Absentia
before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1165 (2007).
158 See Charter of the IMT Nuremburg, supra note 93, art 6(c); Control Council
Law No. 10, supra note 82, art II(c).
159 Jescheck, supra note 101, at 50 (this underlines the importance of retaining the
domestic law in any domestic prosecution of international crimes).
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Commission’s Principles of International Law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the
Tribunal’.160
The crime against humanity has no conventional roots. The cus-
tomary prohibition is what forms the basis – not always the exact
content – of jurisdiction that has been discussed since World War
I.161 After the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the concept evolved
further through Control Council Law No. 10 and cases thereunder,
and atrocity cases tried in domestic courts such as Eichmann,162
Barbie,163 Touvier164 and Finta.165 The status of the prohibition is
evidenced in the 1993 Report of the Secretary-General accompanying
the submission of the ICTY Statute to the Security Council, which
explained that crimes against humanity are ‘‘beyond any doubt part
of customary international law’’.166 While there is no doubt that
crimes against humanity are prohibited as international crimes, there
are differences between all the major definitions, none of which is
identical to the elements of the crime that was tried at Nuremburg.
This was considered by the Group of Experts on Cambodia, who
stated nevertheless that:
160 G.A. Res 95(I), supra note 93; ILC Nuremburg Principles, supra note 97,
Principle VI(c) (under which a crime against humanity is punishable as a crime under
international law. The resolution maintained the definitions used by the IMT
Nuremburg).
161 See the 1915 Franco–British–Russian Joint Declaration condemning the
massacre of Armenians and calling for all members of the Turkish government to be
held responsible for such ‘‘crimes against civilization and humanity’’. This is quoted
in the Armenian Memorandum presented by the Greek delegation to the Commis-
sion of Fifteen on Mar. 14, 1919. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINSTHUMANITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 62, n. 84 (2nd ed., 1999); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against
Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 178, 181, n. 2 (1946); Rouben Paul Adalian, American
Diplomatic Correspondence in the Age of Mass Murder: The Armenian Genocide in the
US Archives, in AMERICAN AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE OF 1915 150 (Jay Winter ed.,
2003).
162 Eichmann District Court Judgement, supra note 81.
163 Fe´de´ration nationale des de´porte´s et interne´s re´sistants et patriotes and others
v. Barbie 78 I.L.R. 125 (Fr. Cass. crim. 1985).
164 Touvier 100 ILR 338 (Fr. Paris Cours d’assises 1992), rev’d 100 ILR 351 (Fr.
Cass. crim. 1992).
165 R v. Finta, supra note 141.
166 Report of the UNSG under UNSC Res 808, supra note 100, – 48.
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The trends that have now solidified were well in place by 1975, so that a prosecution
of Khmer Rouge leaders for such violations would not violate a fair and reasonable
reading of the nullum crimen principle.167
The Bangladeshi text, on the face of it, appears to turn ordinary but
serious crimes – murder, even mass murder in the form of extermi-
nation – into extraordinary crimes simply because they are committed
against any civilian population. Missing from the text is the concept
of the ‘‘widespread or systematic attack’’ against the civilian popu-
lation, which is the hallmark of the crime against humanity, and
which distinguishes it from ordinary crimes. It is true that the term
‘‘widespread or systematic attack’’ only appeared for the first time in
positive law in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda [hereinafter ICTR] in 1994.168 It was not in the Charter of
the IMT Nuremberg, nor was it in the Charter of the IMT Far
East.169 The requirement that the particular actions be part of a
‘‘widespread or systematic attack’’ against the civilian population
came to form an integral part of the crime through the caselaw.170 In
1993, the Report of the Secretary-General accompanying the sub-
mission of the ICTY Statute to the Security Council explained that
crimes against humanity are ‘‘inhumane acts of a very serious
nature…committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population’’.171 In spite of this, it was not felt
necessary to include it in the definition in the Statute. But the Tadic´
decision confirmed the principle that crimes against humanity must
be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the
civilian population, and it requires this as part of the burden of
167 Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 52/135, – 71, U.N. Doc. A/53/850-S/1999/231, Annex (Feb. 18,
1999) [hereinafter Cambodia Experts Report].
168 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955; U.N. SCOR
49th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); 33 I.L.M. 1598.
169 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (As amended
26 April 1946) 14 State Dept Bull, 8990; TIAS No. 1589 [hereinafter Charter of the
IMT Far East].
170 The United Nations War Crimes Commission had confirmed the prototype of
the widespread or systematic plan’ by observing that systematic mass action’ is
required for a finding of crime against humanity in the context of Second World War
cases: See BASSIOUNI, supra note 161, at 37.
171 Report of the UNSG under UNSC Res 808, supra note 100, – 48.
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proving the elements of the crime.172 In Almonacid-Arellano et al.
v. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered
crimes against humanity in Chile in 1973. It found, inter alia, that
they had been committed, the underlying crimes having been ‘‘com-
mitted as part of a systematic and general pattern against the civil
population’’.173 The element of a ‘‘widespread or systematic attack
against the civilian population’’ is also included in the crimes against
humanity provision used at Cambodia’s ECCC for 1975–1979.174
The court trying the Bangladeshi crimes will have to establish the
state of customary law in 1971 and rule on this matter of whether the
crime against humanity then had to be committed as part of a
‘‘widespread or systematic attack’’ on the civilian population.
There also has to be a nexus’ or a link’ between the accused’s acts
(the underlying core crime) and the ‘‘widespread or systematic’’ at-
tack on the civilian population. In modern international criminal law,
it is clear that the acts of the accused must comprise part of a pattern
of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian popu-
lation and the accused must have known that his acts fit into such a
pattern.175 The underlying core crime need not be an attack176 or in
itself a widespread or systematic attack, but it needs to be part of it.
Attack’ here does not mean an armed attack as under the interna-
tional law of armed conflict. But, that obviously does not mean that
military or other acts of violence in armed conflict cannot amount to
an attack’ for the purposes of crimes against humanity. For this
crime, the notion of attack is wider than that of the international law
of armed conflict, and ‘‘encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian
population’’.177 When establishing an attack’ of this nature, it is
irrelevant that the other side committed atrocities, although such
172 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138, – 248. See also ICTR Statute, supra
note 168, art 3.
173 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 44/02,
I.A.C.H.R. Doc. 5 rev 1 at 208, – 104 (2002).
174 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006, art 5
(Cambodia) (Unofficial translation by the Council of Jurists) [hereinafter Law on
ECCC]; ICTR Statute, supra note 168.
175 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138, –– 248, 252, 271.
176 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-A & 23/1-A, Appeal Judge-
ment, – 917 (Jun. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Kunarac Appeal Judgement].
177 Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic´, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgement, –– 29–30 (Nov. 29,
2002) [hereinafter Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgement].
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considerations would go towards mitigation of any sentence follow-
ing a conviction.
What of policy – does the prosecution have to show that there was
a policy to commit widespread or systematic attacks on the civilian
population in 1971? There was some initially contradictory juris-
prudence, but according to the law of the contemporary tribunals,
there is no need in customary law for a plan or policy as such but its
existence can go towards proving the systematic’ element. ‘‘The
existence of policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but it is not a
legal element of the crime’’.178 Whether this was the case in 1971 will
have to be considered by the Bangladeshi Tribunal. It should be
noted that the ICC Statute179 goes beyond custom in specifically
requiring proof of policy;180 this is because it is intended to catch
particularly egregious actions. But, it is helpful in that it provides
some guidance on what to look for: relevant policies can be active, or
be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is con-
sciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a
policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or
organisational action. In other words, one needs more than mere
inaction. The writings and studies on the 1971 war strongly suggest
that there was indeed a policy, as well as systematic planning of the
Pakistani operations in the East.
On the basis of a textual analysis of Section 3(2)(a), there are two
interpretations possible on the discriminatory intent (‘‘on political,
racial, ethnic or religious grounds’’): (1) All the crimes listed have to
be perpetrated with discriminatory intent; (2) Only persecution has to
be committed with discriminatory intent. Modern international
criminal law makes it clear that in custom, it is just persecution which
requires discrimination.181 It is interesting to compare the Ban-
gladeshi provision, for crimes of the 1971 war, with that of the
178 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, supra note 176, – 98.
179 ICC Statute, supra note 98.
180 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, supra note 176, – 98. This requirement was ap-
plied in the ICC recently, as a matter of law: Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, Case No.
ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, – 79 est. seq. (Mar. 4, 2009).
181 The crime against humanity has never required that every such crime must be
committed with discrimination’ (see Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138, ––
288–292). The ICTY went through tribunal statutes, international and domestic
crimes against humanity cases. This was confirmed by the ICTR Appeals Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-1-A, Appeal Judgement, – 464 (Jun. 1,
2001) [hereinafter Akayesu Appeal Judgement].
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Cambodian Court’s definition of crimes against humanity, for crimes
committed between 1975 and 1979:
Crimes against humanity, which have no statute of limitations, are any acts com-
mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds, such as:
murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape;
persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; other inhumane acts.182
The ECCC provision is identical to that of the Statute of the ICTR. It
requires that all crimes against humanity, not just persecution, have to
be committed with a discriminatory intent. The issue of the discrimi-
natory element in this provision was found, in the ICTR’s Akayesu
Appeal Judgement, to be a matter of jurisdiction.183 The Appeals
Chamber distinguished the requirement of discrimination in the cha-
peau and the requirement of discrimination in the core crimes. It
determined that the chapeau reflects the drafters’ intent to restrict
jurisdiction of the court to a certain type of crimes against humanity
that is ‘‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population’’ on certain discriminatory grounds.184 So, the
category of ‘‘widespread or systematic attack’’ that the ICTR can look
at is that committed with discriminatory intent – this must therefore be
proven as part of the chapeau. All this does is narrow the scope of the
court’s jurisdiction but does not introduce additional element in the
legal ingredients of the crime as these are known in customary inter-
national law. The intention of the drafter (Security Council) was not to
depart from customary law. ‘‘It limited at the verymost the jurisdiction
of theTribunal to a sub-groupof such crimes,which in actualitymaybe
committed in a particular situation.’’185 So, for Bangladesh, this deci-
sion indicates the following. In customary international law, it is only
for persecution that the core crime must be committed with a dis-
criminatory intent. For all other core crimes, there is no need to show
discrimination. The ‘‘widespread or systematic attack’’ on the civilian
population, in the absence of a statutory provision, does not have to
be committed with a discriminatory intent. This should move the
Bangladeshi tribunal towards finding discriminatory intent is required
only for persecution.
182 Law on ECCC, supra note 174, art 5.
183 Akayesu Appeal Judgement, supra note 181, –– 460–469, 495.
184 Id., – 464.
185 Id., – 465.
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The text of the Bangladeshi law does not require a nexus with
armed conflict.186 Is this a correct reflection of customary law in
1971? There was initially, in Article 6(c) of the Charter of the IMT
Nuremberg, a nexus with international armed conflict and other
crimes in the Charter, namely War Crimes and Crimes against Peace.
The international armed conflict linkage to war crimes was strategic
and necessary, for the war crimes provision was the most secure of
the Charter’s provisions in terms of respecting the principle of nulla
poena sine lege. Very shortly after, Article II of Control Council Law
No. 10 removed that requirement of a nexus. It was not in the Israeli
Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Act. The International Law Commis-
sion’s drafts of the elements of the crime against humanity beginning
with its 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind did not require a nexus to any armed conflict. By 1968,
the nexus was not cited in the Convention on the Non-Applicability
of the Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity.187 Professor Cassese, in commenting on the European
Court of Human Rights case of Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, has said
that the crystallisation of the no-nexus rule probably began at this
time.188 Yet, the 1993 ICTY Statute reintroduced the nexus. In 1995,
the ICTY Tadic´ Appeals Chamber held that: ‘‘[i]t is by now a settled
rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity
do not require a connection to international armed conflict’’.189 But,
this 1995 decision was nuanced on armed conflict as such:
‘‘Indeed…customary international law may not require a connection
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.’’190 The 1994
ICTR Statute did not include any nexus and neither is it to be found
in the 1998 ICC Statute and the 2002 SCSL Statute. So, it would seem
to be correct that there was no need for a nexus to an international
armed conflict in 1971, but it is not as certain on armed conflict per se.
186 The recognised definition of armed conflict is that laid down in Prosecutor v.
Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction].
This will be discussed later in the section analysing crimes in armed conflict.
187 At relevant time, Pakistan was not a party and to-date, Bangladesh remains a
non-party.
188 Antonio Cassese, Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity and
Non-Retroactivity of Criminal Law: The Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia Case before the
ECHR, 4 J. INT’L J. CRIM. JUSTICE 410 (2006).
189 Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, – 141.
190 Id.
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Having said all of that, this problem’ is very easily deflected by the
realities of the situation: there was undeniably an armed conflict of
some kind in East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, from 25
March 1971 until the surrender on 15 December 1971.
The Bangladeshi court will have to rule on these, and other mat-
ters relating to the state of the customary prohibition of crimes
against humanity in 1971, including the elements of the core crimes,
in particular extermination and persecution, and the additional core
crimes of imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture and rape.
Given the prevalence of allegations of sexual violence, the definition
of rape at that point in time will have to be identified. The definition
in the then applicable Penal Code of 1860 reads:
375. A man is said to commit ‘‘rape’’ who except in the case hereinafter excepted, has
sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the five
following descriptions: Firstly. Against her will. Secondly. Without her consent.
Thirdly. With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her in fear
of death, or of hurt. Fourthly. With her consent, when the man knows that he is not
her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another
man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly. With or
without her consent, when she is under fourteen years of age.
The statutory explanation given is that ‘‘[p]enetration is sufficient to
constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.
Exception. Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife
not being under 13 years of age, is not rape.’’ This can of course be
contrasted with the contemporary international definition used at the
ICC, which draws from ICTY jurisprudence.191
191 See ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 7; Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part
II-B), art 7(1)(g)-1, adopted Sept. 9, 2002; entered into force Sept. 9, 2002 [herein-
after Elements of Crimes]:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim
with any object or any other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression
or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking
advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a
person incapable of giving genuine consent. (Footnotes omitted)
See also the definitions developed in the ad hoc Tribunals jurisprudence including:
Akayesu Appeal Judgement, supra note 181; Kunarac Appeal Judgement, supra note
176 and Prosecutor v. Furundzˇija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, – 185
SUZANNAH LINTON
Excluded from the definition of both Bangladeshi laws are sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisa-
tion, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.192
Sexual violence has traditionally been neglected as an international
crime. In Bangladesh today, it continues to be regarded as a crime
against personal dignity’ or honour’ of women, rather than crim-
inal acts aimed at the physical or mental integrity of the person.193
In the post World War II cases, sexual offences were generally
caught under ‘‘other inhumane treatment’’ – rapes in Nanjing were
prosecuted at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
as ‘‘other inhumane acts’’. Control Council Law No. 10 was the
first express inclusion of rape as a crime against humanity (no rape
prosecutions were conducted under it); it was also expressly in-
cluded as a core crime in the crime against humanity provisions of
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. These too did not refer to other
forms of sexual or gender violence, and the Bangladeshi process will
invariably also have to fill the lacunae with reliance on ‘‘other
inhumane acts’’.
5.4.2 Crimes Against Peace: Section 3(2)(b)
Aggression is one of the most serious violations of international law,
engaging the responsibility of the aggressor state in international law.
It is a violation for which the state may be held responsible. More
problematic is whether those of its officials who had the necessary
authority or power to plan, prepare, initiate or wage aggression may
be held individually criminally responsible. According to the IMT’s
Nuremberg judgement, to ‘‘initiate a war of aggression…is not only
an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing
Footnote 191 continued
(Dec. 10, 1998) (‘‘…[T]he following may be accepted as the objective elements of
rape: (i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of
the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or
threat of force against the victim or a third person’’).
192 See ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 7; Elements of Crimes, supra note 191.
193 See Rubaiyat Hossain, Trauma of the Women, Trauma of the Nation: A Fem-
inist Discourse on Izzat, a paper presented at the Second International Conference on
Genocide, Truth and Justice, Jul. 30–31, 2009. She points out that izzat means
prestige, dignity, honour, or chastity. Sexual violence violates a woman’s izzat,
causing spoiling or loss of prestige, dignity, honour, or chastity. In Bangladesh, the
sexual violence of 1971 is referred to in the sense of izzat.
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only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole’’.194
The Bangladeshi law uses the classic IMT Nuremberg provision:
‘‘Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances’’, but omitted are the words ‘‘or
participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment of any of the foregoing’’. This omission may perhaps reflect the
continental lawyer’s traditional distaste for this notion of criminality
that is prevalent in the common law system, and the notion of
common plan’ which was very controversial at Nuremberg.
It is unlikely that this provision will ever be used, as even if there
are major legal obstades (see laber) the chances of ever being able to
exercise jurisdiction over persons who were responsible for the use of
force in East Pakistan are slim. But the symbolism is important and
its psychological value is not to be underestimated in such a situation.
It is a satisfaction that has been denied the East Timorese, who also
view their State as having come into being with an internationally-
unrecognised Unilateral Declaration of Independence; they were in-
vaded and occupied by Indonesia for 24 years. The Cambodians too
have been denied the satisfaction of such a provision in their law, for
it raises the spectre of the saturation bombing of Cambodia by the
United States in pursuit of the Vietcong. For both of East Timor and
Cambodia, an aggression provision in domestic law also leads to
troublesome yet legitimate questions about the States that assisted
other States in breaking the rules. In the circumstances of Bangla-
desh, it is understandable that the drafters chose to rely on something
for which there was already precedent.
But, there are legal problems. Aggression is of course, about inter
State relations, not intra-State affairs; thus there are inherent prob-
lems with the concept being applied to the East Pakistan war of
liberation, involving as it did, secession from the State of Pakistan.
The inclusion of this never-prosecuted-before provision in the
Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals was highly con-
tentious and is always cited as one of the numerous grounds for
critiquing the fairness of those proceedings. As Professor Jescheck
wrote in 2004, this provision went beyond the pre-existing law, relied
on the methodology of analogy which was unconvincing and
194 International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgement and Sentences, rep-
rinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 186 (1974) [hereinafter IMT Judgement].
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erroneously tried to ground the criminal punishment of the crime
against peace in customary law.195 He also raised the lack of speci-
ficity, stating that ‘‘A sanction as grave as individual criminal
responsibility for the war of aggression would have had to be spelled
out explicitly in the [Kellogg-Briandt] Pact in order to take effect in
international law’’.196 Professor Cassese also dismisses the justifica-
tion used by the IMT Nuremberg in its judgement, and considers that
the crime against peace’ (and the crime against humanity’) were new
crimes invented by the London Agreement of 1945. In acting on this
new crime against peace’, the IMT ‘‘applied international law ret-
roactively, as the defence counsel at Nuremberg right stressed’’.197
He, like many others, challenges the judgement’s claim that the
Charter was, in the matter of the crime against peace and the crime
against humanity ‘‘the expression of international law existing at the
time of its creation; and to that extent [it was] itself a contribution to
international law’’.198 There was no such thing as the crime against
peace in international law until it appeared in the London Agreement
and was applied at Nuremberg. It is true that this definition was then
used for the Tokyo Tribunal and accepted by the UN General
Assembly in its Resolution 95(I) of 1946. A differently defined con-
cept of aggression’ was included in the International Law Commis-
sion’s Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and the Security of
Mankind.199 However, outside of theNuremberg andTokyo tribunals,
and certain of the trials under Control Council Law No. 10, prosecu-
tions for crimes against peace have been particularly rare. Telford
Taylor reported that a total of 25 Japanese and 16 Germans were
convicted of this charge.200 The Finnish leadership trial atHelsinki and
that of Hermann Roechlin in Rastatt also involved charges of crimes
195 Jescheck, supra note 101, at 39, 41–42.
196 Id., at 48–49.
197
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 43 (2nd ed., 2008).
198
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 148 (1st ed., 2003). See also
CASSESE, supra note 197, at 43–44. See also e.g., Georg Schwarzenberger, The
Judgement of Nuremberg, 21 TUL. L. REV. 329 (1947) and Sheldon Glueck, The
Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 396 (1946).
199 ILC Nuremburg Principles, supra note 97.
200
TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG TRIALS, WAR CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
(1949), at 86.
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against peace.201There was also domestic prosecution of the Crime
against Peace when China tried certain captured Japanese military
officers (eg. Takashi Sakai) in relation to Japan’s ‘‘war of aggression’’
against China during World War II.202 There do not appear to have
been any prosecutions outside of the World War II context. In Article
19(3) of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the International
LawCommission controversially attempted todevelopaprovision that
provided for serious breaches of international peace and security to
constitute international crimes for which the State may be held crimi-
nally liable, but this was abandoned due to strong objections by States.
It is no accident that the crime of aggression or the crime against peace
is not part of the subject matter of either of the ICTY or ICTR (the
absence is particularly striking given the circumstances covered by the
ICTY). In 2009, the concept and elements of the crime of aggression are
still being argued over by the States Parties to the ICC Statute, indi-
cating that even today we do not have the necessary consensus on what
this actually means.203
In terms of international law, it seems that the State of Bangladesh
didnot come intobeinguntil after thewar.Regardless of the exceptional
recognition that was eventually given by all nations in the world to this
State born of secession in the face of horrendous abuse by Pakistan, the
International Commission of Jurists’ careful study was clear – and
correct – that the Unilateral Declaration of Independence was not valid
in international law in 1971. Until India’s engagement as a belligerent,
what happened in East Pakistan was an internal matter, and not a
matter of States ‘‘planning, preparation, initiation orwaging of awar of
aggressionor awar’’ against other States.Wehave little to goonbeyond
the contested Nuremberg and Tokyo judgements for what crimes
against peace actually constitute, but all the cases have concerned
international armed conflict in the classical sense. Two highly relevant
201
B. V. A. RO¨LING & C.F. RU¨TER, THE TOKYO JUDGEMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (1977), at XIII, fn. 7.
202 See Trial of Takashi Sakai, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. III,
The United States War Crimes Commission, 1948, pp.1–7. The legal basis was
contained in Rules Governing the Trial of War Criminals, later to become the Law
Governing the Trial of War Criminals, 24 October 1946, discussed in the same
volume.
203 For a more comprehensive account of the struggle to have the crime of
aggression defined, See OSCAR SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION (2007).
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documents that we do have are the United Nations Declaration on
Friendly Relations between States204 and the Declaration on the Defi-
nition of Aggression.205 In neither document is it considered aggression
or a crime against peace for a sovereign State to attempt to quell
attempts at secession from its internationally recognised territorial
boundaries. This, of course, does notmean that Pakistan could dowhat
it wanted in theEast. But it does underscore that the crime against peace
is a State-on-Statematter, and under international lawof the time, there
was no sovereign State of Bangladesh. This analysis is supported by the
finding of the International Commission of Jurists that ‘‘no question
arises of a crime against peace’ in Bangladesh’’.206
5.4.3 Genocide: Section 3(2)(c)
The label that is used to describe criminal behaviour arising from
atrocity can be a very emotive and sensitive issue. In Bangladeshi pro-
accountability circles, genocide is the commonly used term to
describe the terrible events of 1971. Others, such as the eyewitness
journalist Sydney Schamberg, have also used this label.207 As has
been noted, the International Commission of Jurists did conclude
that genocide had been perpetrated in Bangladesh. But they found it
was not committed against the Bengali group as such.208 Members of
the Awami League, students and Hindus were certainly singled out
for special attention,209 and the International Commission of Jurists
did not rule out genocide as being committed against part of the
Bengali people. But they were only prepared to find ‘‘a strong prima
facie case that the crime of genocide was committed against the group
comprising the Hindu population of East Bengal’’.210 As to the
documented attacks by Bengalis on non-Bengalis, the report recog-
nised the complexities in providing the dolus specialis, and while it
204 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) (adopted without
a vote) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations between States].
205 DefinitionofAggression,G.A.Res 3314 (XXIX),U.N.GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31 (Dec. 14, 1974) (adopted by consensus) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
206
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
207 See Sydney Schamberg, The Pakistani Slaughter That Nixon Ignored, NEW
YORK TIMES, May 3, 1994. See also Rounag Jahan, Genocide in Bangladesh, in CEN-
TURY OF GENOCIDE 295–331 (2nd ed., Totten, Parsons & Charney eds., 2004).
208
ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.
209 Id., at 56.
210 Id., at 57.
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did not rule out the fact that certain individuals may have had such
intent, took the position that ‘‘[f]or our part, we find it difficult to
accept that spontaneous and frenzied mob violence against a par-
ticular section of the community from whom the mob senses danger
and hostility is to be regarded as possessing the necessary element of
conscious intent to constitute the crime of genocide’’.211
The genocide definition in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act
As Amended is that of Article II of the Genocide Convention, with 2
differences. Political groups are added, and the phrase ‘‘as such’’ has
become ‘‘such as’’. The ancillary modes of perpetration of genocide in
Article III are excluded, which is not in itself fatal since modes of
responsibility for crimes are covered elsewhere in the legislation. But,
the absence in the 1973 Act of an express provision for the mode of
responsibility of incitement, discussed later in the section on modes of
responsibility, leaves a lacunae for there may be no way to prosecute
‘‘direct and public incitement to commit genocide’’.212
The problem with the Bangladeshi addition of political groups is
that this was one of the groups deliberately excluded from the ambit
of the crime of genocide set out in the Genocide Convention.213
States that were engaged in the drafting process did not want their
own people’ to be tried for genocide for the very common practice of
targeting their political enemies. And, as is well known, efforts to
change the definition of genocide for the ICC by adding political
groups’ were resoundingly defeated at the Rome Conference. Thus,
the Statute of the ICC preserved the definition that already existed in
treaty and customary law, and which continues to so exist.
It is pertinent to recall here that like Bangladesh, Cambodia also
tamperedwith the conventional definition of genocide. InAugust 1979,
two of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, were
tried in absentia over 5 days from 15 to 19 August 1979 by a People’s
Revolutionary Tribunal of the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea. The
211 Id., at 57.
212 But see infra text accompanying note 305.
213 Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Case No. IT-96-10-T, Judgement, – 69 (Dec. 14, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and Sentence –– 55–57
(Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-1-T, Judgement, – 516
(Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Trial Judgement] (Also held that any ‘‘stable and
permanent group’’ should also be protected; William Schabas, Comments on Article 6
of ICC Statute, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 149–150 (2nd ed., Otto
Triffterer ed., 2008); WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME
OF CRIMES 179–189 (2000) [hereinafter SCHABAS, GENOCIDE].
SUZANNAH LINTON
action was brought under the charter of the special tribunal, Decree
LawNo. 1 dated 15 July 1979214 andon the basis of an indictment dated
30 July 1979. Article 1 gave the tribunal jurisdiction over
the acts of genocide committed by the Pol Pot – Ieng Sary clique, namely, planned
massacres of groups of innocent people, expulsion of inhabitants of cities and vil-
lages in order to concentrate them, and force them to do hard labour in conditions
leading to their physical and mental destruction; wiping out religion, destroying
political, cultural and social structures and family and social relations.
This was not genocide as international lawyers know from the
Genocide Convention. The entire process was widely denounced for
being a sham.215 Two decades later, another attempt by the Royal
Government to introduce a tailor-made definition of genocide, the
better to convict, was rejected by the United Nations during nego-
tiations.216 As it is, nobody has yet to be been charged with genocide
in Cambodia before the ECCC. If it wishes to proceed with genocide
charges, the prosecution in Bangladesh would be well advised to keep
within the four protected groups – national, ethnic, racial or religious
– and not to venture into bringing charges against anyone for
participation in genocide of a political group. To venture beyond
would be to violate the principle of legality.
The original language of both International Crimes (Tribunals)
Act 1973, and its 2009 amendment, is English. There was probably an
un-intentional mix-up with the two little words ‘‘as’’ and ‘‘such’’. But
all lawyers know that innocent mix-ups can have major implications
in law. In the Genocide Convention, ‘‘as such’’ is a phrase that
matters a lot in the context of the definition of the crime. The ‘‘as
such’’ emphasises the prohibited targeting of protected groups, which
a critical aspect of the concept of genocide.217 The ultimate target is
the group, and individuals are targeted because they are members of
214 Decree Law No. 1: Establishment of People’s Revolutionary Tribunal at
Phnom Penh to Try the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Clique for the Crime of Genocide, Jul. 15,
1979 (Cambodia).
215 Cambodia Experts Report, supra note 167, – 43. See William Schabas, Cam-
bodia: Was it really Genocide?, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 470 (2001).
216
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE, supra note 213, at 475.
217 Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 Judgement, supra note 132, – 193 (‘‘requires an intent to
destroy a collection of people who have a particular group identity’’).
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the group. The ‘‘as such’’ underscores that. In Section 3(2)(c) of the
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended, the turn to ‘‘such
as’’ not just shifts the emphasis away from the targeting of the pro-
tected groups to the core crimes, but it also turns the Genocide
Convention’s closed list of core crimes into a merely illustrative list.
I have already raised the issue of the application of judgements of
foreign courts and tribunals in the courts of Bangladesh. It will of
course be essential for the Tribunal to examine the wealth of recent
jurisprudence – with care to respect the principle of legality – on
issues such as the identification of the national, ethnic, racial or
religious groups, elements of the core crimes, command responsibility
over genocide and the mental intent for genocide.
5.4.4 Crimes in Armed Conflicts
The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended has two provi-
sions for crimes in armed conflict, and neither expressly provides for
prosecution of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It is
possible that the architecture was meant to reflect the traditional distinc-
tion between (1) the rules governing combat operations, the means and
methods of fighting (Hague law) and (2) the humanitarian rules directed
purely at protecting non-participants in combat, for example civilians
(Geneva law). The Bangladeshi tribunal will have to go through a logical
and systematic interpretation of the provisions, as was done by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in the Tadic´ case, to see how they relate to each other,
and to the legislation as a whole.218 This is going to be a complex task.
There seem to have been three stages to the armed conflict. In
terms of the international law of armed conflict, this armed conflict
mutated from a Common Article 3 situation of ‘‘armed conflict not of
an international character’’ to an internationalised armed conflict, to a
full international armed conflict. Inmy assessment of ‘‘armed conflict’’,
I rely on the Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, where the ICTY’s Appeals
Chamber observed that the definition of an armed conflict varies
depending on whether the hostilities are international or internal:219
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law
applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation
218 See Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186.
219 Id., – 67.
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of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.220
It is helpful that the International Court of Justice has recently
conceded that it may be correct that international criminal law uses a
different standard than the Nicaragua test in assessing the degree of
linkage that is necessary between a non-State entity and a State in
order to internationalise an armed conflict and trigger the application
of the Geneva Conventions 1949.221 The Tadic´ decision examined the
matter of internationalisation of a non-international armed conflict.
In case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a
State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circum-
stances, be international in character alongside an internal armed
conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its
troops, or alternatively (ii) some of the participants in the internal
armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.222
Tadic´ established that an armed conflict, which is otherwise
internal, is internationalised if a foreign state exercises overall con-
trol’ over the military forces of one of the parties to that conflict. The
220 Id., – 70. It is also relevant to consider Pictet’s authoritative Commentary on
Common Article 3. He suggests useful criteria for what could amount to an ‘‘armed
conflict not of an international nature’’:
1. That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an
organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a
determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect
for the Convention. 2. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse
to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military in pos-
session of a part of the national territory. 3. (a) That the de jure Government
has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or (b) that it has claimed for itself
the rights of a belligerent; or (c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition
as belligerents for the purposes only of the present Convention; or (d) that the
dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General
Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a
breach of peace, or an act of aggression. 4. (a) That the insurgents have an
organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State. (b) That the
insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons within a
determinate portion of the national territory. (c) That the armed forces act
under the direction of an organized authority and are prepared to observe the
ordinary laws of war. (d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound
by the provisions of the Convention.
4 THEGENEVACONVENTIONSOF12AUGUST1949:COMMENTARY 35–36 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958).
221 Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 Judgement, supra note 132, – 403.
222 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138, – 84.
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overall control’ test set forth in the Tadic´ Appeal Judgement has
been internally confirmed as the applicable criteria for determining
the existence of an international armed conflict.223 Tadic´ also held
that if the controlling State is not the territorial State where the
armed clashes occur or where at any rate the armed units perform
their acts, more extensive and compelling evidence is required to
show that the State is genuinely in control of the units or groups not
merely by financing and equipping them, but also by generally
directing or helping plan their actions.224
As for international armed conflict itself, Common Article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions refers to ‘‘all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of
them’’. Pictet has argued that any difference arising between two States
and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an
international armed conflict sufficient to trigger the applicability of
Common Article 2. For him, the occurrence of de facto hostilities is
enough.225 ‘‘It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts or how
much slaughter takes place. The respect due to the human person is not
measured by the number of victims’’. Thus, hostile acts involving
military operations, the use of a State’s armed forces and weaponry,
leading to armed engagement with the other State’s forces suffice. For
Professor Greenwood, ‘‘[a]n international armed conflict exists if one
party uses force of arms against another party…. It is irrelevant
whether the parties to the conflict consider themselves to be at war with
each other and how they describe this conflict’’.226 Finally, according
to Pictet, the term armed conflict’ was a deliberate choice so as to
prevent arguments by a State that is using arms to commit hostile act
against another State that it is not making war but merely engaging in
police action or acting in legitimate self-defence.227
223 Delalic´ et al. Trial Judgement, supra note 136, – 378, aff’d Prosecutor v. Del-
alic´, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgement, – 26 (Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
Delalic´ et al. Appeal Judgement].
224 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138, –– 137–138.
225 4 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY, supra note 220, at
20 (commenting on common Article 2).
226 Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in HAND-
BOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 46 (2nd ed., Dieter Fleck ed., 2008).
227 4 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY, supra note 220,
at 20 (commenting on common Article 2).
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The International Commission of Jurists viewed the conflict in
East Pakistan as a Common Article 3 situation throughout and never
examined the international armed conflict aspects. There seems no
doubt that there was an armed conflict of sufficient intensity to
amount to a Common Article 3 situation beginning on the evening of
25 March 1971. But, the rest of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
Hague law in treaty and/or custom, clearly applied from the moment
the conflict became internationalised when there was sufficient Indian
involvement, which was definitely the case when the Indian forces
actively engaged in armed activities in the conflict, and probably even
earlier given the extent of their assistance to, and control over, the
Mukti Bahini. In these matters too, the Tadic´ case is critical,
although here it is also the Appeal Judgement that must be con-
sulted.228
5.4.4.1 War Crimes: Section 3(2)(d). The International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended defines war crimes as:
violation of laws or customs of war which include but are not limited to murder, ill-
treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian pop-
ulation in the territory of Bangladesh; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing of hostages and detenues, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified
by military necessity.
This text is almost taken word-for-word from the IMT Nuremberg
Statute (‘‘detenues’’ and references to Bangladesh are added).
The Nature of the Armed Conflicts
The first issue to raise is the nature of the armed conflict. The ‘‘laws
and customs of war’’ are rooted in old notions of State sovereignty
that have traditionally drawn a line between international armed
conflict, which is a matter of legitimate concern for the international
community, and non-international armed conflict (used interchange-
ably with the term armed conflict not of an international nature’),
which has been viewed as an internal matter which is solely the
business of the State concerned. Traditional rules such as those set out
in the Regulations Annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907 were
premised on the-then reality of armed conflict as being about wars
between States; it was then not considered proper to lay down rules for
228 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138.
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non-international armed conflict as that was within a State’s domestic
jurisdiction. Adopted in 1949, Common Article 3 is the lone regulator
of armed conflict not of an international character’ in the 1949
Geneva Conventions treaty regime and its focus is on protecting the
victims of conflict, namely those taking no active part in hostilities. It
has been repeatedly confirmed as providing the core protections in
non-international armed conflict and as being part of customary
international law.229 The 1977 Additional Protocol II extended this, as
did Additional Protocol I’s Article 1(4) on wars of liberation,230 but
regulation of internal conflicts remains rudimentary in comparison
even though the gaps may be supplemented by human rights law.231
229 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.A.), 1986 I.C.J. Reports 13, – 218 (Jun. 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judge-
ment]. Here, the International Court of Justice held that Common Article 3 is an
expression of fundamental general principles of humanitarian law which are legally
valid, independent of any treaty basis. It reflects elementary considerations of
humanity’ and is thus a minimum yardstick and part of customary law. See also
Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, –– 89, 98, 102, 116, 134.
230 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art 1(4), Jun.
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. (‘‘Armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’’ fall within
the remit of the protocol and the four Geneva Conventions. It is not expressly stated,
but implicit that they are therefore to be considered international armed conflicts,
because Additional Protocol I only applies in international armed conflicts.)
231 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art 1(1),
Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (The threshold
for a ‘‘non-international armed conflict’’ is higher than what is required for armed
conflicts not of an international character’ in Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, supra note 1, they do not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts’’ but only to ‘‘armed conflicts which take place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or
other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.)The ICRC
includes as internal disturbances those confrontations that may be brief or
chronic, and which may give rise to lasting humanitarian problems. Internal
disturbances may take place without any government intervention to restore
order. Disturbances sometimes take the form of clashes between factions,
without any direct State participation. See Marion Harroff-Tavel, Internal
Violence, 294 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 195 (1993).
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There is no denying that Article 1(4) and its attendant Article 44(3)
were controversial. Even so, the provisions were the result of majority
vote, ending a process of negotiation that formally began in 1974 and
unofficially began years earlier as the right to self-determination came
to be a mighty weapon in struggles for national liberation. Additional
Protocol I in its entirety was signed by 62 States at the Diplomatic
Conference.232 Professor Cassese points out that when the provision
was put to the vote in 1977, 87 voted in favour, 1 against and 11
abstained; Israel was the only State that rejected the provision.233
Those who did not vote in favour did so because they questioned the
political and legal ramifications of the rule. Cassese argues that in
1977, an emergent rule was crystallised when the previously objecting
European States accepted it: ‘‘The acceptance of Article 1 testified to
the formation of a rule binding on all the States participating in the
conference (regardless of whether they ratified the Protocol) save for
Israel’’.234
The reservations that have been entered on articles dealing with
national liberation movements are primarily concerned with limiting
the scope so that secession by minority groups and terrorism are not
made lawful. In fact, the majority of those reservations underline that
loosening of the combatancy provisions in Article 44(3) is limited,
and most reservations expressly recognised the necessity for the
provision to apply in occupied territories.235 Wilson points out that
the governments who opposed or abstained did so ‘‘because the cri-
teria were arbitrary and subjective and because they feared that such
a provision would lead to the unequal and partial application of jus in
bello. No delegation suggested that the use of force for self-deter-
232
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mination was itself illegitimate.’’236 She cites how the Egyptian del-
egate, representing the developing world, spoke of how international
practice ‘‘on the universal, regional and bilateral levels had estab-
lished beyond doubt the international character of wars of national
liberation’’.237 Greece and Australia also spoke in such terms, with-
out challenge from any State.238 So, given the concerns to prevent
secessionist wars in 1977, is it nevertheless possible to put forth a
persuasive argument that that prior to the 1977 Additional Protocols,
and specifically at the critical date of March 1971, wars of national
liberation were already regulated in customary international law by
the rules of international armed conflict?
State practice at the United Nations in the 1960s and 1970s
leading up to the diplomatic conference that resulted in the adoption
of Additional Protocol I reveals a line of resolutions, albeit contested
ones, on the legal status of wars of national liberation as international
armed conflicts, and the entitlement of national liberation fighters to
combatant and Prisoner-of-War treatment under the Geneva Con-
ventions 1949 if captured. The adoption of the resolutions suggests
that for some States, the humanitarian protections of the conventions
applied regardless of ratification and type of conflict, thus pointing to
the possible evolution of an opinio juris necessary for a customary
rule or general principle.239
The first line to explore is that of the status of the conflict. On the
facts, it is unconvincing to argue that Bangladesh came into existence
with Sheikh Mujibur’s 7 March 1971 speech, for the extant materials
about the realities on the ground did not meet the objective standards
of international law on statehood, buttressed that the reality that no
State recognised its existence until India did at a very advanced stage
of the conflict when it had become a direct participant in hostilities
236
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and the winds of war had already turned.240 That national liberation
movements have come to be regarded as combatants in international
armed conflicts has been the result of the collapse of colonial empires,
the experiences of the Second World War and the influx of newly
independent former colonies, many of which had to use force in order
to achieve the right to self-determination. This restructuring of the
international community enabled the passing of resolutions such
Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960, the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.241 This provided
that the use of force to prevent the exercise of the right to self-
determination is unlawful: ‘‘all armed action or repressive measures
of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to
enable them to exercise…their right to complete independence’’.242
This is not to suggest that these resolutions were uncontroversial, for
the issue of whether the legitimacy of the struggle meant could lead to
the legitimacy of the use of force was generally contested by the
former and remaining colonial powers. General Assembly Resolution
2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 ‘‘recognises the legitimacy of the
struggle by peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-
determination and independence and invites all states to provide
material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in
colonial territories’’.243 In 1970, the Declaration on Principles of
International Law (Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970), the
General Assembly unanimously proclaimed that
[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples
referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resis-
tance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-deter-
240 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
16 L.N.T.S. 19, reprinted in 28 A.J.I.L., Supp. 75.
241 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66–67, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960).
242 Id., – 4.
243 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), – 10, U.N. Doc A/RES/2105
(XX) (Dec. 20, 1965) (adopted by 74 votes for, 6 votes against, 27 abstentions and 10
not-voting (total voting membership: 117)).
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mination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the Charter.244
This resolution certainly does not specifically provide national lib-
eration movements with a right to use force, but its deliberate
ambiguity reveals the desire to avoid dealing with the issue head-on.
In Resolution 2708 (XXV) of 14 December 1970, the General
Assembly reaffirmed ‘‘its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle
of the colonial peoples and peoples under alien domination to exer-
cise their right to self-determination and independence by all means at
its disposal’’.245 The 1970s saw more such resolutions of wider import
covering use of force by those seeking to exercise the right to self-
determination in colonial situations as well as those under alien
subjugation. One such was resolution 3103 (XXVIII) which reaf-
firmed ‘‘the legitimacy of peoples’ struggle for liberation from colo-
nial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available
means, including armed struggle.’’246 Resolution 3246 (XXIX) called
upon all States not just to recognise the right to self-determination
and independence of all those under colonial, foreign or alien sub-
jugation, but also to ‘‘offer them moral, material and other forms of
assistance in their struggle to exercise fully their inalienable right to
self-determination and independence’’.247 Others include Resolutions
244 Declaration on Friendly Relations between States, supra note 204, – 1.
245 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2708 (XXV), – 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
2708 (XXV) (Dec. 14, 1970) (adopted by 94 votes for, 5 votes against, 22 abstentions
and 7 not-voting (total voting membership: 127)) (emphasis added).
246 Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against
Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103 (XXVIII), – 1,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3103 (XXVIII) (Dec. 12, 1973) (adopted by 83 votes for, 13 votes
against, 19 abstentions and 20 not-voting (total voting membership: 135)).
247 Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 3246 (XXIX), – 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3246 (XXIX) (Dec. 4, 1974) (adopted by
107 votes for, 1 vote against, 20 abstentions and 10 not-voting (total voting mem-
bership: 138)).
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3070 (XXVIII),248 3328 (XXIX)249 and 3481 (XXX),250 all of which
culminated in the consensus 1974 Declaration on the Definition of
Aggression, which obviously came after the Bangladesh war was
over. The 1974 Declaration, having outlined what amount to acts of
aggression, closes with the caveat that none of its provisions can ‘‘in
any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and
independence…particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes
or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration [on Friendly Relations]’’.251
The second line of exploration in this matter of national liberation
wars as international armed conflict is the status of captured freedom
fighters’. Were they to be treated as ordinary criminals under
domestic law or as Prisoners-of-War benefitting from the protections
of the Geneva Conventions 1949? Resolution 2396 (XXIII) dealing
with South Africa demanded that the population of South Africa as a
whole should be able to exercise its right to self-determination, and
that as their struggle was legitimate, freedom fighters there should be
treated as Prisoners-of-War under the terms of international law,
namely the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.252 Other examples of
resolutions calling for application of the Geneva Conventions in
248 Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 3070 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3070 (XXVIII) (Nov. 30, 1973) (adopted by
97 votes for, 5 votes against, 28 abstentions and 5 not-voting (total voting mem-
bership: 135)).
249 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 3328 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3328
(XXIX) (Dec. 16, 1974) (adopted by 118 votes for, 0 votes against, 10 abstentions
and 10 not-voting (total voting membership: 138)).
250 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 3481 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3481
(XXX) (Dec. 11, 1975) (adopted by 108 votes for, 3 votes against, 15 abstentions and
18 not-voting (total voting membership: 144)).
251 Definition of Aggression, supra note 205, art 7.
252 The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A. Res 2396
(XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2396 (XXIII) (Dec. 2, 1968) (adopted by 85 votes for, 2
votes against, 14 abstentions and 25 not-voting (total voting membership: 126)).
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national liberation struggles were253 all of which dealt with wars of
national liberation in the Portuguese African territories and called for
application of the Third and Fourth Conventions. The States that
participated in the International Conference on Human Rights in
Tehran in 1968 approved Resolution XXIII which called for those
fighting minority racist regimes or colonial regimes to, if detained, be
treated as Prisoners of War or political prisoners.254 Resolution VIII
called for the treatment of captured freedom fighters as Prisoners of War
as per Geneva Convention III.255 This was reiterated in General
AssemblyResolution 2621 (XXV) of 12October 1970 which also claimed
Prisoner of War treatment for freedom fighters under detention.256 The
Secretary General’s Second Report on Human Rights in Armed Conflict
in 1970, reviewed the protection given by United Nations human rights
instruments in armed conflicts and inter alia, suggested that Geneva
Convention III should apply to freedom fighters and recommended
amendment of the treaty to cover national liberation struggles.257 One of
the most important of the line of normative resolutions in the matter of
liberation fighters, that came after the Bangladesh war was over, was
Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973 on Basic Principles of
the Legal Status of Combatants Struggling against Colonial and Alien
Domination andRacist Regimes.258 This drew from the numerous earlier
appeals of the General Assembly to colonial powers and those occupying
foreign territories as well as racist regimes to ‘‘ensure the application to
the fighters for freedom and self-determination of the provisions of the
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12
August 1949, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949’’. It stressed that
struggles against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes
253 Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, G.A. Res 2707
(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RSE/2707 (XXV) (Dec. 14, 1970) (adopted by 94 votes for, 6
votes against, 16 abstentions and 11 not-voting (total voting membership: 127)).
254 International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, Resolution XXIII (May
12, 1968).
255 International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, Resolution VIII (May 12, 1968).
256 Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res 2621
(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2621 (XXV) (Oct. 12, 1970) (adopted by 86 votes for, 5
votes against, 15 abstentions and 21 not-voting (total voting membership: 127)).
257 The Secretary-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Report
of the Secretary-General, –– 197–199, UN Doc A/8052 (Sept. 18, 1970).
258 See supra, note 246.
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are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the legal status envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949
Geneva Conventions and other international instruments is to apply to the persons
engaged in armed struggles against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes.
Such persons, if captured ‘‘are to be accorded the status of prisoners
of war’’ and their treatment should be in accordance with the pro-
visions of Geneva Convention III.
For both these streams – the status of liberation wars and the
status of liberation fighters – it is clear that these many but highly
controversial resolutions do not suffice to form the state practice and
opinio juris necessary to prove the existence of a customary rule in
1971 whereby struggles of liberation pursuant to the right to self-
determination could be covered by the rules of international armed
conflicts, let alone be considered as international armed conflicts. If
the State practice can be found to show that in 1971, States actually
treated such conflicts, and captured freedom fighters’ as protected by
the Geneva Conventions as Prisoners-of-War, then the argument
becomes more convincing. Without that, it is untenable.
The Applicability of Customary Rules to Armed Conflicts not
of an International Character
The extent to which the customary rules are applicable to armed
conflict not of an international nature has been controversial. Com-
mon Article 3 sets down minimum standards in a non-international
armed conflict. In 1986, the International Court of Justice in Nicara-
gua recognised Common Article 3 as reflecting elementary consider-
ations of humanity and affirmed that it affords protection in not just
non-international armed conflict but also international armed con-
flict.259 In Tadic´, the ICTY Appeals Chamber accepted this as correct,
holding that ‘‘at least with respect to the minimum rules in Common
Article 3, the character of the conflict is irrelevant.’’260 These two
critical decisions came after the Bangladeshwar of independence. And,
over in Cambodia, one of the findings of the Group of Experts for
Cambodia was that the only international regulation of internal
259 Nicaragua Judgement, supra note 229, –– 218–219 (drawing from Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Reports 4, – 215) [hereinafter Corfu Channel
Judgement].
260 Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, – 102.
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conflict during the Khmer Rouge years (1975–1999) was Common
Article 3.261 Hague law on the means and methods of war did not apply.
As is well known, the Nuremberg tribunal dealt with violations of
the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’ in international armed conflict, but
not non-international armed conflict.262 Likewise, the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Control Council
Law No. 10 were also dealing with international armed conflict.
Created in 1993, the ICTY also has a war crimes definition relying on
the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’, although it was differently con-
structed. The Bangladeshi tribunal would be well advised to examine
closely how the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’ were handled in Tadic´
and other cases. Until the ICTY’s Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction in
1995, it was disputed that war crimes could be committed in a non-
international armed conflict.263 This is because there is a difference
between rules that are prescriptive and rules that carry penal sanc-
tion. Until the Tadic´ decision clarified the state of customary law, the
only clear penal sanctions were for violations of the Grave Breaches
provisions of the Geneva Conventions 1949 and the violations of the
‘‘laws and customs of war’’, which could only arise in international
armed conflicts. This takes us back to the problem of the status of the
armed conflict in East Pakistan. In international law, this was a
Common Article 3 situation that become internationalised through
India’s participation and then a full international armed conflict
when India engaged in acts of armed force against Pakistan (this
preceded the Pakistani attacks on India). So, jurisdiction over the
early months of the war, including the armed attacks against Dhaka,
is in doubt for this provision. This underscores the important role
that the Penal Code could have played in this legislation.
The Content of the ‘‘Law and Customs of War’’ in 1971
What exactly were the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’ that applied in 1971?
According to the Nuremberg tribunal’s famous judgment, ‘‘by 1939
these rules laid down in the [Regulations annexed toHagueConvention
IV] were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being
261 Cambodia Experts Report, supra note 167, – 75.
262 This was also recognised in the ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5,
at 59.
263 See e.g., Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Civil Wars and Human
Rights, 6 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS 62 (1976); Michael Bothe, War Crimes in Non Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts, in WARCRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293 (Yoram Dinstein &
Mala Tabory eds., 1996).
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declaratory of the laws and customs of war’’.264 The Martens Clause,
incorporated into the preamble of Hague Convention IV of 1907 and
providing a minimum protection of ‘‘the principles of the law of na-
tions, as they result from the usages established among civilised peo-
ples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience’’ is also firmly part of that body of law.265 These regulations
had in fact been influenced by the 1863 Lieber Code, used in the
American Civil War and the Franco–Prussian War and amount to
what the International Court of Justice in Corfu Channel described as
‘‘elementary considerations of humanity’’.266
Since Nuremberg, the content of the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’
has expanded. In its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the
International Court of Justice declared these principles of humanity
to be ‘‘intransgressible principles of customary law’’ which bind all
States whether or not they have ratified the Hague and Geneva
Conventions.267 The court saw that at the heart of such provisions
were two overriding considerations:
The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and
establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; states must
never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons
that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. According
to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants:
it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly
aggravating their suffering. In application of that second principle, states do not have
unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.268
In its Wall Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice reit-
erated that ‘‘the provisions of theHagueRegulations have become part
of customary law’’ (a point onwhich all participants in that proceeding
(15 countries made oral submissions) were agreed).269 It went further –
‘‘In the Court’s view, these rules incorporate obligations which are
264 IMT Judgement, supra note 194, at 248. This was confirmed in Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 239, – 75 and Wall Advisory Opinion, supra
note 132, – 89.
265 Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 132, –– 78, 84.
266 Corfu Channel Judgement, supra note 259, at 22.
267 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 239, – 79, cited with approval
in Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 132, – 157.
268 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 239, – 78.
269 Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 132, – 189.
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essentially of an erga omnes character.’’270 It has also been held that
‘‘[t]he one definite rule of international law, however, is that the direct
and deliberate bombing of non-combatants is in all circumstances
illegal’’.271Other rules that are so fundamental as to apply in any armed
conflict have been judicially identified:
protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks,
protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those
who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of
means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain
methods of conducting hostilities.272
The Geneva Conventions 1949 came after the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials. They were designed to apply to States parties. But they have
been confirmed as being part of customary international law.273
Common Article 3 has been confirmed as applying in all armed
conflicts.274 The question for the Bangladeshi tribunal to answer is
whether this was already so in 1971. The 1995 Tadic´ Decision on
Jurisdiction is helpful for shedding further light on this matter. The
notion of ‘‘laws and customs of war’’ was also used in the ICTY
Statute, although its provision is differently formulated.275 The jud-
ges of the Appeals Chamber had to interpret the provision in the light
of the Statute, and ultimately concluded, on the basis of a textual,
teleological and logical construction, that the provision was:
a general clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not falling under Article
2 or covered by Articles 4 or 5, more specifically: (i) violations of the Hague law on
international conflicts; (ii) infringements of provisions of the Geneva Conventions
other than those classified as ‘‘grave breaches’’ by those Conventions; (iii) violations
of common Article 3 and other customary rules on internal conflicts; (iv) violations
of agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict, considered qua treaty law, i.e.,
agreements which have not turned into customary international law.276
It is very important to stress that this decision cannot be relied on as is,
for it is built on the particular architecture of the ICTY Statute, which
270 Id., – 157.
271 Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, – 100.
272 Id., – 127.
273 Confirmed as customary in the Report of the UNSG under UNSC Res 808,
supra note 100, –– 35, 37.
274 Confirmed as applicable in all armed conflicts in Nicaragua Judgement, supra note
223, – 218; Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, –– 89, 98, 102, 116, 134.
275 Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, – 87.
276 Id., – 89.
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divided out the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’ and the Grave Breaches of
the Geneva Conventions 1949. While the decision is very helpful, even
essential, for those dealing with the Bangladeshi provision, it has to be
handled with great care and with a thorough understanding of inter-
national criminal law and the international lawof armed conflict. It will
not apply as is; the Bangladeshi law also has to be read in its own
context. Following that logic of reading the structure of the legislation,
and for the reasons set out in the following sections,277 it seems that this
provision was not mean to include the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Criminalisation of Breaches of Common Article 3
There is another issue that must be raised here. The complex process
of analysing a provision such as Section 3(2)(d) is not just a matter of
identifying which positive rules contained in treaties had passed into
customary international law by 1971. Those prohibitions must also, if
violated, have triggered individual criminal responsibility.278 This is
well explained by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Vasiljevic´, which
determined that a Trial Chamber:
must further satisfy itself that the criminal conduct in question was sufficiently
defined and was sufficiently accessible at the relevant time for it to warrant a criminal
conviction and sentencing under the criminal heading chosen by the Prosecution, in
this case ‘‘violence to life and person’’. From the perspective of the nullum crimen
sine lege principle, it would be wholly unacceptable for a Trial Chamber to convict
an accused person on the basis of a prohibition which, taking into account the
specificity of customary international law and allowing for the gradual clarification
of the rules of criminal law, is either insufficiently precise to determine conduct and
distinguish the criminal from the permissible, or was not sufficiently accessible at the
relevant time. A criminal conviction should indeed never be based upon a norm
which an accused could not reasonably have been aware of at the time of the acts,
and this norm must make it sufficiently clear what act or omission could engage his
criminal responsibility.279
This is a tricky problem for the 1971 war. The International Com-
mission of Jurists Report correctly identified the problem inherent in
Common Article 3: it does not expressly penalise acts in contravention
277 See in particular, the sections on Criminalisation of Breaches of Common
Article 3 and ‘‘Violations of any Humanitarian Rules Applicable in Armed Conflicts
Laid Out in the Geneva Conventions of 1949’’.
278 See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM.
J. INT’L L. 554 (1995).
279 Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgement, supra note 177, – 193.
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of its provisions. TheReport recognised the controversy, but ultimately
argued that war crimes should at least include breaches of Common
Article 3.However, the reasoningwas inadequate.Therewasno textual
analysis of Common Article 3, even in the section on the Geneva
Conventions, to sustain the recommendation that a national court set
up to try offenders under international penal law could take jurisdiction
over violations of the provision.280 The report referred to the intentions
of the United Nations, and not the intentions of the drafters of the
Geneva Conventions 1949, of which Common Article 3 is part. There
was also no examination of State practice or opinio juris to sustain the
argument for an evolution in the customary international rule allowing
for the prosecution of violations of Common Article 3 as a war crime.
In light of the above, the International Commission of Jurists’ position
on Common Article 3 is unsustainable.281
I do however believe that there is ground to argue for the crimi-
nalisation of violations of Common Article 3 by 1971, in itself and by
linking it to the fundamental general principles of humanitarian law’
which are undeniably part of the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’. In 1986,
when the International Court of Justice held that Common Article 3
applied in all conflicts and reflected fundamental general principles
of humanitarian law’, it did not comment on whether this meant that
breaches carried criminal sanction, or that this would amount to war
crimes carrying international criminal responsibility.282 Professor
Meron and others had doubts, although in his seminal 1995 article in
the American Journal of International Law, Professor Meron cited
some examples of growing evidence of the criminalisation of viola-
tions of Common Article 3.283 Confirmation that breaches of Com-
mon Article 3 involved international criminality finally came with its
appearance in the Statute of the ICTR in 1994, and even more so in
1995, when the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber issued a landmark decision
holding that breaches of Common Article 3 amounted to breaches of
the laws and customs of war, and were thus prosecutable under
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. According to the Appeals Chamber in
280 See ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 53–54.
281 See id., at 53–54, 57–58.
282 Nicaragua Judgement, supra note 229, –– 218–219.
283 See Meron, supra note 278; Bothe, supra note 263, at 293–204; Denise Plattner,
The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 30 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 4 (1990); Theodor Mer-
on, Note and Comment: On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and. Human
Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument (1983) 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 589 (1983).
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Tadic´, ‘‘many elements of international practice show that States
intend to criminalise serious breaches of customary rules and prin-
ciples on internal conflicts’’. It drew on examples such as from the
Nigerian civil war and from relevant provisions of the 1956 US Army
Field Manual which suggested that war crimes, described as ‘‘every
violation of the law of war’’, include infringement of Common Article
3 as well as from the British Manual of Military Law (1958).284
Of great relevance to the formation of opinio juris to the effect that
violations of general international humanitarian law governing inter-
nal armed conflicts entail the criminal responsibility of those commit-
ting or ordering those violations are certain resolutions unanimously
adopted by the Security Council. Thus, for instance, in two resolutions
on Somalia, where a civil strife was under way, the Security Council
unanimously condemned breaches of humanitarian law and stated that
the authors of such breaches or those who had ordered their commis-
sion would be held ‘‘individually responsible’’ for them.285
The Appeals Chamber concluded that:
[a]ll of these factors confirm that customary international law imposes criminal lia-
bility for serious violations of Common Article 3, as supplemented by other general
principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for
breaching certain fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods of
combat in civil strife.286
In addition to State practice and opinio juris, the Appeals Chamber in
Tadic´ noted that violations of Common Article 3 entailed individual
criminal responsibility regardless of the type of conflict because
‘‘[p]rinciples and rules of humanitarian law reflect elementary con-
siderations of humanity’ widely recognised as the mandatory mini-
mum for conduct in armed conflicts of any kind. No one can doubt
the gravity of the acts at issue, nor the interest of the international
community in their prohibition.’’287
This reasoning covered the law that applied to the conflict in the
Balkans which began in 1991. Can it be applied to a situation 20 years
earlier? The examples cited, did include pre-1971 ones. Those seeking
to argue this will have to show that there was the State practice and
opinio juris to support there being individual criminal responsibility
284 Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, – 131.
285 Id., – 133.
286 Id., – 134.
287 Id., – 129.
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for violations of Common Article 3 in 1971. The fact that there had in
1971 not been any international prosecutions for violations of the
‘‘fundamental principles of humanity’’ in non-international armed
conflicts does not in itself mean that these customary rules may not be
treated as carrying penal sanction. The Nuremberg precedent in
relation to war crimes is that acts need not be expressly criminalised,
but it suffices if they are prohibited in international law (in that case
by the ‘‘laws and customs of war’’, most particularly the Regulations
Annexed to Hague Convention IV). Compliance with the principle of
legality means going beyond those ‘‘relaxed attitudes’’, to borrow
from Professor Jescheck. The core acts would need to be criminalised
by domestic law or according to the general principles of law recog-
nised by the community of nations. That international law imposes
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States was
recognised long before the IMT’s judgement, and in the words of the
military tribunal in High Command, it would be ‘‘an utter disregard
of reality…legal shadow-boxing’’ if there were no means of ensuring
compliance with such fundamental principles of international law.288
It is only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes that the
provisions of international law can be enforced.289
Ultimately, to succeed with an argument that in 1971, violations of
Common Article 3 were already criminalised in custom and could be
prosecuted as violations of the laws and customs of war in non-inter-
national armed conflict, it will have to be shown that therewas the State
practice and opinio juris to support there being individual criminal
responsibility for violations of CommonArticle 3 in 1971. Absent that,
Common Article 3 cannot properly be used to prosecute anyone.
This situation clearly shows how important it was to have retained
the Bangladesh Penal Code, under which acts falling through the
many loopholes of international criminal law could be prosecuted.
This was, ironically, used in the 1972 Collaborators Act.
5.4.4.2 ‘‘Violations of any Humanitarian Rules Applicable in Armed
Conflicts Laid Out in the Geneva Conventions of 1949’’. On a plain
reading, it is not clear what this provision means, since all the rules in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are ‘‘humanitarian’’ (Geneva law) as
opposed to being of jus in bello (Hague law) nature such as are
288 See United States v. Von Leeb et al., XI Trials of War Criminals 462–697
(U.S.A. Military Tribunal, 1948), XII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1, 72
(U.S.A. Military Tribunal 1949) [hereinafter High Command Case].
289 IMT Judgement, supra note 194, at 221.
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contained in the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of
1907. Contextually, this provision comes after the war crimes’ pro-
vision, and the reference to ‘‘humanitarian rules’’ and the ‘‘Geneva
Conventions’’ gives the impression that the drafters may actually
have intended the war crimes’ provision to cover Hague law and this
second provision to cover Geneva law.
Contrary to what the text suggests, there is not individual criminal
responsibility for every single breach of every single rule in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. The hundreds of rules in the Geneva
Conventions range from prohibition of murdering civilians to rules
specifying the kind of identity card that a Prisoner-of-War is sup-
posed to have and rules on censoring of mail. In general terms, there
three categories of rules in the Geneva Conventions 1949 – funda-
mental provisions, violations of which are called Grave Breaches of
the Geneva Conventions; violations of the Geneva Conventions that
are serious, but do not amount to Grave Breaches; and the rest.
It is only violation of the fundamental rules that carry individual
criminal responsibility in international criminal law, and can be
prosecuted as Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions. These are
international crimes. Grave Breaches are perpetrated when there is an
international armed conflict290 and someone commits the following
acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of
a hostile
(f) power;
(g) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular
(h) trial;
(i) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
(j) taking civilians as hostages.
290 Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, – 84. (‘‘Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Appeals Chamber must conclude that, in the present state of devel-
opment of the law, Article 2 of the Statute only applies to offences committed within
the context of international armed conflicts.’’)
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We see this confirmed in Article 50 of Geneva Convention I, Article 51
of Geneva Convention II, Article 130 of Geneva Convention III and
Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV. With Grave Breaches come a
host of responsibilities, namely the obligation to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing,
or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches, and the obli-
gation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. TheHigh
Contracting Party may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
It is obviously possible to prosecute Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions 1949, in relation to the international armed conflict
phase of the 1971 war. On a reading in accordance with Article 31 of
the VCLT, Grave Breaches would fall within the notion of
‘‘humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid out in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949’’. The tribunal will have to determine a
critical date’ from which the Indian involvement was such as to
internationalise the Common Article 3 conflict. It is clear that the
massacres of the intellectuals in Dhaka just prior to the surrender
would fall within the period of the international armed conflict, and
could be prosecutable as Grave Breaches (although it may be felt to
be more appropriately to be charged as a crime against humanity,
even genocide, depending on the evidence that is available).
Can violations of Common Article 3 be Grave Breaches? In 1994,
Professor Bassiouni’s commission argued that breaches of Common
Article 3 were not Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions.291
One year later in Tadic´, the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber majority
291 Commission of Experts (Former Yugoslavia), Final Report of the Commission
of Experts (Former Yugoslavia) Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780, – 42, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994):
The treaty law designed for internal armed conflict is in common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II of 1977, and article 19 of the 1954
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
ArmedConflict. These legal sources do not use the terms grave breaches’ or war
crimes’. Further, the content of customary law applicable to internal armed
conflict is debatable. As a result, in general, unless the parties to an internal
armed conflict agree otherwise, the only offences committed in internal armed
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(Judge Abi-Saab with a strong dissent) noted that there was flux but
took the view that the law as it stood did not recognise the notion of
Grave Breaches in non international armed conflict. It cited with
‘‘satisfaction’’ the Amicus Curiae submission of the USA, which
argued that Grave Breaches could be committed in non-international
armed conflict, and that national courts were taking the view that the
grave breaches system may operate regardless of the whether the
armed conflict was international or internal.292 Yet it found that ‘‘at
the present state of development of the law’’, Grave Breaches as
contained in Article 2 of its Statute, only applied to offences com-
mitted in the context of international armed conflict. The majority of
the judges did, as this paper has already demonstrated, find that
breaches of Common Article 3 would amount to violations of the
‘‘laws and customs of war’’ further to the construction of the ICTY
Statute. Serious but non-grave breaches would also fall therein.
Each of the Geneva Conventions also requires High Contracting
Parties to take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts
contrary to the provisions of its provisions other than the Grave
Breaches.293 They are not Grave Breaches and are not necessarily
international crimes (Professor Meron correctly points out that they
may amount to violations of the laws and customs of war294). The
prosecution, under this Bangladeshi provision, of such violations of
the Geneva Conventions packaged up as if they were international
crimes, is going to be very problematic. Even today, they are not
automatically international crimes. This is a very different situation
Footnote 291 continued
conflict for which universal jurisdiction exists are crimes against humanity’ and
genocide, which apply irrespective of the conflicts’ classification.
See also Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of Inter-
national Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 80 (1994); International Committee of the Red
Cross [ICRC], Preliminary Remarks on the Setting-Up of an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, – 4, Doc.
DDM/JUR/442 b (Mar. 25, 1993).
292 Tadic´ Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 186, – 83.
293 For example, Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, requires that
‘‘Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of
all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave
breaches defined in the following Article.’’
294 See Meron, supra note 278, at 242.
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from Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,295
which is geared for a particular type of war crime (described as
‘‘serious violations of international humanitarian law’’: a. Inten-
tionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; b.
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civ-
ilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
c. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hos-
tilities. These, it will be obvious, are offences of the Hague law
variety, involving the jus in bello. These would, if we were to draw an
analogy with Bangladesh, fall under its ‘‘war crimes’’ provision.
5.4.5 ‘‘Any Other Crimes Under International Law’’
This standalone catch-all provision is noteworthy. Its vagueness and
the absence of the necessary specificity required to bring a criminal
charge against a person are remarkable. The principle of specificity is
part of the principle of legality, which must surely be a general
principle of law. It requires that crimes are defined as precisely or
specifically as possible so that a potential perpetrator is aware of the
elements constituting the prohibited conduct, and can regulate his or
her behaviour accordingly. In Vasiljevic´, an ICTY Trial Chamber
held that the offense must be defined ‘‘with sufficient clarity for it to
have been foreseeable and accessible, taking into account the speci-
ficity of customary international law.’’296 The principle extends to the
role of the court in assessing criminal provisions; this is captured in
Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute: ‘‘The definition of a crime shall be
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of
ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.’’ As Professor Cassese
acknowledges, there are specificity problems with much of interna-
tional criminal law (for example, the Geneva Conventions use the
term torture’ but do not define it), and the principle is not fully
applied in international law.297 Professor Jescheck cautioned that, in
295 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Aug. 14, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138,
S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
296 Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgement, supra note 177, – 198.
297
CASSESE, supra note 197, at 41.
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relation to customary international law, general principle of law and
case law, the principle can only serve ‘‘as a guiding doctrine, to be
observed when interpreting the rules produced by these sources of
law’’.298 But to prosecute people on the basis of ‘‘any other crimes
under international law’’ is really going too far.
A similar situation – and it is nowhere near as extreme – to this
provision in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As
Amended is the ‘‘other inhumane acts’’ provision in the crimes
against humanity definitions of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. An
ICTY Trial Chamber held that this notion of ‘‘other inhumane acts’’
was deliberately designed as a residual category, as it was felt to be
undesirable for this category to be exhaustively enumerated, that
would merely create opportunities for evasion of the letter of the
prohibition.299 That does not get around the problem that this pro-
vision lacks specificity. The technique that is used to deal with this
sort of situation is the ejusdem generis approach, which is inter-
pretation-by-analogy. And that is also controversial; it is prohibited
by the aforementioned Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute. Using this
method, the term ‘‘other inhumane acts’’ is interpreted in the light of
the other provisions, leading to the conclusion that is does not mean
any old ‘‘inhumane act’’ but those which are of the same level of
gravity as the identified crimes, such as persecution and extermina-
tion.300 Dissatisfaction with the lack of specificity exemplified in these
examples has resulted in much more careful drafting of the ICC
Statute. The following catch-all’ provisions illustrate how a list can
be left open-ended, without violating the principle of specificity:
• Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of com-
parable gravity;301 and
298 Jescheck, supra note 101, at 41. See also Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case
No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Preliminary Motions by the Defence of Joseph
Nzirorera, E´douard Karemara, Andre Rwamakuba and Mathieu Ngirumpatse
Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Joint Criminal Enterprise, – 43 (May 11,
2004) (‘‘that, given the specificity of international criminal law, the principle of
legality does not apply to international criminal law to the same extent as it applies in
certain national legal systems’’).
299 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic´ et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, – 563 (Jan.
14, 2000).
300 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 161, at 331 (elaborating on the use of the principle).
301 ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 7(1)(g) (emphasis added).
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• Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.302
The reason why these particular catch-alls are acceptable is because it
is made clear that the sorts of other unlisted crimes have to be of
similar type and magnitude of the preceding crimes. Notice is clearly
given of the kind of prohibited criminal conduct. This is not the case
with the provision in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As
Amended. There can be no foreseeability with a provision like this, it
is virtually an anything goes’ provision. It treats international law
like an open book and allows the Prosecutor to draw in anything that
he wants as a ‘‘crime under international law’’. The accused is not on
notice of what he is supposed to have done wrong until the Prose-
cutor pulls the mysterious ‘‘any other crimes under international law’’
out of the hat. In the face of such a provision, and the naked will of
the Legislature that it reveals, it does not seem at all fair or just for a
court of law to apply the ejusdem generis approach.
That being said, the consequences of this provision may actually
not be that bad. How does one identify what international crimes are?
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic´ identified four principles to
guide the identification of an international crime: (1) the infringement
of a rule of the international law of armed conflict; (2) the customary
or treaty law character of the crime; (3) the seriousness’ of the vio-
lation of humanitarian law and (4) the establishment of individual
criminal liability by the rule in question.303 In Norman, a Trial
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone went through the
process of trying to ascertain the customary status of the crime of
child military recruitment, the critical date being 1996, and the result
very controversial.304
In an earlier section, I observed that the ancillary crime of direct
and public incitement to commit genocide has not been expressly
provided for in the 1973 Act and appears not to be covered by the
enumerated modes of responsibility. In 1971, this was probably a
‘‘crime in violation of international law’’, i.e. in line with the Tadic´
test, particularly being in violation of the Genocide Convention and
the customary prohibition against genocide and carrying individual
302 ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 7(1)(k) (emphasis added).
303 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138, – 94.
304 Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Pre-
liminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), –– 30–53 (May
31, 2004).
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criminal responsibility.305 This provision could perhaps be used to
enable prosecution and convictions for direct and public incitement
to commit genocide. In 1971, there were probably no other ‘‘inter-
national crimes’’ than piracy, genocide and its ancillary crimes,
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Piracy seems not to be
relevant to the Bangladeshi situation. One would have to conduct
further research to be certain, but it is not unreasonable to posit
that slavery was, in 1971, already prohibited under customary
305 See e.g. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Report 15, 26 (May 28) (‘‘The origins of
the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to condemn and
punish genocide as ‘‘a crime under international law’’…. The first consequence arising
from this conception is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles
which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation…’’ (emphasis added)); G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946) (‘‘Affirms that genocide in a crime under international
law…and for the commission of which the principals and accomplices are punish-
able’’); Eichmann District Court Judgement, supra note 81, at 11. In 1988, Hanni-
kainen considered genocide as a ‘‘clear’’ case of international crimes under
customary international law punishable in domestic court (see LAURI HANNIKAINEN,
PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT,
CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 285–286 (1988)). See also Buzzacott v Minister for the
Environment and Others, 120 I.L.R. 354, – 18 (Austl, Fed. Ct., 1999):
I accept that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of customary
international law, giving rise to a non-derogatable obligation by each nation
State to the entire international community. This is an obligation independent
of the [Genocide Convention]. It existed before the commencement of that
Convention in January 1951, probably at least from the time of the United
Nations General Assembly resolution in December 1946 (emphasis added).
On incitement to commit genocide, a Trial Chamber of the ICTR has noted pros-
ecution and conviction of incitement in international criminal law since the IMT
Nuremburg (see Akayesu Trial Judgement, supra note 213, – 550):
Perhaps the most famous conviction for incitement to commit crimes of
international dimension was that of Julius Streicher by the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal for the virulently anti-Semitic articles which he had published in his
weekly newspaper Der Stu¨rmer. The Nuremberg Tribunal found that: ‘‘Strei-
cher’s incitement to murder and extermination, at the time when Jews in the
East were being killed under the most horrible conditions, clearly constitutes
persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with War Crimes, as
defined by the Charter, and constitutes a Crime against Humanity’’.
On this point, see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Judgement, –– 978 est. seq. (Dec. 3, 2003) (also known as the
‘‘Media’’ case).
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international law. But that does not mean it was also a ‘‘crime under
international law’’ carrying individual criminal responsibility. Tor-
ture is problematic, for despite a prohibition of the act in the UDHR,
European Convention on Human Rights,306 Geneva Conventions
1949 and the not-yet-in-force ICCPR, the international anti-torture
movement only started in response to events in Latin America after
the Bangladesh war was over. The foundational international activity
came with General Assembly Resolution 3059 (XXVIII) of 1973307
adopted unanimously, which revealed the international community’s
concerns to reinforce the illegality of this practice and came out of a
growing awareness that there was a need for greater international
regulation; and Resolution 3218 (XXIX) of 6 November 1974,308 that
sought specific information from States on the practice of torture and
saw the General Assembly move towards standard-setting and doing
more than simply issuing declarations. It followed four potentially
normative lines: the possibility of developing the rules against torture
and ill-treatment, safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention,
professional ethics for police and analogous officers, professional
ethics for medical personnel. Resolution 3452 (XXX), the Declara-
tion against Torture, would only come on 9 December 1975.309 So
torture as a stand-alone international crime in 1971 seems most
unlikely. Terrorism would seem to be a possibility. There were
already some anti-terrorist conventions in force at the time of the
Bangladesh war of independence. But these outlawed certain acts,
and relied on States Parties to adopt implementing legislation to
prosecute accused persons in domestic law. It was not envisaged that
they would be tried in an international process before an interna-
tional court. Acts, such as those in violation of the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague
306 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sep. 3, 1953, as
amended by Protocols 1–14).
307 Question of Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res 3059 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3059 (Nov. 2, 1973).
308 Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
relation to Detention and Punishment, G.A. Res. 3218 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3218 (Nov. 6, 1974).
309 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, G.A. Res 3452
(XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3452 (XXX) (Dec. 9, 1975).
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on 16 December 1970,310 were not ‘‘crimes in violation of interna-
tional law’’.
5.5 Modes of Responsibility
The Bangladesh Penal Code 1860 – which was also the law at the time
of the war of liberation under a different name – does provide for
modes of responsibility. In addition to detailed elaborations of the
prohibited forms of direct commission of crime, that code also con-
tains detailed chapters on abetment (Ch. V), criminal conspiracy (Ch.
VA), and attempts (Ch. XXIII). Although the Penal Code has not
been expressly ousted, particular provisions on modes of responsi-
bility that are included in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act
1973 As Amended, suggest that the Penal Code is not to apply.
With the great benefit of hindsight, one would have wished to see
something like Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, providing that ‘‘1. A
person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a
crime referred to in articles 2–5 of the present Statute, shall be
individually responsible for the crime.’’ Article 25 of the ICC Statute
is also very clear. The modes of perpetration of crimes under
the Statute are by way of committing; ordering, soliciting, inducing;
aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting; common purpose;311 direct
and public incitement to commit genocide and inchoate offences.
Subsection 1 of Section 3 of the International Crimes (Tribunals)
Act 1973 As Amended describes the personal jurisdiction of the tri-
bunal as being over those who committed or have committed certain
crimes in the territory of Bangladesh. The drafters do detail the types
of criminal conduct to be covered, but these are actually different
concepts. The 1973 Act does not address direct perpetration, such as,
to take an example, Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute, which
criminalises the acts of a person who ‘‘commits such a crime, whether
as an individual, jointly with another or through another person,
310 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,
860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971).
311 ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 25(3)(d):
Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the
aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where
such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the
group to commit the crime.
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regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible’’. In
terms of individual responsibility, the following are provided in the
1973 Act. Section 3(2)(g) criminalises ‘‘attempt abetment or con-
spiracy to commit any such crimes’’. Strangely, commission’ of crime
is not included among the enumerated list of modes of responsibility.
One could of course stretch to argue that Joint Criminal Enterprise
(JCE’)312 is a form of conspiracy or even abetment under the Ban-
gladeshi law, but if one were to rely on the international cases, there
will have to be an evaluation of whether JCE existed in 1971, and
what its content was. Also, the ICTY jurisprudence on JCE roots it in
the notion of commit’, which is not in the relevant provisions,
namely Sections 3(2)(g) and (h). Section 3(2)(h) criminalises ‘‘com-
plicity in or failure to prevent commission of any such crimes’’.
Subject to Section 4(2) below, there is no provision on ordering.
There is also nothing on planning, instigation or incitement. How-
312 The term Joint Criminal Enterprise’ (also known as ‘‘JCE’’) was invented at
the ICTY to describe different types of co-perpetration that had evolved in the World
War II jurisprudence. That jurisprudence conceptualised co-perpetration in different
ways, using different phrases. JCE has been held to be a form of commission’ of
crime under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, supra note 156, and Art 6(1) of the
ICTR Statute, supra, note 168, which are not limited to physical perpetration. In
Tadic´, the ICTY Appeals Chamber divided the jurisprudence into 3 categories, all of
which have 3 features: a plurality of persons, a common plan and participation in the
common plan (Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, supra note 138, –– 185–229, especially –
227). The first 2 types of JCE are straightforward. All co-defendants, acting pursuant
to a common design, possess the same criminal intention (JCE 1 – Basic JCE); and
concentration camp cases – groups of persons acting pursuant to a concerted plan
(JCE 2 – Systemic JCE). What is controversial is the third form, extended JCE,
whereby the accused did not personally commit the crime, or it was not a component
of the common plan, but was a predictable consequence of execution of the common
plan and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk (Tadic´ Appeal
Judgement, supra note 138, –– 210, 229).
In Cambodia, the ECCC is still grappling with the issue. After having asked for
amicus curiae from experts, the Pre-Trial Chamber refused to allow the first accused
to be tried for his membership in a JCE or a conspiracy to commit all 15,000 killings
at S-21 Centre and Choeng Ek, on the grounds that the prosecutor’s request was
vague and long overdue. The co-investigating judges did not conduct their work with
JCE specifically in mind, and the attempt to expand the type of conduct attributable
to Duch was not fair as he had the right to be informed of the charges at the
investigative stage. They could have taken this decision without asking for amicus
briefs, and so dodged the substantive issue. But JCE is still pending in the second
case, where the prosecution is at time of writing making submissions on JCE for a
multi-accused case (see Prosecutor v. Kaing (Alias ‘‘Duch’’), Case No. 001/18-07-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02), Decision on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicting
Kaing Guek Eav Alias ‘‘Duch’’ (Dec. 5, 2008)).
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ever, embedded in the definition of the crime against peace are:
‘‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression…’’
Under Section 4(1), ‘‘[w]hen any crime as specified in Section 3 is
committed by several persons, each of such person is liable for that
crime in the same manner as if it were done by him alone’’. This
underlines in the individual nature of criminality, a person will be
judged by his or her own conduct.
What of command responsibility? In Dhaka, one is told of the
abiding significance of the command responsibility standard set down
in the Yamashita decision,313 and that the highly progressive and
expertly drafted law of 1973 provides for this in Section 4(2). Com-
mand responsibility, it is said, is critical for prosecuting the crimes in
question. But, the standard of almost-strict liability imposed on that
Japanese general have long been rightly criticised for being both unjust
and having no legal basis at that point in time.314 Command respon-
sibility was not applied in that form to the German war accused or any
other Japanese, just to General Yamashita. We have seen, over and
313 The military court held that where ‘‘vengeful actions are widespread offences
and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the
criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable.’’
(Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, IV Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals
1, 35 (U.S.A. Military Tribunal 1949)). General Yamashita, by his position and
authority, must have had a certain degree of knowledge of the activities committed in
Manila by his troops and the naval forces tactically assigned to him. There was no
need for a linkage to the actual crimes.
314 In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 28 (1946). Justices Murphy and Rutledge com-
plained about the absence of fair trial as guaranteed under the Constitution and the
violation of the principle of legality. They found there was no serious attempt to charge
or prove a recognised violation of the laws of war; the accused was not even charged
with personal participation in the acts of atrocity, or ordering or condoning their
commission; the prosecution couldn’t even show he had knowledge of the crimes:
[The prosecution] simply alleged that he unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duty as a commander to control the operations of the members of
his command, permitting them to commit the acts of atrocity. The recorded
annals of warfare and the established principles of international law afford, not
the slightest precedent for such a charge.
Overall, they concluded it was unfair to have charged him with failure to control the
Japanese forces when the US had done everything to destroy and disorganise his
lines of communication and his ability to maintain effective control of his personnel.
See also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTOR-
ICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 319–322 (1977); A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA
(1971); BASSIOUNI, supra note 161, at 426 (recognising the controversy of this
‘‘notorious’’ trial).
COMPLETING THE CIRCLE
over again, that there is an obsession with the notion of command
responsibility, which is a wrong categorisation for mass crimes where
subordinates act the way their commanders want them to act. East
Timor and Indonesia are particularly clear examples of how command
responsibility does not work for system crimes. The commander is
invariably going to be part of some kind of common plan and he
conveys the objectives of the plan down the line. The doctrine of JCE,
controversial as it is, does capture the bigger picture and the scheme of
criminality within which the commander operates.
That being said, scrutiny of Section 4(2) reveals that it is a pro-
vision that is not known to international criminal law past or present,
one that confuses the different modes of criminal responsibility:
Any commander or superior officer who orders, permits, acquiesces or participates in
the commission of any of the crimes specified in section 3 or is connected with any
plans and activities involving the commission of such crimes or who fails or omits to
discharge his duty to maintain discipline, or to control or supervise the actions of the
persons under his command or his subordinates, whereby such persons or subordi-
nates or any of them commit any such crimes, or who fails to take necessary mea-
sures to prevent the commission of such crimes, is guilty of such crimes.
This provision is neither Yamashita, nor is it
High Command315 or Hostages316 or
315 See High Command Case, supra note 288. (A US Military Tribunal accepted
the notion of command responsibility but not strict liability: 1. ‘‘In order for a
commander to be criminally liable for the actions of his subordinates ‘‘there must be
a personal dereliction’’ which ‘‘can only occur where the act is directly traceable to
him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal
negligence on his part’’ tantamount to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of
his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.’’ 2. ‘‘Under basic principles of com-
mand authority and responsibility, an officer who merely stands by while his sub-
ordinates execute a criminal order of his superiors which he knows is criminal
violates a moral obligation under international law. By doing nothing he cannot
wash his hands of international responsibility’’ (see High Command Case, supra
note 288, at 76).)In short, the ‘‘should have known’’ standard ‘‘was unacceptable
and not sufficient proof of actual knowledge. Crime must be evident’’. According to
the court, there ‘‘must be a personal dereliction’’ (see High Command Case, above n.
288, at 76).
316 United States of America v. Wilhelm List et al., XI Trials of War Criminals
1230–1319, VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 32 (U.S.A. Military Tri-
bunal, 1948) [hereinafter Hostages Case]. Here, a US Military Tribunal accepted the
notion of command responsibility. But it stated that a commander is ‘‘charged with
notice of occurrences taking place within [occupied] territory’’ where he has received
reports of crimes and he ‘‘fails to require and obtain complete information, the
dereliction of duty rests upon him and he is in no position to plead his own dere-
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Toyoda317 or Medina318 or the provisions on superior responsi-
bility that were, 6 years later, to be adopted in Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.319 Command
Footnote 316 continued
liction as a defence.’’ (see Hostages Case, supra note 316, at 71). Command
responsibility requires actual receipt of information, and action where the com-
mander is put on notice. Where, having been put on notice, a commander fails to
‘‘require and obtain complete information, the dereliction of duty rests upon him and
he is in no position to plead his dereliction as a defence…want of knowledge of the
contents of reports made to him is not a defence’’ (see Hostages Case, supra note 316,
at 71).
317 United States v. Soemu Toyoda, Judgement, Official Transcript of Record of
Trial 4998–5007 (U.S.A., Military Tribunal sitting in Tokyo, Sept. 6, 1949):
[…] [I]f this accused knew, or should by the exercise of ordinary diligence have
learned, of the commission by his subordinates, immediate or otherwise, of the
atrocities proved beyond a shadow of a doubt before this Tribunal or of the
existence of a routine which would countenance such, and, by his failure to
take any action to punish the perpetrators, permitted the atrocities to continue,
he has failed in his performance of his duty as a commander and must be
punished’’ (see United States v. Soemu Toyoda, quoted in Delalic´ et al. Trial
Judgement, supra note 136, – 340).
318 Instructions from the Military Judge to the Court Martial Members, United
States of America v. Ernest Medina, in 2 THE LAW OF WAR – A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
1729–1737 (Leon Friedmann ed., 1972) [hereinafter Medina Instructions]. The
Military Judge in the case instructed the jury that in order to convict Medina of
Command Responsibility, there had to be sufficient evidence of actual knowledge
plus a wrongful failure to act.
Mere presence at the scene without knowledge will not suffice. That is, the
commander-subordinate relationship alone will not allow an inference of
knowledge. While it is not necessary that a commander actually see an atrocity
being committed, it is essential that he know that his subordinates are in the
process of committing atrocities or about to commit atrocities.
319 Additional Protocol I, supra note 230, art 86(2) (Failure to Act): Superiors
cannot escape liability for acts of subordinates if
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in
the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power
to prevent or repress the breach.
See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 230, art 87 (Duty of Commanders):
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require
military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their
command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where
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responsibility is not, as has been done here, to be confused with
individual criminal responsibility arising from ordering the commis-
sion of a crime, or ordering an actwhere there is a substantial likelihood
that crimes would be committed in the course of that act.320 The pro-
vision also relies on a concept of ‘‘fails or omits to discharge his duty’’.
What is the mental element: is it to be the almost-strict liability of
Yamashita’s ‘‘must have known’’ standard, or the ‘‘knew or ought to
have known/had reason to know’’ concept that is actually what came
out of the whole process of the post World War II trials, including the
trials under Control Council Law No. 10 and the domestic trials held
across Europe and Asia, and other trials such as Medina, and ulti-
mately reflected in Additional Protocol I? Here is also contained the
only reference to ordering in the Act, and it is limited to ‘‘any com-
mander or superior officer’’. It seems to be the local civilian and
paramilitary groups that are most likely to be targeted by Bangladeshi
investigations and prosecutions: one could probably stretch the defi-
nition to make it include those with de facto command, whether mili-
tary or civilian.321
Footnote 319 continued
necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Con-
ventions and of this Protocol.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and
Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of
responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under
their command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this
Protocol.
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any
commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control
are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of
the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disci-
plinary or penal action against violators thereof.
320 See Prosecutor v. Blaskic´, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgement, –– 89–93
(Jul. 29, 2004). Note however that it also held that Article 7(1) subsumes Article 7(3).
Thus, if an accused is found to have commits crimes under the individual criminal
responsibility and command responsibility modes, a conviction must be entered under
individual criminal responsibility (Article 7(1)) as it is the most direct form of
responsibility.
321 In customary international law, in determining if someone is a commander for
the purposes of the doctrine of command responsibility, it is not a person’s rank that
counts, but whether a person had authority to issue orders to the subordinates, who
were obliged to obey. It applies to civilians andmilitary, State andnon-State actors. See
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement, –– 75–76 (Jun. 25,
1999); Delalic´ et al. Appeal Judgement, supra note 223, – 197 (‘‘the doctrine of superior
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One way to work in the actual definition of command responsi-
bility that applied in 1971, would be to draw on Article 3(2)(h) which
criminalises ‘‘complicity in or failure to prevent commission of any
such crimes’’. Only certain persons have a duty to prevent commis-
sion of crime, and that includes military and civilian superiors. That
being said, Article 3(2) is insufficient and Section 4(1) is an unsatis-
factory provision that really must be replaced with a statement that
reflects the actual state of international law in 1971.
These are the sorts of things that should have been tidied up in the
review of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended
in 2009.
5.6 Defence Matters
There is much of importance to the defence discussed in the following
section on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but there are some
matters that are more appropriate dealt with separately.
5.6.1 Defence Counsel
The ICCPR, inArticle 14, requires the accused has the right to a lawyer
of his choice, with free legal assistance if he does not have the means to
pay for it. The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended does
Footnote 321 continued
responsibility extends to civilian superiors only to the extent that they exercise a
degree of control over their subordinates which is similar to that of military com-
manders’’).
See also Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeal Judgement, –
52 (Jul. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Bagilishema Appeal Judgement]:
[…] [T]he establishment of civilian superior responsibility requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused exercised effective control over his subordi-
nates, in the sense that he exercised a degree of control over themwhich is similar
to the degree of control ofmilitary commanders. It is not suggested that ‘‘effective
control’’ will necessarily be exercised by a civilian superior and by a military
commander in the sameway, or that it may necessarily be established in the same
way in relation to both a civilian superior and a military commander.
This does notmean that the control exercised by a civilian superiormust be of the same
nature as that exercised by a military commander.
It is sufficient that, for one reason or another, the accused exercises the
required ‘‘degree’’ of control over his subordinates, namely, that of effective
control…. The case law of the International Tribunals makes it mandatory to
use the effective control test for both de jure and de facto superiors (see
Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, – 55).
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provide for defence counsel to be made available. Since this is a 100%
domestic process, there is noprovision for foreign defence counsel. But,
under Section 12, where an accused person is not represented by
counsel, the Tribunal may, at any stage of the case, ‘‘direct that a
counsel shall be engaged at the expense of the Government to defend
the accused person and may also determine the fees to be paid to such
counsel’’. Obviously, this does not provide for the right of an accused
person to have or choose his counsel; it gives the Tribunal the discre-
tionary power to assign a particular counsel of its choice to the accused,
and at ‘‘any stage of the case’’. There are always reasons to be con-
cerned when counsel is imposed on an accused, rather than by choice.
But, the reality is the right to counsel of choice is not an absolute right.
Even if the accused is able to pay his own legal costs, he has to choose a
lawyer who is entitled to appear before the court. If he cannot pay his
own way, he will be limited by the rules of the body that pays the legal
costs. For example, at the ICTY and ICTR, indigent accused (those
who cannot pay for their own costs)mayonly choose counsel froma list
providedby theRegistrar of the courtwho is the paymaster onbehalf of
the UN.322
5.6.2 Defences
Following on from the deplorable practice established in the postWorld
War II processes, this is a law that is silent on defences to be made
available for the accused. In the 1973 law, there is not even a statement
about the essential presumption of innocence in favour of the accused
322 See e.g. ICTY Statute, supra note 156, art 21; ICTR Statute, above n. 168, art
20; Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic´, Zdravko Mucic´, Hazim Delic´ and Esad Landzo,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Request by Accused Mucic´ for Assignment of
New Counsel (Jun. 24, 1998); Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T/
ICTR-96-17-T, Decision on the Motion by Accused to be Assigned New Counsel
(Jun. 11, 1997). See also Crossaint v Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 13611/
88 ECHR, – 29 (Nov. 27, 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng:
It is true that Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art 6-3-c) [of the ECHR] entitles ‘‘everyone
charged with a criminal offence’’ to be defended by counsel of his own
choosing. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the importance of a relationship
of confidence between lawyer and client, this right cannot be considered to be
absolute. It is necessarily subject to certain limitations where free legal aid is
concerned and also where, as in the present case, it is for the courts to decide
whether the interests of justice require that the accused be defended by counsel
appointed by them. When appointing defence counsel the national courts must
certainly have regard to the defendant’s wishes…. However, they can override
those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that
this is necessary in the interests of justice. (citation omitted)
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(this is apparently because the presumption is implicit in theBangladeshi
criminal justice system, is a part of the criminal justice culture, and hence
would alwaysbe in themindsof the judges).323 ThePenalCode1860 that
was then applicable provides in detail for the defences are that available
to an accused. Chapter IV contains general exceptions, and they cover
mistake of fact, mistake of law, acts by a minor, acts by persons of
unsound mind, intoxication, consent, and compulsion. There is also an
entire section on the right of private defence (self-defence). The Inter-
national Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended does not address the
matter of the Penal Code 1860; it has not been expressly ousted. How-
ever, the law isnot standalone, in the sense that itdoes refer tocertainacts
such as the Army Act 1952 which will continue to apply. This is not the
casewith thePenalCode1860. It therefore seems that thedefences in that
code may not be available for the accused under this 1973 law. For the
reasons already discussed, there is no way to challenge anything in the
law on the basis of the Constitution.
In international criminal law today, there is a wide range of what
are called ‘‘circumstances excluding responsibility’’ (the terminology
has to balance the different approaches of the common and civil law
traditions). The following are recognised in the Statute of the ICC:
mental disease or defect;324 intoxication;325 self-defence;326 duress/
necessity;327 mistake of fact or law;328 alibi and superior orders.329
The official capacity of the accused is irrelevant.330 In the Bangladeshi
law of 1973 as amended, there is only a provision covering official
capacity and superior orders. Section 5 of the International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act 1973 As amended provides as follows:
(1) The official position, at any time, of an accused shall not be con-
sidered freeing him from responsibility or mitigating punishment.
(2) The fact that the accused acted pursuant to his domestic law or
to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him
323 Email from M. Shah Alam, Professor of the University of Chittagong (Sept. 5,
2009) (on file with the author).
324 ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 31(1)(a).
325 Id., art 31(1)(b).
326 Id., art 31(1)(c).
327 Id., art 31(1)(d).
328 Id., art 32.
329 Id., art 33.
330 Id., art 27.
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from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if the Tribunal deems that justice so requires.331
This is a very slight adaptation of the IMT Nuremberg formulation. In
the then-and-present applicable domestic law, the equivalent provision is
Section 76of the1860PenalCode,whichprovides that it canbeadefence
for a person to have acted in good faith pursuant to law, or by mistake
believed himself, in good faith, to be bound by law. The commentary on
Section 76 illuminates with the following explicit illustration:
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with
the commands of the law. A has committed no offence. (b) A, an officer of a Court of
Justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z
to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.
This raises a major problem. Superior orders were and are expressly
available as a defence in the then-and-present applicable domestic
law. But, for a certain category of person to be tried under the
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended, this defence is not
available. This is clearly unequal treatment before the law. It is
compounded by the fact that these persons are also barred from
making any constitutional challenges to the law.
Official acts are not controversial, but the correctness of relying on
the IMT’s superior orders provision for 1971 crimes is uncertain.
Superior orders have long been a controversial issue in international
law. Professor Jescheck stated that the IMT’s claim in its judgement
that the superior orders provision was in conformity with the law of all
nations ‘‘cannot hold’’.332 As the Israeli Supreme Court held in Eich-
mann, when interpreting the superior orders provision in the IMT
Statute,
It must be understood that this express provision was designed to defeat in advance
any attempt by the Nazi criminals to resort to the respondeat superior plea to the
point of carrying it ad absurdum, in view of the Fuehrerprinzip which, in the last
analysis, made it possible to trace to Hitler alone the source of the satanic orders
which resulted in the perpetration of the horrendous Nazi crimes, including that of
the ‘Final Solution’.333
331 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973AsAmended, supra note 79, Section 5.
332 Jescheck, supra note 101, at 46.
333 Eichmann Supreme Court Judgement, supra note 81, at 316–317.
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The legal position has yoyo-ed from being a complete
defence334 or partial defence335 in the pre World War II
years, to no defence at all in the Statutes of the IMTs
Nuremberg and Tokyo as well as Control Council Law No. 10336
334
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 264 (1st ed., 1906) (Stating
the rule in international law as being: ‘‘In case members of forces commit violations
ordered by their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the com-
manders are alone responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war
criminals on their capture by the enemy.’’ [absolute defence]). The British and
American Military Codes of the time recognised this defence of respondeat superior –
a superior order shall serve as a defence for a war crime committed in obedience to it.
It is the one who made the order who will be criminally responsible for the subor-
dinate’s act [absolute defence].
335 Military Penal Code 1872, s47 (Ger.). The Code provided for a qualified
superior orders defence: there was no responsibility for a subordinate unless the
subordinate knew, while committing the act, that the act as a misdemeanour or a
crime. Made superiors responsible if they issued unlawful orders. [limited defence]. In
the Llandovery Castle case before the Supreme Court of Leipzig:
[…] [T][he subordinate obeying an order is liable to punishment, if it was
known to him that the order of the superior involved the infringement of civil
or military law…. It is certainly to be urged in favour of the military subor-
dinates that they are under no obligation to question the order of their superior
officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no such confidence can be held
to exist, if such an order is universally known to everybody, including the
accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the law. (The Landovery
Castle Case [1921] Cmd. 1422 at 45, 2 Annual Digest of Public International
Law Cases 436–438 (Ger. Reichsgericht 1921).)
Also held that one can assume an order that looks ok on the face of it is consistent
with the law. In the Dover Castle case, before the Supreme Court of Leipzig: ‘‘…a
subordinate who acts in conformity with orders…is liable…when he knows [com-
pliance would] involve a civil or military crime or misdemeanour’’. (The Dover
Castle Case [1921] Cmd. 1422 at 42, 2 Annual Digest of Public International Law
Cases 429–430 (Ger. Reichsgericht 1921).) These cases set down a loose ought to
have known’ or actually knew’ standard for the subordinate. It is no defence where
the order was so blatant that he knew or ought to know that the instruction was
unlawful [limited defence].
336 Charter of the IMT Nuremberg, supra note 93, art 8. See also Control Council
Law No. 10, supra note 82, art 4(b): ‘‘The fact that any person acted pursuant to the
order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a
crime, but may be considered in mitigation’’.
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to a partial defence in the post World War II case law
such as Hostages,337 High Command,338 Calley339 and
337 Hostages Case, supra note 316, at 50–52. The court accepts that there is a rule
that superior orders is not a defence to a criminal act, but it qualifies it by empha-
sising lawful and unlawful orders:
It cannot be questioned that acts done in time of war cannot involve any
criminal liability on the part of officers or soldiers if the acts are prohibited by
the conventional or customary rules of war. Implicit obedience to orders of
superior officers is almost indispensable to every military system. But this
implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act pursuant to a superior’s
order be murder, the production of the order will not make it any less so. It
may mitigate but it cannot justify the crime. We are of the view, however, that
if the illegality of the order was not known to the inferior, and he could not
reasonably have been expected to know of its illegality, no wrongful intent
necessary to the commission of the crime exists, and the inferior will be pro-
tected. But the general rule is that [soldiers] are bound to obey only the lawful
orders of commanding officers and they cannot escape criminal liability by
obeying a command, which violates international law and outrages funda-
mental concepts of justice (see Hostages Case, supra note 316, at 50–52).
A soldier is a ‘‘reasoning agent’’ and not an automaton that does nothing more than
follow orders given. While a soldier is obliged to follow the orders of a superior,
which includes the passing on of orders to subordinates, obedience is requisite only
when the orders received (and perhaps passed on) are lawful. The defence of superior
orders is not available where the order given, and subsequently passed on was so
done knowing that the same was criminal.
338 See also High Command Case, supra note 288, at 73–74:
Military commanders in the field with far reaching military responsibilities
cannot be charged under international law with criminal participation in
issuing orders which are not obviously criminal or which they are not shown to
have known to be criminal under international law.’’ ‘‘Whenever there is a
manifestly illegal order involved, the subordinate is no longer entitled to rely
on the order given by the superior and must accordingly refuse to obey such
orders or run the risk of liability.
339 See also the Medina Instructions, supra note 318; Soldiers are trained to follow
orders, and special attention is given to obedience of orders on the battlefield.
Military effectiveness depends upon obedience to orders.
On the other hand, the obedience of the soldier is not the obedience of an
automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent, not a machine, but a person. The
law takes these factors into account in assessing criminal responsibility for acts
only in compliance with illegal orders’’. ‘‘The acts of a subordinate done in
compliance with a lawful order given him by his superior are excused and
impose no criminal liability unless the superior’s order is one which a man of
ordinary sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, known to
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Finta,340 and back to no defence in the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes341 and culminating in the highly nuanced provision
adopted for the ICC.342 In such a situation, if one were to respect
the presumption of innocence and the doctrine of favor rei, one
should give the accused the benefit of the doubt and allow him/her
to use the superior orders defence. It is particularly so since the
domestic law at the time, the Penal Code 1860, which continues to
apply to this day, allows the superior orders defence.
5.6.3 Inducements to Confess
Section 15 is an inducement to confess, a form of plea bargain
agreement.
Footnote 339 continued
be unlawful, or if order in question is actually known to the accused to be unlawful.
340 See R v. Finta, supra note 141, at 706. The Canadian Supreme Court accepted
that superior orders is a defence, subject to the manifest illegality test, and the moral
choice test (which actually goes into Duress):
[…] [T]he defences will not be available when the orders in question were
manifestly unlawful. Even where the orders were manifestly unlawful, the
defence of obedience to superior orders and the peace officer defence will be
available in those circumstances were the accused had no moral choice as to
whether to follow the orders. That is to say, there was such an air of com-
pulsion and threat to the accused that the accused had no alternative but to
obey the orders. As an example, the accused could be found to have been
compelled to carry out the manifestly unlawful order in circumstances were the
accused would be shot he or she failed to carry out the orders.’’ The case
considered when an order is manifestly unlawful: ‘‘It must be one that offends
the conscience of every reasonable, right thinking person; it must be an order
which is obviously and flagrantly wrong. The order cannot be in a gray area or
be merely questionable; rather, it must be blatantly and obviously wrong.
341 See ICTYStatute, supranote 156, art 7(4); ICTRStatute, supranote 168, art 6(4).
342 ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 33:
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed
by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether
military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility
unless: (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the
Government or the superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the
order was unlawful; and (c) the order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against
humanity are manifestly unlawful.
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(1) At any stage of the trial, a Tribunal may with a view to
obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been
directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any of the crimes
specified in Section 3, tender a pardon to such person on con-
dition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the
circumstances within his knowledge relative to the crime and to
every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in
the commission thereof.
(2) Every person accepting the tender under this section shall be
examined as a witness in the trial.
(3) Such person shall be detained in custody until the termination of
the trial.343
It is described as a ‘‘pardon’’, but there seems to be some confusion
here. If the person is not yet convicted, it would be an amnesty from
prosecution; if the person in question is someone already convicted,
then it would be a pardon. Section 15 is actually a provision that pre-
dates Article 16 of the South African Interim Constitution of 1994,
which led to the notorious amnesty for the truth’ provision that has
come to be the defining feature of South Africa’s Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission.344 The roots of this amnesty, in the Interim
Constitution, were what ultimately saved it when the Constitutional
Court ruled on the challenge brought by the Azanian People’s Orga-
nisation.345 Mahomed DP, for the Constitutional Court, held that:
[32]… The amnesty contemplated is not a blanket amnesty against criminal prose-
cution for all and sundry, granted automatically as a uniform act of compulsory
statutory amnesia. It is specifically authorised for the purposes of effecting a con-
structive transition towards a democratic order. It is available only where there is a
full disclosure of all facts to the Amnesty Committee and where it is clear that the
particular transgression was perpetrated during the prescribed period and with a
political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. That objective
has to be evaluated having regard to the careful criteria listed in s 20(3) of the Act,
343 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, supra note 79, Sec-
tion 15.
344 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995, arts. 18–20 (S.
Afr.) (on the procedure for granting amnesty: Where an applicant has ‘‘made a full
disclosure of all relevant facts, it shall grant amnesty in respect of that act, omission
or offence’’).
345 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v. President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others, 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC); 1996 (8) B.C.L.R. 1015
(CC); 131 I.L.R. 492 (S. Afr.).
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including the very important relationship which the act perpetrated bears in pro-
portion to the object pursued.
[50] In the result, I am satisfied that the epilogue to the Constitution authorised and
contemplated an ‘‘amnesty’’ in its most comprehensive and generous meaning so as
to enhance and optimise the prospects of facilitating the constitutional journey from
the shame of the past to the promise of the future. Parliament was, therefore, entitled
to enact the Act in the terms which it did.… The choice of alternatives legitimately
fell within the judgment of the lawmakers. The exercise of that choice does not, in my
view, impact on its constitutionality. It follows from these reasons that s 20(7) of the
Act is authorised by the Constitution itself and it is unnecessary to consider the
relevance and effect of s 33(1) of the Constitution.346
In terms of international law, pardons are not generally contested;
however, amnesties for international crimes are widely seen as con-
trary to the obligations to investigate, prosecute and punish, laid
down in treaties and customary international law. The Lome´ Peace
Agreement contained an amnesty that was raised in litigation at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. In Prosecutor v. Kallon et al., the
Appeals Chamber held that
[the] court is entitled in the exercise of its discretionary power, to attribute little or no
weight to the grant of such amnesty which is contrary to the direction in which
customary international law is developing and which is contrary to the obligations in
certain treaties and conventions the purpose of which is to protect humanity.347
The Human Rights Committee has addressed this matter of amnes-
ties too. In General Comment No. 20 on Article 7 of the ICCPR, the
Committee expressed concern over the use of amnesties in respect of
torture and held that
amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts;
to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they
do not occur in the future. States may not deprive individuals of the right to an
effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be
possible.348
346 Id., 131 I.L.R. 492 at 513 – 32, 521 – 50.
347 Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Buzzy Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2004-
15-AR72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction:
Lome´ Accord Amnesty, – 84 (Mar. 13, 2004)
348 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Replaces general com-
ment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7), –
15, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 151 (Mar. 10, 1993).
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It has challenged States on this matter in reviewing their periodic
reports, usually expressing the following concerns:
• the amnesty prevents relevant investigation and punishment of
perpetrators of past human rights violations;
• the amnesty precludes proper compensation;
• the amnesty would contribute towards impunity and seriously
undermine efforts to re-establish respect for human rights and to
prevent a recurrence of the massive human rights violations expe-
rienced in the past;
• failure to exclude violators from service in Government, particu-
larly in the military, the National Police and the judiciary, will
seriously undermine the transition to peace and democracy.349
The Committee is likely to engage with Bangladesh in this manner
in relation to Article 15 of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act
As Amended. In a number of individual communications, the Human
Rights Committee has also addressed in the matter in the same way.
In dealing with a communication challenging Argentina’s Full Stop
Law’, the Committee reminded Argentina that ‘‘it is under an obli-
gation, in respect of violations occurring or continuing after the entry
into force of the Covenant, thoroughly to investigate alleged viola-
tions and to provide remedies where applicable, for victims or their
dependants’’.350
349 See Human Rights Committee, Comments on El Salvador, – 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.34 (Apr. 18, 1994); Human Rights Committee, Comments on
Paraguay, – 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.48 (1995); Human Rights Committee,
Comments on the Report submitted by Peru of 25 July 1996, – 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/79/Add.67 (1996); Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations:
Croatia, – 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/HRV (Apr. 30, 2001).
350 See R. A. V. N. et al. [names deleted] v. Argentina (No. 343/1988), – 5.4, U.N.
Doc. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/343/1988 (Mar. 26, 1990). On 24 December 1986,
Argentina’s Parliament adopted Law No. 23,492, known as the Finality Act’ (Ley de
Punto Final). This established a deadline of 60 days for commencing new criminal
investigations with regard to the events of the so-called ‘‘Dirty War’’. This deadline
expired on 22 February 1987. On 8 June 1987, Law No. 23,521, Parliament then
adopted a law known as the Due Obedience’ Act (Ley de Obediencia Debida),
introducing an irrebuttable presumption that members of the security, police and
prison services cannot be punished for such crimes if committed in due obedience to
orders. The Act further extended protection to senior officers who did not have a
decision-making role with regard to the violations.
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5.7 Rules of Procedure and Evidence
The normally applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure 1898,351 and the Evidence Act, 1872,352 used in the 1972 Col-
laborators Order, were expressly ousted in the 1973 Act and remain
excluded after the 2009 amendments. Already back in 1974, the law
provided that these 1971 cases would receive special treatment, sub-
ject to different standards from all other criminal cases in Bangladeshi
courts. Section 19 makes it clear that the tribunal ‘‘shall not be bound
by technical rules of evidence; and it shall adopt and apply to the
greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and
may admit any evidence, including reports and photographs pub-
lished in newspapers, periodicals and magazines, films and tape-re-
cordings and other materials as may be tendered before it, which it
deems to have probative value’’. Article 19 goes on to provide for
judicial notice of ‘‘facts of common knowledge’’ and also of ‘‘official
governmental documents and reports of the United Nations and its
subsidiary agencies or other international bodies including non-
governmental organizations’’. The removal of basic common law
safeguards potentially expedites the proceedings; while this greatly
relieves the prosecution of its heavy burden, it is done at the expense
of the accused. However, in the absence of trial by a lay jury (trials
will be by professional judges), this may not be as deleterious to the
rights of the accused as would appear at first sight. The legislation
antcipates that rules of procedure and evidence will be adopted by the
judges. Processes of accountability for international crimes do require
some flexibility in the rules of procedure and evidence, but there are
limits to the concessions granted to the prosecuting authority. It is
antithetical to a presumption of innocence and fundamental princi-
ples of equality before the law and fairness of the process if extensive
concessions are deliberately introduced to facilitate the securing of
convictions. In Cambodia, the much criticised ECCC process, facing
challenges no less onerous than Bangladesh, follows rules of proce-
dure and evidence that are rooted in the applicable domestic law and
have been adapted to international practice in line with the statutory
authorisation that
[i]f these existing procedure do not deal with a particular matter, or if there is
uncertainty regarding their interpretation or application or if there is a question
351 Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 89.
352 Evidence Act, supra note 90.
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regarding their consistency with international standard, guidance may be sought in
procedural rules established at the international level.353
The judges of the ECCC are required to ‘‘exercise their jurisdiction in
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due
process of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’’.354
One of the 2009 amendments to the Bangladeshi law was that
‘‘The tribunal shall be independent in the exercise of its judicial
functions and shall ensure fair trial’’.355 In international law, ‘‘fair
trial’’ for a State that is party to the ICCPR means it must be con-
ducted in accordance with that convention, particularly Articles 9
and 14. As already noted, Bangladesh cannot raise its domestic law as
an excuse for non-compliance with binding international norms.356
Under Section 22 of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As
Amended, a Tribunal may regulate its ‘‘own procedure’’, although
subject to provisions in the act itself. There will obviously have to be
extensive rules of procedure and evidence adopted in order to regu-
late the proceedings to ensure fair trial with due process.357 But, what
currently regulates how the investigations are conducted if the
Criminal Procedure Code,358 and the Evidence Act359 regulating
investigations and evidence gathering are ousted, there are no court-
adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and rudimentary (and
unsatisfactory) provisions in the law itself? Matters of investigation,
coercive measures, arrest, detention, surrender and extradition, etc.
353 Law on ECCC, supra note 174, art 33. See also Internal Rules, Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia [Rev. 3], available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh
(Mar. 3, 2009) (ECCC Internal Rules’).
354 Law on ECCC, supra note 174, art 33.
355 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, supra note 79, Sec-
tion 2(A) (newly added provision).
356 VCLT, supra note 132, art 27 (‘‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’’) See also the sources
quoted in supra note 148 for the rule as a general principle of international law.
357 See e.g., ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 353; Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence (Amended) (10 June 2009), Special Trib. For Lebanon, STL/BD/2009/01/Rev.
1 (2009); Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Amended on 27 May 2008), Special Ct.
for Sierra Leone (2008); Transitional Code of Criminal Procedure, U.N.Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/30 (E. Timor) [hereinafter East Timor Transitional Code of
Criminal Procedure].
358 Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 89.
359 Evidence Act, supra note 90.
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surely fall outside of the ‘‘own procedure’’ of the tribunal, these are
not matters for the judges to regulate. The pre-trial phase is especially
worrying given the reputation of the Bangladeshi police.360 The
judges at the ICTY were granted specific powers to go outside the
court-room: Article 15 of the Statute provided that ‘‘[t]he judges of
the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and evi-
dence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials
and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and
witnesses and other appropriate matters.’’ The Cambodian law has
been examined already. Even if one were to take an exceptionally
liberal interpretation of ‘‘own procedure’’, this situation and the
paucity of the existing rules in the law itself means that in Bangla-
desh, investigations and pre-trial work cannot begin until the judges
adopt rules to regulate the work done at this stage.
5.7.1 Investigations/The Pre Trial Stage of Proceedings
Under Section 7, the government will appoint one or more persons to
conduct the prosecution before a Tribunal on such terms and con-
ditions as may be determined by the Government; and every such
person shall be deemed to be a Prosecutor for the purposes of the
Act. There will be a Chief Prosecutor. Under Section 8(1), the gov-
ernment may establish an Agency for the purposes of investigation
into crimes within the jurisdiction. Any officer belonging to the
Agency shall have the right to assist the prosecution during the trial.
Any person appointed as a Prosecutor is competent to act as an
Investigation Officer and the provisions relating to investigation shall
apply to such Prosecutor. One would assume the Prosecutors
supervise the investigations, but it is not clear from the legislation.
Section 8 provides some regulations of investigations and the pre-
trial stage of proceedings, but there are significant problems arising.
360 See United States Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Bangla-
desh, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). It details
torture, death in custody and arbitrary detention by the police, and failure to
investigate human rights violations. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Interna-
tional have also called to attention the problem of unchecked torture and extraju-
dicial executions by organs of the State, in particular the Directorate General of
Forces Intelligence (DGFI): See Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh: Stop Deny-
ing Killings and Torture, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/10/06/
bangladesh-stop-denying-killings-and-torture (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) and
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BANGLADESH: SUBMISSION TO THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC
REVIEW, 4TH SESSION OF THE UPR WORKING GROUP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL,
FEBRUARY 2009, AI Index: ASA/13/006/2008 (Sept. 1, 2008).
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Some of these are matters that the judges can deal with in their rules
of procedure and evidence, assuming they do in fact have the powers
to regulate the pre-trial phase. Provisions that are codified in the
law will bind the tribunal. In terms of domestic law, there are
problems that impact on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution (see earlier discussion). In terms of international
law, Bangladesh, as a party to the ICCPR, is obliged to follow
Article 9:361
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are estab-
lished by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons
for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release
may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is
not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.
The only provision on arrest and detention is in Section 11(5): ‘‘Any
member of a Tribunal shall have power to direct, or issue a warrant
for, the arrest of, and to commit to custody, and to authorise the
continued detention in custody of, any person charged with any crime
specified in Section 3.’’ This is problematic in terms of the ICCPR.
Charging only comes at a later stage, i.e. under Section 9(1) when the
Chief Prosecutor or Prosecutor formally lays charges, and there is no
requirement that the prosecution evidence reasonable grounds to
believe that a person has committed a crime. There is no minimum
content for the Section 11(5) warrant. There is no provision that
upon arrest, the suspect shall be informed of his or her rights, in
accordance with the law, or to be given a copy of the warrant
361 Bangladesh’s reservation on the right of an accused to be present during his or
her trial has already been discussed, and the declaration to the right to legal aid will
be addressed later.
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detailing the allegations. The conditions for depriving a person of
liberty are not set out in the law. Beyond Section 11(5), the law is
silent on the procedures for carrying out arrest or detention of a
suspect, and the period of time that the person may be deprived of
liberty. There is no provision requiring that the person be brought
‘‘promptly’’ before a judge or other officer authorised by law (the
Human Rights Committee has held in relation to Israeli preventive
detention, that ‘‘[t]he State party should ensure that no one is held for
more than 48 h without access to a lawyer’’362), or requiring regular
review of detention (which the Human Rights Committee regards as
essential).363 There is no procedure by which the person can raise
allegation of ill treatment or violations of his or her human rights by
police officers or other authorities, or the unlawfulness of his or her
detention. There are no criteria for assessing what sorts of factors
would be reasonable grounds for prolonging detention (the usual
factors to be considered would be the likelihood of flight, the risk of
tampering with evidence, the risk of threats or harm to witnesses or
danger of flight). There is nothing on the amount of time that a
person can be held in detention pending trial: the ICCPR requires
trial within ‘‘a reasonable time’’ or release, on the understanding
that pre-trial detention ‘‘should be an exception and as short as
possible’’.364
There is nothing requiring that the accused be given prompt notice
of the accusations against him. Section 9(1), which provides for the
commencement of proceedings upon the submission by the Chief
Prosecutor, or a Prosecutor authorised by the Chief Prosecutor of
formal charges, seems to be the first time that the accused is, by law,
put on notice of the accusations against him. Article 14 of the ICCPR
requires that the information about the charges be provided
‘‘promptly’’ and in detail in a language which the person understands.
Even in armed conflict, the customary rule provides that the accused
362 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Israel, – 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003).
363 Id., – 21. In General Comment 29, the Committee held that judicial determi-
nation of lawfulness of detention may never be abrogated even if there is no such
explicit stipulation in article 4 of the Covenant. This is founded on the principle that
procedural guarantees must always remain in place to protect non-derogable rights:
General Comment 29, supra note 146, –– 11, 15–16.
364 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8 on Article 9, – 13, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 130 (Jun. 30, 1982).
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is to be informed ‘‘promptly’’ of the allegations against him;365 in fact
the two protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
provide that such information must be provided ‘‘without delay’’.366
There is no provision on how long the investigators have to complete
their investigation or a maximum period of detention of the person.
Simply by way of illustration, this free hand to the State to do
whatever it wants in the matter of arrest and detention contrasts
sharply with the law of the East Timor Special Panel for Serious
Crimes. It is unusual to point to this particular process as a model of
how to do international criminal justice in a domestic court, but the
applicable law was undeniably sound on matters of arrest and
detention:
6.2 Immediately upon arrest, the suspect shall be informed by the arresting police
officers of the reasons for his or her arrest and any charges against him or her, and
shall also be informed that he or she has the following rights:
(a) the right to remain silent and not to admit guilt, and that silence will not be
interpreted as an admission;
(b) the right to contact a relative or close friend and be visited by such person;
(c) the right to contact a legal representative and communicate with him or her
confidentially;
(d) the right that a legal representative will be appointed if the suspect is unable to
pay for a lawyer;
(e) the right to be brought before an Investigating Judge within 72 h upon arrest;
(f) the right to be questioned in the presence of a legal representative, unless the
right is waived; and
(g) if the suspect is a foreign national, the right to contact diplomatic or consular
officials of his or her country.
[…]
20.6 At the conclusion of the hearing the Investigating Judge may:
(a) confirm the arrest and order the detention of the suspect;
(b) order substitute restrictive measures instead of detention, as provided in Sec-
tion 21 of the present regulation; or
(c) order the release of the suspect.
20.7 The Investigating Judge may confirm the arrest and order the detention of the
suspect when:
(a) there are reasons to believe that a crime has been committed;
365 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 359 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
366 Additional Protocol I, supra note 230, art 75(4); Additional Protocol II, supra
note 231, art 6(2).
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(b) there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the suspect was
the perpetrator; and
(c) there are reasonable grounds to believe that such detention is necessary.
20.8 Reasonable grounds for detention exist when:
(a) there are reasons to believe that the suspect will flee to avoid criminal pro-
ceedings;
(b) there is the risk that evidence may be tainted, lost, destroyed or falsified;
(c) there are reasons to believe that witnesses or victims may be pressured,
manipulated or their safety endangered; or
(d) there are reasons to believe that the suspect will continue to commit offences
or poses a danger to public safety or security.
20.9 The Investigating Judge shall review the detention of a suspect every thirty
(30) days and issue orders for the further detention, substitute restrictive measures or
for the release of the suspect.367
People are most vulnerable to abuse when they are first taken into
custody. The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended
contains no prohibition of incommunicado detention, nor torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, nor is there an express pro-
hibition on the use of any evidence obtained under such conditions.
While these critical pre-trial matters are not provided for, the
recording of confessions by a magistrate is envisaged in Section 14.
This framework suggests a system that will actively promote the
practice of obtaining confessions, and reliance on them. The provision
contains a sort-of safeguard that comes far too late in the process:
The Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the accused
person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so it
may be used as evidence against him and no Magistrate shall record any such
confession unless, upon questioning the accused making it, he has reason to believe
that it was made voluntarily.368
It is not accompanied by a provision allowing the Magistrate to
investigate or prefer charges should it appear that the confession was
coerced. As a State party to the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Bangladesh can under no circumstances allow statements which have
367 East Timor Transitional Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 357.
368 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, supra note 79, Section 14.
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been made as a result of prohibited acts to be used as evidence in
proceedings against the person who made the confession.369 It is
required to ensure prompt, impartial and full investigations into all
complaints, plus accountability. No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as
a justification of torture, under Article 2(2).
Common law jurisdictions have always placed importance on the
right to silence at all stages of the criminal justice process (even if the
exact scope of that right is controversial), and international human
rights law emphasises the presumption of innocence and protection of
the suspect against self-incrimination. Article 14(2) of the ICCPR
states that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
Article 14(3)(g) provides that in the determination of any criminal
charges against him, everyone shall be entitled to, inter alia, the
minimum guarantee, in full equality of not being compelled to testify
against himself or to confess guilt. In 2008, the Human Rights
Committee asked France to ensure that ‘‘[a]nyone arrested on a
criminal charge should be informed of the right to remain silent
during police questioning, in accordance with article 14, paragraph 3
(g), of the Covenant.’’370 All of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC explicitly
recognise the right to silence, already at the investigation stage; the
ICC Statute goes the furthest in stating that silence cannot be used as
‘‘a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence’’.371
Having defence counsel present during pre-trial custodial questioning
is critical in order to protect these rights at a time when the person is
at greatest risk of intimidation and physical ill-treatment.372 In its
369 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading
Treatment Or Punishment, art 15, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force Jun. 26, 1987, Bangladesh acceded on Oct. 5,1998).
370 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observation of the Human Rights
Committee – France, – 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (Jul. 31, 2008).
371 ICC Statute, supra note 98, art 67.
372 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture recommends that the
right of access to a lawyer is guaranteed from the very outset of police custody. See
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Second General Report on the CPT’s Activities covering the
Period 1 January to 31 December 1991, – 36, Doc. CPT/Inf(82)3[EN] (Apr. 13,1992);
Reiterated in European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, The CPT Standards: ‘‘Substantive’’ Sections of
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General Comment No. 2, the Committee against Torture, which
monitors compliance with the Convention against Torture, Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, has stressed that the right of
detainees promptly to receive independent legal assistance is one of
the basic guarantees against torture and ill-treatment of persons
deprived of their liberty.373 It is one of the fundamental safeguards
against such acts. International documents of the ‘‘soft law’’ variety
also stress the significance of counsel and prescribe some time-
frames.374
The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended contains
no provision affirming the right to have counsel during the critical
pre-trial phase. As such, it does not require that the suspect be ad-
vised of his rights on being deprived of his liberty, including the right
not to answer questions without defence counsel present. It contains
no provision prohibiting questioning of the person in the absence of a
defence counsel, if he opts to have such a counsel present. There is a
provision, in Section 12, allowing for the Tribunal, ‘‘at any stage of
the case’’ to appoint counsel for an unrepresented accused. This is not
a right to counsel, it is a discretionary power of the court (the pro-
vision says the Tribunal ‘‘may’’ take such steps). And, there is no
Footnote 372 continued
the CPT’s General Reports, – 36, Doc CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1, Rev. 2006 (Oct. 2006).
In November 2008, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
held that under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, access to
a lawyer should be provided from the very first interrogation of a suspect by the
police. That may be subject to exception but not when it unduly prejudices the rights
of the accused under Article 6. ‘‘The rights of the defence will in principle be irre-
trievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation
without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.’’ See Salduz v. Turkey, App No.
36391/02 ECHR, – 55 (Nov. 27, 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
373 Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2: Implementation of article 2
by States Parties, – 11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP. 1/Rev.4 (Jan. 24, 2008).
374 Principle 15 of the non-binding Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment recommends that access to
legal representationmust be given in ‘‘a matter of days’’. See Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res.
43/173,Annex,U.N.GAOR43thSess. Supp. (No. 49) at 298,U.N.Doc.A/43/49 (Dec.
9, 1988).Principle 7 of the also non-binding Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers is
more specific, specifying 48 h as the time limit for providing a person with access to
legal counsel. See Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27
August to 7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990).
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provision for hearing an application from a detained person on this
matter of legal counsel, nor is there any requirement on the investi-
gators to inform the person that there is a possibility of legal counsel
being assigned. Also, there is no provision affirming the right of the
accused to communicate freely with counsel, or to be given ‘‘sufficient
time and resources’’ to prepare his defence.
In the absence of any right to the assistance of legal counsel at the
investigative/pre-trial stage, Sections 8(4)–(5) create obvious problems
with the presumption of innocence and the right to silence, specifically
its component protecting a person from self-incrimination:
(4) Any Investigation Officer making an investigation under this Act may examine orally
any person who appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
(5) Such person shall be bound to answer all questions put to him by an Investigation
Officer and shall not be excused from answering any question on the ground that the
answer to such question will criminate, or may tend directly or indirectly to crimi-
nate, such person: Provided that no such answer, which a person shall be compelled
to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in
any criminal proceeding.375
Any witness is going to be at risk by the following provision:
18. A witness shall not be excused from answering any question put to him on the
ground that the answer to such question will criminate or may tend directly or
indirectly to criminate such witness, or that it will expose or tend directly or indi-
rectly to expose such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind: Provided that no
such answer which a witness shall be compelled to give shall subject him to any arrest
or prosecution or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding, except a
prosecution for giving false evidence.376
There are other problems, such as Section 8(6), allowing the Inves-
tigating Officer to ‘‘reduce into writing any statement made to him in
the course of examination’’, which does not require verification by an
accused or his/her counsel.
5.7.2 Commencement of Proceedings, Including Trial Procedures
The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended provides
for the commencement of proceedings in Section 9 and the basic
order of proceedings in Section 10, which is standard common law.
Importantly, it allows the defence to cross-examine witnesses. The
375 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, supra note 79, Sec-
tions 8(4)–(5) (emphasis added).
376 Id., Sections 8(4)–(5) (emphasis added).
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proceedings will be in public, unless the court sees fit to hold pro-
ceedings in camera. The proceedings before a Tribunal shall com-
mence upon the submission by the Chief Prosecutor, or a Prosecutor
authorised by the Chief Prosecutor, of formal charges of crimes al-
leged to have been committed by each of the accused persons. The
procedure for trial allows for the charges to be read,377 taking of the
plea, opening statements, examination in chief followed by cross
examination followed by re examination, etc. It is only at this stage
that the accused, who will probably have already been in custody for
some indeterminate period of time, and interrogated without a lawyer
present, gets notice of the matter with which he is charged (Section 16
provides for ‘‘particulars of the alleged crime as are reasonably suf-
ficient to give the accused person notice of the matter with which he is
charged’’). As already noted, the ICCPR requires that notice of the
charges must be provided ‘‘in detail’’.
In what is probably a touch of the civil lawyers who advised the
government at the time, there is a provision that the Tribunal
may, in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts, ask any witness any
question it pleases, in any form and at any time about any fact; and may order
production of any document or thing or summon any witness, and neither the
prosecution nor the defence shall be entitled either to make any objection to any such
question or order or, without the leave of the Tribunal, to cross-examine any witness
upon any answer given in reply to any such question.378
There are rules governing evidence in Section 19:
(1) A Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence; and it shall adopt
and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical pro-
cedure, and may admit any evidence, including reports and photographs
published in newspapers, periodicals and magazines, films and tape-recordings
377 The requirements of the charge are set out in Section 16:
(1) Every charge against an accused person shall state: (a) the name and
particulars of the accused person; (b) the crime of which the accused person is
charged; (c) such particulars of the alleged crime as are reasonably sufficient to
give the accused person notice of the matter with which he is charged. (2) A
copy of the formal charge and a copy of each of the documents lodged with the
formal charge shall be furnished to the accused person at a reasonable time
before the trial; and in case of any difficulty in furnishing copies of the doc-
uments, reasonable opportunity for inspection shall be given to the accused
person in such manner as the Tribunal may decide.
378 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, supra note 79,
Section 10(h).
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and other materials as may be tendered before it, which it deems to have
probative value.
(2) A Tribunal may receive in evidence any statement recorded by a Magistrate or
an Investigation Officer being a statement made by any person who, at the time
of the trial, is dead or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount
of delay or expense which the Tribunal considers unreasonable.
(3) A Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take
judicial notice thereof.
(4) A Tribunal shall take judicial notice of official governmental documents and
reports of the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies or other international
bodies including non-governmental organisations.379
The closest that come to disclosure rules are the following provisions
in Section 9:
(3) The Chief Prosecutor shall, at least three weeks before the commencement of
the trial, furnish to the Tribunal a list of witnesses intended to be produced
along with the recorded statement of such witnesses or copies thereof and
copies of documents which the prosecution intends to rely upon in support of
such charges.
(4) The submission of a list of witnesses and documents under Sub-section (3) shall
not preclude the prosecution from calling, with the permission of the Tribunal,
additional witnesses or tendering any further evidence at any stage of the trial:
Provided that notice shall be given to the defence of the additional witnesses
intended to be called or additional evidence sought to be tendered by the
prosecution.
(5) A list of witnesses for the defence, if any, along with the documents or copies
thereof, which the defence intends to rely upon, shall be furnished to the Tri-
bunal and the prosecution at the time of the commencement of the trial.
Three weeks before the start of trial is hardly sufficient time to pre-
pare the defence against charges of the kind covered in the Interna-
tional Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended.
The powers of the tribunal are laid out in Section 11:
(1) A Tribunal shall have power: (a) to summon witnesses to the trial and to
require their attendance and testimony and to put questions to them; (b) to
administer oaths to witnesses; (c) to require the production of document and
other evidentiary material; (d) to appoint persons for carrying out any task
designated by the Tribunal.
(2) For the purpose of enabling any accused person to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him, a Tribunal may, at any stage of the trial
without previously warning the accused person, put such questions to him as
the Tribunal considers necessary: Provided that the accused person shall not
379 Id., Section 11.
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render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions or by
giving false answers to them; but the Tribunal may draw such inference from
such refusal or answers as it thinks just;
(3) A Tribunal shall: (a) confine the trial to an expeditious hearing of the issues
raised by the charges; (b) take measures to prevent any action which may cause
unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements.
(4) A Tribunal may punish any person, who obstructs or abuses its process or
disobeys any of its orders or directions, or does anything which tends to pre-
judice the case of a party before it, or tends to bring it or any of its members
into hatred or contempt, or does anything which constitutes contempt of the
Tribunal, with simple imprisonment which may extend to 1 year, or with fine
which may extend to Taka five thousand, or with both.
(5) Any member of a Tribunal shall have power to direct, or issue a warrant for,
the arrest of, and to commit to custody, and to authorise the continued
detention in custody of, any person charged with any crime specified in
Section 3.
(6) The Chairman of a Tribunal may make such administrative arrangements as he
considers necessary for the performance of the functions of the Tribunal under
this Act.380
Article 11(2) is remarkable. It appears to discard the traditional
common law right to silence as well as the protection against self-
incrimination, and codifies trial-by-ambush in the form of surprise
judicial questioning:
For the purpose of enabling any accused person to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him, a Tribunal may, at any stage of the trial
without previously warning the accused person, put such questions to him as the
Tribunal considers necessary: Provided that the accused person shall not render
himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions or by giving false
answers to them; but the Tribunal may draw such inference from such refusal or
answers as it thinks just.381
This is a provision that must not be allowed to stand.
The standard of proof in these proceedings is not stated. In its
General Comment No. 13, the Human Rights Committee interpreted
Article 14 to mean that ‘‘by reason of the presumption of innocence,
the burden of proof of the charge is on the prosecution and the
accused has the benefit of the doubt. No guilt can be presumed until
380 Id., Section 11.
381 Id., Section 11(2).
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the charge has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’’382 This
must be the applicable standard in the Bangladeshi process.
5.7.3 Victims and Witnesses
The wounds are still very raw in Bangladesh. Victims can be heard
complaining that there is more concern shown about the rights of an
accused than their rights. But this overlooks the fact that the whole
effort to bring to account alleged criminals is about using the criminal
process to bring justice to the victims and restore equilibrium in
society. If the victims want to have a criminal justice process, they
have to accept that central in that is the right of an accused person to
a fair trial with due process before an independent and impartial
tribunal. That is non-negotiable, no matter how much the victims
have been through. It is only that kind of proceeding that is worthy of
hearing the sorts of atrocity allegations that are made in Bangladesh
about the 1971 war. A conviction in a kangaroo court is of no value
whatsoever; thankfully, that does not seem to be what is being at-
tempted in Bangladesh. It is another reason why Bangladesh needs to
bring its 1973 Act up to the modern day and age. Today, victims are
recognised as legitimate stakeholders in international legal proceed-
ings, not just commodities to be used by prosecution and defence
(which continues to be the case in the common law system, which is
what Bangladesh is following). But, as with most things, there is a
difficult balance to be struck. One can use an example from Cam-
bodia. After heavy lobbying from victims groups and NGOs, there is
now disturbing distortion of the criminal justice process with exces-
sive participation by the civil parties in the proceedings, to the extent
that the presumption of innocence and the level playing field between
prosecutor and defence are seriously impaired. One can expect, if
there is a conviction, that Duch383 will appeal on the ground of
violation of basic human rights standards because the excessive and
inappropriate involvement of the civil parties in the proceedings
impacted on the accused’s right to a fair trial and due process.
The only protective provision in the International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act As Amended is in Section 10(4), under which ‘‘the
Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, take proceedings in camera’’. Beyond
this, there is nothing on witness protection or support. There seems to
382 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13: Article 14, U.N. Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.6 at 135 (Apr. 13, 1984).
383 This accused was the commander of the infamous S-21 torture centre in Phnom
Penh.
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be paucity across the board: a provision exists in the Prevention of
Oppression Women and Children Act 2000, which allows for there to
be provided ‘‘safe custody’’ for women and children during trial.384
Under this section, the tribunal can order that women and children
be kept outside the jail in a government approved place or under the
custody of any person or organisation the Tribunal thinks fit. The
reference to ‘‘jail’’ suggests that this is applicable only for the pro-
tection of convicted persons. The paucity of witness protection and
support in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, even after the
2009 amendment, is even worse than that which was in the equivalent
Indonesian legislation governing the East Timor trials at the ad hoc
Court for Human Rights Violations in East Timor: Article 34 of the
Law on Human Rights Courts provided that victims and witnesses of
gross violations of human rights had ‘‘the right to physical and
mental protection from threats, harassment, terror, and violence by
any party whosoever’’ and that such protection is ‘‘an obligatory duty
of the law enforcement and security apparatus provided free of
charge’’.385 A government regulation on witness protection in cases
before the human rights courts was rushed through as the first of the
East Timor trials was beginning. There were just three options for
protection in Section 4 of the regulation: protection of the victim or
witness’ personal security from physical or mental threats; confi-
dentiality of the identity of the victim or witness; testifying to the
court out of the presence of the accused. While this was the first
witness protection measure as such, it was clearly not the specialised
witness protection regime that was needed, leading to atrocious
handling of victims and witnesses during the trials. This must not
happen in Bangladesh.
There is now a wealth of international experience, culminating in
the exceptionally complex and demanding regime of the ICC, that
should be drawn on in order to ensure that witnesses and victims in
Bangladesh are properly supported, and protected as necessary, at all
stages of the proceedings. Of course, it is unrealistic to expect Ban-
gladesh to cope with the heavy witness protection obligations that
apply at the ICC. But, it cannot proceed to trial on the basis of the
current state of the law. A realistic yet principled balance has to be
struck, which takes into consideration what is actually possible in the
circumstances of Bangladesh. Particular concerns arise in relation to
384 Prevention of Oppression of Women and Children Act 2000, Act VIII of 2000,
Section 31 (Bangl.).
385 See Linton, supra note 88 and Linton, supra note 151.
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the handling of sexual offences, which are said to have been partic-
ularly rampant during the war. Firstly, this is a Moslem society, and
much of the recent developments in this area are based on Western
victim-restoration notions about the importance of victims speaking
out about their experiences; this does not necessarily translate well to
countries such as Bangladesh. Secondly, this is a common law juris-
diction, and the witness is a commodity of the parties and the court-
room experience can be particularly traumatic. Let us take the
example of someone accused of the abduction and unlawful detention
of women on a military base where they were used as sex slaves. The
prosecution team find a survivor. She will firstly be questioned by
investigators. Are they trained in gender sensitivity and the investi-
gation of crimes of sexual violence? What kind of care or support is
she given? What about protecting her identity, or other forms of
personal protection if there are legitimate concerns about her safety?
She is then brought to court to testify. Apart from ‘‘in camera’’
proceedings, what other protections can the court afford her? Will
there be any expunging of names and identifying information from
the documents, or non-disclosure to the public of records identifying
the victim, or provision for her to testify through image or voice
altering devices or closed-circuit television, or the assignment of a
pseudonym so her real name is not revealed? If she had a child born of
rape, how will that the identity of that child, now an adult, be pro-
tected? Will the court be able to provide psycho-social support as she
goes through the trauma of recounting events she has probably
locked away in the dark recesses of her mind for 39 years? And what
of her family, how will they be supported through this process? How
will the court regulate the questioning of the victim in the court room?
Will there be any protections in the courtroom, such as are provided
at the ICTY, where Rule 96 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provides that (a) there is not need for no corroboration of
evidence given by victims of sexual violence (b) the manifestation of
consent cannot be invoked as any form of captivity vitiates consent
(c) the defence must satisfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the
evidence of consent is relevant and credible, and (d) the prior sexual
conduct of the victim cannot be permitted as evidence. Who and what
are to protect the victim from rigorous cross-examination by a
defence counsel who believes he is just doing his job of defending his
client? When it is all over, what after-care and support is provided to
the victim, who may suffer re-traumatisation as a result of reliving the
terrible experiences? What kind of protection will be provided to her,
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against retaliatory attacks? What kind of remedy will be made
available to her, whether or not a conviction results? These are issues
that seem not to have been considered in Bangladesh.
5.7.4 Suggestions for Content of Rules of Procedure and Evidence
There are basic issues that cut across all processes of accountability
that have been conducted since the rudimentary nature of the pro-
ceedings at Nuremberg. In addition to the issues that I have raised in
this paper, the following need to be addressed:
• Procedure on a guilty plea.
• Interlocutory applications.
• Evidence: for example, burden and standard of proof, disclosure
(including of exculpatory evidence), admissibility and evaluation of
evidence, means of proof, written or oral, rules for particular
witnesses (e.g. ICRC, journalists, experts, amicus curiae, etc.).
• Special issues arising from multiple accused trials, including joint
charging.
• Indictments: cumulative or consecutive charging.
• Deliberation, the making of decisions and judgements (unanimity
or majority), cumulative or consecutive convictions, dissent, etc.
• Sentencing considerations, especially the sentencing practice in
Bangladesh.
• Role of victims, victims rights, victim and witness support and
protection.
• Reparations (although the scale of the harms suffered means that
there really should be a national scheme for reparations, rather
than individualised reparations for the lucky’ ones whose cases get
heard).
The procedural rules for the ECCC, Special Tribunal for Leba-
non, War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor should be
particularly closely – and critically – consulted, as they are closer to
the circumstances of Bangladesh than the ICC, Special Court for
Sierra Leone, ICTY and ICTR.
5.8 Appeal
Appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is only
possible, under Section 21 as amended in 2009, in relation to con-
victions, sentence or acquittals.
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Article 24 provides that no order, judgement or sentence of a
Tribunal shall be called in question in any manner whatsoever in or
before any Court or other authority in any legal proceedings what-
soever except in the manner provided in Section 21. This supplements
the constitutional ban on challenging the law and its provisions on
the grounds of constitutionality, and blocks off any form of challenge
to anything other than the ultimate decision taken by the trial
chamber. There can, for example, be no challenges arguing unlaw-
fulness of arrest or detention, violation of defence rights in the trial
proceedings, or impartiality of the judges. This is a major human
rights concern.
5.9 Remedies
There is nothing on remedies in the International Crimes (Tribunals)
Act As Amended, although a liberal interpretation of the power of
the court to impose ‘‘such other punishment proportionate to the
gravity of the crime as appears to the Tribunal to be just and proper’’
may allow reparations orders to be made. Whether there is any
compensation to actually come is another matter.
In general Bangladeshi law, there are no specific provisions pro-
viding civil remedies for victims of crime. But the issue of compen-
sation is covered in Section 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
according to which a court can award compensation out of the fines
ordered against convicted persons. This provision is applicable at
every stage of the suit. There is also provision for fines from
‘‘inheritable property in future’’ under the Prevention of Oppression
of Women and Children Act 2000: the Tribunal may consider
imposing a fine for the benefit of the victim in circumstances
where the fine cannot be realized from the convict or from his existing property, it
can be realized from the property of which he will be the owner or in possession in
future and the claim of such fine or damage shall prevail over any other claim on that
property.386
There is no national programme of reparations for the victims and
survivors of 1971, whether compensatory or symbolic. These national
programmes of reparation are devices for assisting in the wider social
recovery of a society. The position of Bangladesh can be seen in the
following. In acceding to the Convention against Torture and Other
386 Prevention of Oppression of Women and Children Act 2000, supra note 384,
Section 15.
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Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Bangladesh
entered a declaration to Article 14 on the provision of redress to
victims of torture.387 Article 14(1) provides that
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation
including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of
the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to com-
pensation.
Bangladesh’s declaration was that it would apply the provision ‘‘in
consonance with the existing laws and legislation in the country.’’388
There have been objections to this declaration from Germany (on
grounds that this is a reservation of a general nature raising doubts as
to the commitment of Bangladesh to the object and purpose of the
treaty)389 and The Netherlands (on grounds that this reservation
raises doubts as to the commitment of Bangladesh to the object and
purpose of the treaty).390 Neither declares the declaration to be
contrary to the object and purpose of the convention.
There is no remedy for miscarriage of justice under the Interna-
tional Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended, ‘‘provided the govern-
ment acted in good faith pursuant to the act’’.391 Compensation for
miscarriage of justice is a matter on which Bangladesh has entered a
reservation to Article 14 of the ICCPR.
The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, notwithstanding its
acceptance of the principle of compensation for miscarriage of justice, as stipulated
in Article 14, paragraph 6, is not in a position to guarantee a comprehensive
implementation of this provision for the time being. However, the aggrieved has the
right to realise compensation for miscarriage of justice by separate proceedings and
in some cases, the court suo moto grants compensation to victims of miscarriage of
387 See Bangladesh’s Declaration to the Convention Against Torture, hhttp://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4
&lang=en (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
388 Id.
389 See Communication from Germany (Dec. 17, 1999), http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#14
(last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
390 See Communication from the Netherlands (Dec. 20, 1999), http://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang
=en#14 (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
391 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, supra note 79, Sec-
tion 25.
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justice. Bangladesh, however, intends to ensure full implementation of this provision
in the near future.392
5.10 Death Penalty
Section 20, providing for the death penalty or ‘‘other such punish-
ment proportionate to the gravity of the crime as appears to the
Tribunal to be just and proper’’, is retained.
There is no prohibition against the death penalty in international
law as yet, but many commentators have observed a clear evolution
in the law tending towards outlawing of this penalty.393 Iraq also kept
the death penalty, and the notorious trial of Saddam Hussein came to
an even more ignominious end with his grotesquely botched execu-
tion. The death penalty was used in the post World War II trials and
on Eichmann, but outside of Iraq, has not been used since in modern
international justice proceedings, whether the ICTY, ICTR, Special
Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, ECCC, SCSL or the Special
Court for Lebanon. The Human Rights Committee has urged States
parties to the ICCPR to move towards abolition; in the event that
they continue to retain the death penalty, the procedural guarantees
of the ICCPR ‘‘must be observed, including the right to a fair hearing
by an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the min-
imum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review by a higher
tribunal’’. The Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review
examining Bangladesh’s report ‘‘strongly’’ encouraged Bangladesh to
abolish the death penalty, and pending that, to adopt a moratorium
on executions. It was also recommended that Bangladesh should
consider ‘‘amending their legislation on the death penalty in order to
restrict its scope and adjust it to the international minimum standards
on the death penalty…’’394 Other legislation in Bangladesh, for
example the Prevention of Oppression Against Women and Children
Act 2000, follow the Code of Criminal Procedure’s Section 374 which
392 See Bangladesh’s Reservation to the ICCPR, supra note 154.
393 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1, 5–6 (2002).
394 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Bangladesh, – 94, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/18 (Mar. 3, 2009); Implementation
of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death
Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, annex, U.N. ESCOR 1984 Supp. (No. 1) at 33, U.N.
Doc. E/1984/84 (May 25, 1984).
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requires that a death sentence shall not be executed unless it is con-
firmed by the High Court Division. Yet, there is no mandatory review
under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended, even
though it was just amended in 2009. Given what has been discussed in
the preceding pages about the process of accountability in Bangla-
desh, there is much reason for grave concern.
VI CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The domestic court is always the place where accountability should
start. It was remarkable and admirable that Bangladesh, with the
support of its friends abroad, adopted this important legislation back
in 1973. No one denies that Bangladesh, as the territorial State, has
the primary right to take jurisdiction. It is right and proper, and
Bangladesh is to be applauded for doing so.
But there seems to be an unwillingness, perhaps inability, to
comprehend exactly how enormous and complicated the task of
investigating, prosecuting and punishing such cases is. Efforts of
international specialists to facilitate essential training of personnel, in
advance of the project’s start-up, have been unsuccessful; official
thinking seems to be that preparation of personnel for the task at
hand is not really needed and will just slow a straight-forward process
down. After so many years of accountability being put into a deep
freeze, people are understandably anxious to seize the moment and
forestall any backsliding. There is a clear lack of awareness about
how long it takes to prepare for such proceedings, and how long these
trials take. There is, however, a disturbing ease with which legitimate
concerns about the capacity to guarantee fair trial and due process,
including the political targeting of one group’s enemies, are brushed
aside. The reasons for insisting on fair trial and due process do not
really seem to be appreciated, leading to a misperception among some
that the war criminals’ count more than victims and that to insist on
adequate standards is to support the war criminals’. A well-inten-
tioned paper such as I have written is going to be viewed in these
quarters as unhelpful, anti-victim and anti-accountability for point-
ing out various flaws and complexities that need to be addressed
before the process actually begins. Many seem to think that it is just a
matter of touching up the law, setting aside something in the budget,
appointing the staff and getting going with the job of convicting the
persons who are, incidentally, already convicted in much of the public
mind. It is not.
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The complications exposed in this study of the Bangladeshi leg-
islation reveal just how complex the legal challenges on their own are.
Most of these do requiring fixing before the process begins. Then
there are all the practical and procedural problems that are inherent
in any project to bring accountability for international crimes,
let alone in a developing country with a UNDP Human Development
Index ranking of 147 out of 179 (2008)395 and 39 years after the
event. Some of these can also still be addressed, such as through
advance specialised training of the personnel to be involved, and the
adoption of workable and adequate rules of procedure and evidence.
It is, of course, not a matter of importing in the provisions of the ICC
Statute, for East Timor has shown how ridiculous it is to expect a
dysfunctional domestic system in one of the world’s most devastated
and impoverished countries to be able to cope with the gold standard
established for an international criminal court. Here, it seems to be a
matter of making the process in Bangladesh meet basic, not five star,
international standards. If the consistent reports of international
observers about the state of the criminal justice system in Bangladesh
are indeed reliable, there is reason to be concerned about the ability
of the underlying system to cope with this monumental exercise in
overdue accountability as a 100% domestic process.396 We have the
395 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Indices: A
statistical update 2008 – HDI rankings, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (last visited
Aug. 9, 2009).
396 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights
defenders and the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
expressed concerns about threats and attacks against the judiciary in Bangladesh;
there are concerns about targeting the judiciary to apply Islamic laws and the safety
of judges and lawyers and their freedom to carry out their legal work without
pressure, threats or interference. See Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, In Accordance with Par-
agraph 15(B) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Bangladesh, –
22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/BGD/2 (Dec. 12, 2008).
The United States Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report on Bangladesh
details torture, death in custody and arbitrary detention by the police, and failure to
investigate human rights violations. It details severe delays impacting on the right to
expeditious trial. In relation to the courts, it is alleged that corruption, judicial ineffi-
ciency, lack of resources, and a large case backlog remained serious problems, trials are
typically marked by extended continuances, effectively preventing many from
obtaining a fair trial due to witness tampering, victim intimidation, and
missing evidence. Human rights observers contended that magistrates, attor-
neys, and court officials demanded bribes from defendants in a majority of the
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precedents of Ethiopia, East Timor, Indonesia, Iraq and Cambodia,
all also burdened by weak criminal justice systems but proceeding
with accountability for international crimes, to stand as cautionary
tales for Bangladesh as it tries to do it alone. There are salutary
lessons for Bangladesh from Rwanda’s brave effort to develop its
own process of legal accountability in prosecuting the crimes of the
1994 genocide in its domestic courts, efforts that ultimately failed and
led the government to develop parallel forms of justice through
gacaca courts. The 2009 addition to the Bangladeshi 1973 law stating
that ‘‘The tribunal shall be independent in the exercise of its judicial
functions and shall ensure fair trial’’397 are just fine words of the kind
that already exist in the Constitution. Much more is needed.
International crimes of the utmost seriousness were committed in
Bangladesh in 1971, and the way that these are handled is of legiti-
mate concern to the international community. Now that a political
space has opened and accountability is coming out of the deep-freeze,
the international community needs to become engaged in assisting to
make this a worthy process that can bring Bangladeshis the justice
that is due to them, 37 years after they first started the effort. Com-
pleting the circle is a task that cannot be done by Bangladesh on its
own.
Footnote 396 continued
cases filed under the Special Powers Act’’…‘‘The prison system remained abysmal
due to overcrowding, inadequate facilities, and the lack of proper sanitation (see
U.S. Department of States, supra note 360).
See also Amnesty International, supra note 360, at 5–6 (Detailing problems of
incommunicado detention, torture and other ill-treatment; it has also detailed unfair
trials) and Human Rights Watch, supra note 360 (calling to attention the problem of
unchecked torture and extrajudicial executions by organs of the State, in particular
the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI)).
See also Asian Human Rights Commission, Special Report: Lawless Law-Enforce-
ment & the Parody of Judiciary in Bangladesh, August 2006, and Md. Ashrafuzz-
aman, The Disposable Prosecutors of Bangladesh, http://www.article2.org/mainfile.
php/0701/309/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
397 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 As Amended, supra note 79, Sec-
tion 2(A) (newly added provision).
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